



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

Harvard College Library



FROM THE FUND

FOR A

**PROFESSORSHIP OF
LATIN-AMERICAN HISTORY AND
ECONOMICS**

ESTABLISHED 1913



**THE INDEPENDENCE OF
THE SOUTH AMERICAN REPUBLICS**

Other Books by the Same Author :

THE LAST AMERICAN FRONTIER (1910)

THE CIVIL WAR (1911)

THE NEW NATION (1915)

GUIDE TO THE MATERIALS IN LONDON
ARCHIVES FOR THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES SINCE 1783 (1914,
with C. O. Paullin)

6

The Independence of The South American Republics

A STUDY IN
RECOGNITION AND FOREIGN POLICY

Second Edition

BY

FREDERIC L. PAXSON

Professor of American History in the University of Wisconsin and sometime
Harrison Fellow in the University of Pennsylvania

Philadelphia

FERRIS & LEACH

29 South Seventh Street

1916

SA 489.03.2

~~18~~

HARVARD COLLEGE LIBRARY
LATIN-AMERICAN
PROFESSORSHIP FUND

June 14, 1923. =

Copyright, 1903, by
FREDERIC L. PAXSON

PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION

In the twelve years that have elapsed since this book appeared, it has been in demand so continuously that a revision and reprinting are necessary. New materials on recognition have appeared, while guides prepared under the direction of the Carnegie Institution have opened up the archives of London, Madrid, Mexico and Washington as never before. I have not re-written the text, but I have revised and re-arranged the notes for this edition, and I have added to the notes references to the more important new materials. Both recognition and neutrality, its parent, have acquired new precedents since 1903; and in the cases of the Panama Republic and the War of 1914 it has again been made clear that international law advances most rapidly in the hands of disinterested nations.

FREDERIC L. PAXSON.

Madison, Wis., February, 1916.

PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION

The great subject of South American history has been so little exploited that it must be approached with modesty and care, for it is not to be expected that initial studies will, either in breadth or in intensity, reach its confines. Its bibliography has not been worked out. Facts of biography are difficult to

obtain, and materials relating to it have not yet been systematically collected or sifted.

Yet, if the character of the South American republics is to be understood, and if they are to be dealt with by the other nations of the world in a rational and honest manner, it is necessary that their history be narrated and considered. With their antecedents before us, certain conditions now prevalent in the Latin republics are, if not justified, at least explained. From a careful examination of these antecedents it may not be impossible to arrive at the causes of the evil conditions, which will be the first step towards correcting them.

This little book is a study in a single period and a single phase. For the greater part it is based upon unpublished original manuscript; while none of its material, printed or not, has hitherto been used to any considerable extent. Some care has been taken to make the sources here used more available for future students.

I have the honor to acknowledge my great indebtedness to my masters, Albert Bushnell Hart and John Bach McMaster, and to Hubert Hall, Pendleton King and Charles Francis Adams, who gave me their time and care that I might reach the archives in their charge.

FREDERIC L. PAXSON.

Philadelphia, June, 1903.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Doctrine of recognition	17
Neutrality in seventeenth century	18
Theory of classical writers	19
Neutrality in American revolution	20
Silas Deane and France	20
Instructions of Deane	21
American theory of recognition	22
Policy of France	23
Motive of Louis XVI, in recognition	24
The French treaties	25
French <i>intervention</i>, not <i>recognition</i>	26
The Dutch recognition	27
Mission of William Lee	28
Holland declares war on England	29
Value of French and Dutch precedents	30
The Swedish recognition	32
Recognition by Spain	33
Recognition by Prussia	34
The French revolution	35
Conduct of Gouverneur Morris	36
Attitude of British minister in Paris	36
Morris remains in Paris	38
New French government and Morris	39
Distinterested situation of United States	40

8 *South American Independence*

Washington recognizes the French government	41
War between England and France	41
The proclamation of neutrality, April 22nd, 1793.....	42
Influence of American precedents	43

✓ CHAPTER I

The South American Wars of Liberation

Spanish colonial system	44
Colonial population	45
San Martin, Bolivar and Miranda	46
Miranda's filibustering expedition	47
Popham's attack on Buenos Ayres	48
Whitelocke expedition fails	49
Spanish-American revolts, Buenos Ayres	50
Chile, New Granada and Venezuela	51
Growth of English trade	52
Effect of foreign commerce on South America	53
Situation of Buenos Ayres	54
Turbulence in Buenos Ayres	55
Declaration of independence	57
San Martin at Mendoza	58
Chile and the brothers Carrera	59
Growth of San Martin's army	60
He moves across at Uspallata	61
Chacabuca and Talca	62
Maypu and the independence of Chile	63
Preparations to invade Peru	63
Arrival of Lord Cochrane	64
Capture of Valdivia	66
Liberating squadron leaves Chile	67

Table of Contents

9

Pledges of San Martin	68
The Work of Arenales	68
La Serna replaces Pezuela as viceroy	69
Spanish forces evacuate Lima	70
Independence of Peru declared	71
San Martin assumes Protectorship	71
His disputes with Cochrane	72
Reinforcement and evacuation of Callao	74
San Martin goes to Guayaquil	75
Torre Tagle and Monteagudo	75
Meeting of Bolivar and San Martin	76
San Martin abdicates and retires	77
Beginning of career of Bolivar	78
Surrender of Miranda to Spain	79
Geography of Venezuela and New Granada	79
Bolivar in New Granada	80
The "War to the Death"	80
Bolivar becomes Dictator	81
Spain sends out Morillo in 1815	82
He re-takes New Granada	83
Bolivar erects capital at Angostura	84
The Foreign Legions	85
Campaign of 1819	85
Tunja and Boyaca	86
Union of Venezuela and New Granada	87
Armistice of 1820	88
Bolivar ends armistice of Truxillo	89
Constituent congress at Cucuta	89
Battle of Carabobo, June 24th, 1821	90
Capital moved to Santa Fé de Bogota	91
Meeting of liberating armies in Ecuador	92
Sucre wins at Bompono and Pichincha	92

10 *South American Independence*

The meeting at Guayaquil	93
Ecuador annexed to Colombia	94
Spanish victory at Ica	95
Revolt at Lima	96
Bolivar summoned to Peru	97
Rive-Aguero deposed	97
Bolivar enters Lima, September 1st, 1823	97
Spanish strength in Upper Peru	98
Quarrels between Olafleta and Canterac	99
Bolivar becomes Dictator of Peru	99
He marches inland	100
Spanish forces defeated at Junin	101
And at Ayacucho	102
Miller finishes work at Potosi	103
Independence of Bolivia	103
Bolivar returns to Colombia	104

✓ CHAPTER II

South American Policy of the United States

Traditional attitude of the United States	105
Sympathy with filibusters	106
Petition of the Miranda men	107
Randolph's theory of recognition	108
The Poinsett mission	109
Instructions of Poinsett	110
Other agents in South America	113
Status of the agents in South America	114
Nature of their reports	115
Mendes and Thompson in United States	116
Protests of de Onis	117

Table of Contents

11

Flaws in United States neutrality laws	118
South American privateers	119
Public opinion in 1816	120
Forsyth introduces new neutrality act	121
Further news from South America	122
Poinsett offered a second mission	123
The three commissioners sail	124
Their instructions	124
Beginning of factious opposition	127
Newspaper rumors in summer of 1817	128
Letters of "Lautaro"	128
Reply of "Phocion"	129
Attitude of Monroe and Adams	129
Nature of the opposition	130
Monroe transmits correspondence	131
Clay's great speech	132
Debate on his motion	134
Reply of Forsyth	134
Reports of South American commissioners	135
Superficial and discordant character	136
Their evidence as to political instability	136
Clay's attitude in session of 1818-1819	137
Delicate relations with Spain	138
Message of May 9th, 1820	139
Clay brings up his motion	141
It passes in the House	141
Session of 1820-1821	142
Triumph of Clay	144
Its barren nature	146
Position of Adams in the cabinet	146
His letter to Alex. H. Everett	146
Jealousy of Spain	149

Adams and the European powers	150
Adams' theory of neutrality	151
He foresees the British policy	152
Embarrassments caused by agents	153
Aguirre and the privateers	154
Devereux, Worthington and Halsey	155
Yielding policy of Monroe	156
Courts of Europe sounded	156
Action at Aix-la-Chapelle	157
American policy of inaction	158
Question of the <i>exequaturs</i>	159
Instructions of January 1st, 1819	160
Influence of the Florida negotiations	161
Recognition postponed for two years	162
Difficulties of Adams's position	162
Forbes's mission to Buenos Ayres	164
His instructions	164
Buenos Ayres in 1820	165
His treatment and attitude	166
Rivadavia, Garcia and reform	168
Victories of San Martin and Bolivar	169
Successes of 1821	169
<i>De facto</i> independence achieved	170
Adams prepares for recognition	171
Message of March 8th, 1822	172
Its calm reception	174
Attitude of the newspapers	174
Comment of the <i>Journal des Débats</i>	176
Recognition	178

Table of Contents

13

CHAPTER III

British Relations with South America

Two phases of British attitude	180
Policy after 1811	181
Liverpool ministry and commercial demands	182
Popular sympathy in Great Britain	184
Agitation for recognition begins	184
Weapons of the opposition	185
Services of British officers in South America	186
Proclamations by the Prince Regent	187
Inadequacy of neutrality laws	188
New foreign enlistment act	188
Tierney and Mackintosh oppose	190
Attitude of ministry	190
Petitions from merchants	191
Effect of the new act	192
Spain seeks intervention	193
Interests of the allied powers	193
Aix-la-Chapelle	194
The Spanish expedition of 1818-1819	195
Revolution of 1820	196
Invasion of Spain by France	196
British policy at Congress of Verona	197
Lushington and the commercial demands	198
Reports of the American commissioners	199
England and the American recognition	200
Growing importance of question with Canning	201
Zea circular	202
Renewed demands by merchants	203
And by Commons	203
Canning opposes French intervention in Spain	204

He determines to keep France out of America	205
Mission of Mackie to Mexico	206
Fall of Cadiz and action by Canning	207
Polignac-Canning conference, October 9th, 1823	208
Instructions to new consuls and commissioners	209
Special instructions for Mexico	213
Motive of Canning in sending consuls	216
Allies fail to act on South America	217
Canning's move wins	217
Speech from the Throne, February 3d, 1824	218
Sources of information on South America	219
Difficulties with Mackie in Mexico	220
Difficulties with Hervey, O'Gorman and Ward	221
The treaty of Morier and Ward	222
Hamilton and the Colombian Commission	223
Ordered to re-peruse his instructions	224
Campbell's reports	225
Parish and Buenos Ayres	225
Debate in Parliament, February, 1824	226
Polignac memorandum revealed	226
Lansdowne moves for recognition	227
Great Speech of Sir James Mackintosh, June 15th, 1824..	228
His analysis of theory of recognition	229
Reception of Parish at Buenos Ayres	232
His work satisfies Canning	233
His report of June 25th, 1824	234
Canning's instructions to Parish, August 23d, 1824	235
Parish acts slowly upon them	237
Address of the Government of Buenos Ayres to the Con- gress	239
New Fundamental Law for Buenos Ayres	241
Parish signs a treaty, February 2nd, 1825	241

Table of Contents

15

Canning determines to recognize the republics	242
Spain once more refuses mediation	243
Canning announces recognition to Spain	244
Reply of Spain	245
Reception of British recognition by Europe	247
Protest of Esterhazy, for Vienna	248
Protest of Lieven, for St. Petersburg	249
Protest of Maltzahn, for Berlin	250
Summary of British policy	251
Opening of diplomatic relations	252

INTRODUCTION

Among the doctrines of international law which can hardly be said to have existed previous to the war of the American revolution, is that of recognition.¹ It is true that in some few cases before 1776 a new State had come into existence. Thus the United Netherlands had won their independence of Spain in the sixteenth century, to have it recognized by the powers of Europe in the seventeenth; thus Switzerland had broken off from the dominions of the Hapsburgs and maintained her separate existence; thus Portugal had established itself as an independent monarchy at the expense of Spain. It is true also that in some cases a successful revolution

¹ Neither recognition nor the recognition of the South American Republics had been discussed in detail prior to the appearance of the first edition of this work in 1903, although a few paragraphs on both subjects were to be found in the standard works on international law. There had been considerable contentious writing upon the recognition of the belligerency of the Confederate States and upon the power and expediency of acknowledging the independence of Cuba. But no one seems to have connected the theory of recognition with the doctrine of neutrality, or to have dissociated it from the idea of intervention, as is done here. Recently these ideas have been made the basis of a general treatise upon the subject, drawn exclusively from printed sources and covering comprehensively the experiences of the United States. Julius Goebel, Jr., *The Recognition Policy of the United States* (Columbia University Studies, Vol. LXVI, 1915).

had erected a new and illegitimate government. In the most notable of these Cromwell had established the principle that internal changes do not affect the identity of a State, and had compelled his royal neighbors to extend to him every courtesy that the expelled Stuarts could have demanded. But in none of these cases was there a discussion of a theory of recognition by which a community of people, upon attaining a defined territory, together with an independent government, permanently organized, has a right to demand treatment as a State by the pre-existent nations of the world.

The absence of any well-developed theory of neutrality until the United States came into existence to create one, prevented the establishment of a theory of recognition, for this latter is strictly dependent upon the former. The wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were generally European in their scope. No nation strong enough to make its impartiality respected had been able to remain neutral; while the petty States, if only for the sake of protection, were forced to seek alliance with one side or another. So it happened that when new States came into existence their recognition depended solely on the physical strength of their friends. Recognition by general European treaty at the end of a general European war could have no

authority as a precedent in developing an abstract theory upon the subject.

Before a doctrine of recognition could be evolved there must be created a background of neutrality. The right of a State to participate in or abstain from a war must be freely admitted. Upon this condition alone could a newly-born State receive the theoretical treatment that would help to establish the conditions upon which such an organism has a right to be acknowledged, and would have a tendency to remove recognition from the opportunist realm of international politics to set it up as a permanent doctrine of international law.

Previous to the American revolution there were no neutrals, although there existed the foundations for a superstructure of neutrality. The classical writers on international law, from Grotius, with his idea that neutrality consists in not denying to one belligerent a right conceded to the other, to Vattel, who would not allow the neutral State to render aid to either party, all fail to understand the doctrine as it is understood to-day. The series of sixteenth and seventeenth century treaties, specifying that the contracting States shall not aid the enemy of each other in time of war, shows how far neutrality was from being looked upon as a regular and probable condition. Usage of nations as revealed by the wars

of the eighteenth century shows a general disregard of what are the commonplaces of neutral obligation to-day.

As there had been no neutrals before 1776, so in the wars of the American revolution no neutrals were created. France and Spain, during the period of their professed neutrality, were systematically rendering aid to one of the contestants. The far-famed *Armed Neutrality* of 1780 was nothing more than an alliance that introduced another party into the general war. The recognition of the independence of the United States by France was only the step that marked the advance of Louis XVI. from a state of overt hostility to one of open war.

The great aim of American diplomacy during the early years of the revolution was to secure sufficient aid from Europe to bring the war to a successful termination. France, as the hereditary enemy of England, was the first resort. Thither in the spring of 1776 Silas Deane was sent, ostensibly as an India merchant to gratify his curiosity, actually to beg Vergennes to supply arms to his country and to pledge her commerce in return. Already France was hinting that no aid could be expected of her while the colonies remained colonies, and assuring the Americans that they had "the same protection and liberty as all other English to resort to France to ex-

port thence merchandise, arms and munitions of war.”² “That as to independency,” wrote Deane to the Committee of Secret Correspondence, describing an interview with the French Minister and the words of the latter, “it was an event in the womb of time, and it would be highly improper from him to say anything on that subject until it had actually taken place.”³ Great Britain feared, as the United States hoped for, a French intervention in the war, and assisted Lord Stormont in his protests against the unfriendly acts of the French Government.

In the mind of the Americans, recognition was far from being an act of neutrality. Between it and participation on the side of England was a condition to which their commissioners were instructed to lead the powers of Europe if the latter could not be prevailed upon to take up the American cause. “You shall endeavor . . . to obtain from them a recognition of our independency and sovereignty, and to conclude treaties of peace, amity and commerce. . . . If that cannot be effected, you shall to the utmost of your power prevent their taking part with Great Britain in the war which his Britannic majesty prosecutes

²Dumas to Com. of Secret Correspondence. Francis Wharton, *The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States* (6 vols., Washington, 1889), II: 91.

³Deane to Committee, August 18, 1776. Wharton, II: 112.

“against us, or entering into offensive alliances with that king.”⁴

The value of an instance of recognition as a precedent depends upon its non-partisan character. It “is a matter, which, from its nature precludes any equivalent whatsoever;—either there is a reason for it, and it ought to be demanded as a right, or it cannot be asked for, and to grant extraordinary concessions as the price of obtaining it, is to give them merely in return for the name, and to change the substance for the shadow.”⁵ But this view of the subject had not been taken in 1776. The United States had no hesitation in offering a price for what they truly considered an effective service, though it was concealed under the name of recognition.

“As the other princes of Europe,” ran the note of the three commissioners making their seductive offer to Vergennes, “are lending or hiring their troops to Britain against America, it is apprehended that France may, if she thinks fit, afford our independent States the same kind of aid, without giving England any first cause of complaint. . . .

“North America now offers to France and Spain her amity and commerce. She is also ready to guar-

⁴Committee to Franklin, Deane, and Lee, October 16, 1776 Wharton, II: 172.

⁵Forbes to Garcia, December 6, 1824; enclosed in Parish to Planta, February 18, 1825. *Foreign Office Mss.*

“anty in the firmest manner to those nations all her present possessions in the West Indies, as well as those they shall acquire from the enemy in a war that may be consequential of such assistance as she requests. The interests of the three nations are the same. The opportunity of cementing them and of securing all the advantages of that commerce, which in time will be immense, now presents itself. If neglected, it may never again return; and we cannot help suggesting that a considerable delay may be attended with fatal consequences.”[•]

The interest of the French government in the prosperity of the American cause was slight. There was in France a popular feeling that wished the insurgents well, but the motive inspiring the ministry to action was that of hostility to England rather than anxiety for a republican member of the family of nations. Accordingly the French court resisted the popularity of Franklin and confined itself to rendering a surreptitious assistance to the rebels until the progress of the war forced upon it a change of policy. The surrender of Burgoyne was the determining event in this change.

Both Vergennes and Franklin realized the probability of British overtures for peace when the news of the surrender reached Paris on 4th December,

[•] January 5, 1777. Wharton, II: 245.

1777. The commissioners at once addressed a new demand for recognition to the French court and were accorded a meeting on 12th December. "On signifying to the ministry," they described the conference, "the importance it might be of at this juncture—when probably Britain would be making some propositions of accommodation—that the Congress should be informed explicitly what might be expected from France and Spain, M. Gerard, one of the secretaries, came yesterday to inform us, by order of the king, that after long and full consideration of our affairs and propositions in council it was decided, and his majesty was determined, to acknowledge our independence, and make a treaty with us of amity and commerce."⁷ Louis XVI. himself recorded the motive that inspired this step. He wrote to Charles III. of Spain on the 8th of January, 1778,⁸ of the policy he had followed during the three preceding years: "The destruction of the army of Burgoyne and the straitened condition of Howe have totally changed the face of things. America is triumphant, and England cast down, but the latter has still a great unbroken maritime force, and the hope of forming a beneficial alliance with her Colonies, the impossibility of their being subdued by arms

⁷ December 18, 1777. Wharton, II: 452.

⁸ Wharton, II: 467.

“being now demonstrated. All the English parties agree on this point. Lord North has himself announced, in full Parliament, a plan of pacification for the first session, and all sides are assiduously employed upon it.” Even King Louis did not yet know the extent of the “political somersault” which Lord North would turn when he introduced his measure in February. “Thus,” his letter continued, “it is the same to us whether this minister, or any other, be in power. From different motives they join against us, and do not forget our bad offices. They will fall upon us in as great strength as if the war had not existed. This being understood, and our grievances against England notorious, I have thought, after taking the advice of my council . . . and having consulted upon the propositions which the insurgents make, that it was just and necessary to begin to treat with them to prevent their reunion with the mother country.”

According to the resolution of the king “to prevent their reunion with the mother country,” treaties of alliance and commerce were signed at Paris on 6th February, 1778. In these is found the first recognition of the United States as independent. In the words of the French ambassador, as he announced these treaties to the Court of St. James, there is an insolence so colossal as to be almost admirable. “In

“making this communication to the Court of *London*, the King is firmly persuaded, that it will find in it fresh Proofs of His Majesty’s constant and sincere Dispositions for Peace; and that His *Britannic* Majesty, animated by the same Sentiments, will equally avoid every Thing that may interrupt their Harmony; and that He will take, in particular, effectual Measures to hinder the Commerce of His Majesty’s Subjects with the United States of *North America* from being disturbed, and to cause to be observed in this Respect, the Usages received between trading Nations, and the Rules that may be deemed subsisting between the Crowns of *France* and *Great Britain*.”⁹ But nothing was clearer in the minds of all concerned than that this recognition was an act of war, that the colonies, in spite of their declaration, were not in fact independent, and that it was the interest of France rather than regard for any rights of the insurgents that inspired the act. “I knew very well,” wrote a French ambassador from Madrid, a few years later, “that one could not count on the gratitude of the United States, but that, however, repeated and recent favors formed ties which it would be at least difficult to break suddenly, and especially at the very period of their enjoyment.”¹⁰

⁹ *Commons’ Journals*, XXXVI: 832.

¹⁰ Montmorin to Vergennes, March 30, 1782. He was writing of later efforts to prevent a peace. Wharton, V: 287.

The second formal recognition of the United States came from Holland, and is to be viewed less as an intervention like that of France than as an effort to get in ahead of England and secure a share of American commerce. News of the successful termination of the Yorktown campaign and of the imminence of peace negotiations had reached Holland before she could induce herself to act.

From the beginning of the war the Dutch had watched with envious eyes the breakup of the British Empire. Neutrality was their policy, enjoined upon them by many treaties with England, but an opportunity for the extension of commerce was not to be lightly disregarded. "I find they have the greatest inclination to serve us," wrote William Carmichael from Amsterdam, "and at the same time themselves, for no people see their interests clearer." But the events of the early years of the war were not such as to tempt a peace-loving nation to take up the cause of the Americans. Guided by "their fears that we shall be subdued," the Dutch avoided giving Great Britain cause for offense.¹¹

Among the peripatetic agents appointed by Congress to the courts of Europe was William Lee, who was commissioned in the summer of 1777 to Vienna

¹¹ Carmichael to Committee, November 2, 1776. Wharton, II: 185.

and Berlin.¹² Proceeding to the latter post, in spite of the protests of the Prussian minister in the fall of 1778, he was stopped by the outbreak of war between Prussia and Austria. He retired to Frankfurt to await its outcome, and there amused himself by negotiating a treaty, unauthorized on his side and unconstitutional on theirs, with the pensionary and burgomasters of Amsterdam.¹³ It was an unfortunate transaction. His fellow commissioners at Paris snubbed him well for the assumption of authority;¹⁴ and the draft of the treaty captured at a later time among the papers of Henry Laurens¹⁵ was made a *casus belli* by the English, notwithstanding every effort by the Dutch to disavow¹⁶ it. Holland, in spite of herself, was driven into the war.

"You say the Dutch are disturbed," commented John Adams upon the blustering tactics of Sir Joseph Yorke, the British Minister at Amsterdam. "Do you wonder at it? They have been kicked by the English as no reasonable man would kick a dog. They have been whipped by them as no sober postilion would whip a hackney-coach horse."¹⁷

¹² President of Congress to William Lee, July 1, 1777. Wharton, II: 359.

¹³ W. Lee to Com. For. Off., September 12, 1778. Wharton, II: 715.

¹⁴ Commissioners to W. Lee, September 26, 1778. Wharton, II: 744.

¹⁵ Dana to Jonathan Jackson, November 11, 1780. Wharton, IV: 151.

¹⁶ Manifesto of States General, November 27, 1780. Wharton, IV: 310.

¹⁷ Adams to W. Lee, March 21, 1780. Wharton, III: 564.

On 12th March, 1781, the Dutch declared war on England, but even yet they refused to receive a letter from John Adams in his new official character of Minister Plenipotentiary.¹⁸ It was not until the end of the year, when the news of the surrender of Cornwallis had reached them, that the provinces began to instruct their delegates in favor of a recognition. Then, in one day, five million guilders were subscribed to be lent to France for the use of the United States,¹⁹ and the cumbrous diplomatic machinery of the States General was put in motion. "If it was in any other country," wrote Adams, on 14th January, 1782, "I should conclude from all appearances that an alliance with America and France at least would be finished in a few weeks; but I have been here long enough to know the nation better. The constitution of government is so complicated and so whimsical a thing, and the temper and character of the nation so peculiar, that this is considered everywhere as the most difficult embassy in Europe. But at present it is more so than ever; the nation is more divided than usual, and they are afraid of everybody."²⁰ And so he might well be content to be accorded his formal reception by the Prince of

¹⁸ Adams to Pres. Cong., May 7, 1781. Wharton, IV: 401.

¹⁹ Dumas to Pres. Cong., January 7, 1782. Wharton, V: 86.

²⁰ Adams to Pres. Cong., January 14, 1782. Wharton, V: 100.

Orange on 22d April.²¹ On the twenty-third the French minister at Amsterdam gave a banquet to the diplomatic corps in honor of their new member. The treaty was concluded on October 8th. But the ministry of North had fallen, and British agents were at Paris discussing with Franklin the terms of peace before Holland had ventured upon her recognition.

The value of a precedent in recognition, it has been said, depends on its non-partisan character. It also depends to a considerable degree upon the attitude of the mother country. For it is only before the mother country has brought herself to acknowledge the independence of her former territory that there can be any question as to the propriety of the recognition. Between the time of the declaration of independence, which in the case of the United States was 4th July, 1776, and the recognition of the same by the parent State, which in the same case occurred at the signature of the preliminary articles on 30th November, 1782, the third power in granting recognition must consider two things; the fact of independence and the nature of its relations with the belligerents. If the former of these does not manifestly exist, and in the case under discussion it did not, none can question the right, in a moral way, of

²¹ Adams to Livingston, April 22, 1782. Wharton, V: 320.

the mother country to consider the recognition as premature and an act of war. Thus the recognition by France and in a less degree that by Holland, for she refrained from acting until Britain had shown her own hand, were interventions dictated by self-interest of one form or another. If the interests of the third power are of such a nature as not to be affected by the struggle, she is not likely to be led into a premature recognition, or into any recognition, until the mother country by her own action has renounced her pretension to sovereignty over the new State by acknowledging its independence.

Cases of recognition will have great value in establishing the international law upon the subject only when the mother country delays this renunciation beyond a reasonable time, so that third powers feel that they must recognize the fact of independence in justice to themselves and to the new State.

No valuable precedent in recognition occurred during the American revolution, or could have occurred, for Great Britain acted promptly herself and acknowledged the independence of her former colonies at a time when the fact of their independence was not a matter beyond dispute, and when her own hopes were in no means destroyed, in spite of her loss of a considerable army. No recognition before 30th November, 1782, could have been other

than an intervention; none after that time can be considered as of importance save as an indication of European policy and commercial necessity. Before the administration of Washington began, only three other European States had seen fit to open formal and regular relations with the United States, and only two of them concluded treaties.

Sweden made a treaty of amity and commerce with the United States on the 3d of April, 1783. It was the first time, so the King took credit to himself, that an European power had solicited the friendship of the United States. There is reason to believe that the enormous prestige of Dr. Franklin was an inspiration that accentuated his majesty's desire for commercial relations. Upon his general instructions Franklin entered readily upon the negotiations proposed by the Swedish ambassador, and before he had concluded them his special instructions for this treaty had arrived. He signed the final draft in almost the very words of the project, and at the end of the proceedings was complimented by a request for "young Mr. Franklin" as ambassador.²²

The Spanish negotiations, long and tedious in their course, failed to terminate in a treaty within the period under consideration, although the opening of diplomatic relations was not deferred long after the

²² Wharton, V: 512, VI: 133, 163, 276, 483.

recognition by England. Arthur Lee, Franklin and Jay were at various times during the war commissioned to the court of Spain, but they could accomplish no open result. Spain advanced more or less material assistance to the colonies, but two reasons seem to have kept her from a formal recognition. The principle of independence was none too popular in a country with enormous colonial possessions of her own, while the demand of the United States for free navigation of the Mississippi to its mouth was not to be admitted by a king who needed the whole Gulf of Mexico for himself. Even the offer made near the end of the war, to relinquish the demand for the free navigation, failed to induce Spain to treat. It was not until after the peace preliminaries with England had been signed that the Spanish minister in Paris told Jay that Spain was ready to receive the latter in form. Even then a treaty was not to be had for more than a decade.

Frederick the Great, ruling in Prussia during the revolution, showed some solicitude for American commerce at an early period in the war, and amused himself with the American envoys throughout its length. But there was too little to be gained for him to compromise his country by a recognition, so he fought off the persistent attacks of the Lees until the war was over. Then, on the model of the Swe-

dish treaty, he allowed John Adams to negotiate a treaty with Prussia. Many of its articles revealed a "platonian philosophy"²³ that would scarcely have been admitted between two countries having any considerable intercourse.

Thus, by the end of 1785, the United States had formal diplomatic relations with six States of Europe, France, Holland, Great Britain, Sweden, Spain and Prussia. In one case the recognition had marked a renunciation of sovereignty. In three more, subsequent to this renunciation, it had indicated only a general friendly feeling now free to act. And, in two cases, it had come as an intervention, with differing degrees of flagrancy. In no case had there been any consideration of the question already asked,—whether there is a time in a revolution when the revolting people have a right to demand, or a neutral a right to accord, a recognition in spite of the hostile attitude of the mother country. As has been seen, the nature of the American revolution was such that that question could not have arisen. Some light was destined to be thrown upon the question, however, by the policy of the new republic whose own recognition has now been considered.

The most serious diplomatic problem that had yet

²³ Adams to Thulemeier, February 13, 1785. John Adams, *Works* (10 vols., Boston, 1853), VIII: 225.

presented itself to the administration of George Washington arose when the French revolution passed from the municipal stage into the international. The events of 1792, bringing down upon France the wrath of Europe, aroused in the United States a feeling of sympathy that might well have influenced a government to make more of its treaty obligations to the distressed country than the Washington government showed itself disposed to do. But Washington was profoundly impressed with the need of the United States for a long period of uneventful development. As the wars broke out he saw clearly how little they had to offer the United States and how greatly they would check her growth if she allowed herself to become involved in them. Realizing these dangers, he had little difficulty in convincing himself that the obligations of the treaty of 1778, with France, did not apply to the conditions of 1792, and that the duties of the United States coincided with her interests in prescribing a policy of strict neutrality.

While the French republic was coming into existence, in the autumn of 1792, diplomats were deciding, as their interests prompted them, how it should be greeted. Upon Gouverneur Morris, minister plenipotentiary from the United States, more than his share of the responsibility fell, for his distance from

Philadelphia and his lack of specific instructions applicable to the events of the tenth of August forced him to frame his policy for himself. "You will observe, sir," he commented upon those events, "that matters are now brought to a simple question between an absolute monarchy and a republic: for all middle terms are done away."²⁴

As representing a republican government, Morris could not well take offense at the adoption of a similar government by France; nor could he proclaim a neutrality similar to that of Britain. The minister of the latter power demanded his passports on 20th August, presenting at the same time a threatening note to the effect "that Britain has determined on a strict neutrality, that she means to preserve it, and therefore as his letters of credence are to the king, now dethroned, he had best come away. To this is subjoined a hope that nothing will happen to the King or his family, *because that would excite the indignation of all Europe.* This despatch turned into plain English, is, shortly, that the British court resent what is already done, and will make war immediately, if the treatment of the King be such as to call for, or to justify, measures of extremity."²⁵

²⁴ Morris to Jefferson, August 16, 1792. *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, I: 333. The folio *State Papers* are hereafter to be cited as *A. S. P. F. R.*

²⁵ Morris to Jefferson, August 22, 1792. *A. S. P. F. R.*, I: 336.

The other courts of Europe, fearful with England of the effect of French pronouncements in the name of liberty, also withdrew their ministers from Paris, leaving Morris to constitute the whole diplomatic corps. On the last day of the year Lord Grenville formally refused to accredit the minister of the French republic. "You are not ignorant," he wrote to Chauvelin, "that since the unhappy events of the 10th of August, the king has thought proper to suspend all official communication with France. You are yourself no otherwise accredited to the king, than in the name of his most christian majesty. The proposition of receiving a minister accredited by any other authority or power in France, would be a new question, which, whenever it should occur, the king would have the right to decide according to the interests of his subjects, his own dignity, and the regard which he owes to his allies, and the general system of Europe. I am therefore to inform you, sir, that I acknowledge you in no other public character than that of minister from his most christian majesty, and that consequently you cannot be admitted to treat with the king's ministers in the quality, and under the form stated in your note."²⁶

The attitude which Morris determined to take was

²⁶ Grenville to Chauvelin, December 31, 1792. *Annual Register*, 1793, 116.

the opposite of this of England. He remained in Paris, and continued his relations with the ministry of Foreign Affairs with as little interruption as the course of events would allow. He remained, as he wrote home, "because, in the admitted case that my letters of credence are to the monarchy, and not to the republic of France, it becomes a matter of indifference whether I remain in this country, or go to England, during the time which may be needful to obtain your orders, or to produce a settlement of affairs here. Going hence, however, would look like taking part against the late revolution, and I am not only unauthorized in this respect, but I am bound to suppose that, if the great majority of the nation adhere to the new form, the United States will approve thereof, because, in the first place, we have no right to prescribe to this country the government they shall adopt, and next, because the basis of our own constitution is the indefeasible right of the people to establish it."²⁷

The new French Government itself almost drove Morris to leave Paris. Without specific instructions he declined to pay the instalments on the American debt to the republic as they came due, and a letter of Le Brun, insisting strongly on the identity of France, whatever her domestic form, induced him to demand

²⁷ Morris to Jefferson, August 22, 1792. *A. S. P. F. R.*, I: 336.

his passports. This action evoked an explanatory note from the French minister, so that the demand was withdrawn. "As to my personal opinions," wrote Morris, consenting to remain, "they are unimportant in an affair so serious, but you may be persuaded that I have never doubted the right which every people have of forming, to themselves, such government as they please."²⁸ He was much relieved when Jefferson, on learning of the suspension of the French constitution, wrote him instructions that approved his actions. "During the time of this suspension, and while no legitimate government exists, we apprehend that we cannot continue the payments of our debt to France, because there is no one authorized to receive it and to give us an unobjectionable acquittal." Until further orders Morris was directed to suspend payments, with the understanding that "this suspension [shall not] be continued one moment after we can see our way clear out of the difficulty into which their situation has thrown us."²⁹

The situation and interests of the United States were such that in this crisis she was enabled to fulfil in their strictness both the letter and the spirit of

²⁸ Morris to LeBrun, September 17, 1792. *A. S. P. F. R.*, I: 340.

²⁹ Jefferson to Morris, October 15, 1792. P. L. Ford, *Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, VI: 120.

the law. And where the indistinct law of neutrality was silent, she guided her actions by logical reasoning, based upon the broad principles of honest impartiality and the consent of the governed. The conduct of Morris received the support of the administration. His new instructions, when they came, authorized him to continue the course he had started upon. "It accords with our principles," wrote Jefferson, stating the law of recognition of governments as it has come to be accepted to-day, "to acknowledge any Government to be rightful which is formed by the will of the nation, substantially declared. The late Government was of this kind, and was accordingly acknowledged by all the branches of ours; so any alteration of it which shall be made by the will of the nation, substantially declared, will doubtless be acknowledged in like manner. With such a Government, *every kind* of business may be done."⁵⁰ The situation was such as has been insisted upon as essential for the development of a precedent in recognition; there was a change of government, the effect of it was being contested, a neutral party with no interest in a termination in either direction acted as seemed to it reasonable and right. It is well for the development of international law when the interest of States guides them into logical paths rather than selfish

⁵⁰ Jefferson to Morris, November 7, 1792. Ford, *Writings*, VI: 131.

ones. "The President receives, with great satisfaction," wrote Jefferson to the French minister in Philadelphia, acknowledging his notification of the change of government, "this attention of the Executive Council and the desire they have manifested of making known to us the resolution entered into by the National Convention, even before a definite regulation of their new establishment could take place. Be assured, Sir, that the Government and the citizens of the United States view with the most sincere pleasure every advance of your nation towards its happiness, an object essentially connected with its liberty, and they consider the union of principles and pursuits between our two countries as a link which binds still closer their interests and affections."⁸¹

The actual outbreak of war between France and England, in 1793, brought to this attitude of neutrality the supreme test. France was at once the traditional friend of the United States, and the exponent of a governmental system that could not fail to command the warmest admiration in America. She had rendered to the struggling States, fifteen years before, an assistance that at a later date in the war had become decisive; and it was by no means clear that the bond whereby she pledged her assistance did not entitle her to the aid of the United

⁸¹ Jefferson to Ternant, February 23, 1793. Ford, *Writings*, VI: 189.

States in her own crisis. To resist a popular distrust of England, a sympathy with France and the obligation of the treaty of 1778 was no easy task. By rather close reasoning on the changed situations in Europe, and the obligations of treaties, reinforced by a profound realization of the need of peace to the United States, Washington was led to take for his country an epoch-making attitude.

Summoning his cabinet to meet him,³² the President hurried from Mt. Vernon to Philadelphia when news of the outbreak of the war reached him. To his advisers he propounded a series of thirteen pertinent questions on neutrality and the French treaties,³³ and with their approval, on 22d April, 1793, issued a proclamation that "has had greater influence in moulding international law than any single document of the last hundred years."³⁴ With the brief neutrality proclamation as a text, Jefferson, in his later correspondence with Genet, formulated "against France," and against his own inclination, it might be added, "broad principles of neutrality, to which time has added nothing."³⁵ A year later these principles of international law, now for the first

³² Circular to Cabinet, April 12, 1793. J. Sparks, *Writings of Washington*, X: 336.

³³ Sparks, *Writings of Washington*, X: 533.

³⁴ J. W. Foster, *A Century of American Diplomacy* (Boston, 1900), 154.

³⁵ W. F. Reddoway, *The Monroe Doctrine* (Cambridge, 1898), 15.

time laid down with authority, were enacted with fitting pains and penalties into a statute by the Congress of the United States.

This prompt recognition of the French republic, accompanied by a more thorough-going neutrality than had yet been seen, marks the entrance into European diplomacy of a new power, in whose guidance principles distinctly different from those of Europe would predominate. It may be conjectured that the development of international law since 1793 has been influenced more by this power than by any other, just because of the isolation of interests that forced it into a neutral attitude, from which it could act freely, as a logical international theory might dictate. From the action of the United States regarding the French governments, for the Directorate, the Consulate and the Empire were severally acknowledged as the Republic had been, and the French wars, it might be guessed with considerable accuracy what would be its action when the next great case for recognition should arise—when the American colonies of His Catholic Majesty should be driven by a Castilian stupidity, even greater than an eighteenth-century English stupidity, into a war for independence.

CHAPTER I

THE SOUTH AMERICAN WARS OF LIBERATION

The enterprise of the inhabitants of Spain's four American viceroyalties displayed itself in systematic and consistent smuggling rather than in any form of opposition to Spanish rule as such. Exploitation and repression were the essential features of the Spanish colonial system. If Buenos Ayres proved to be a competitor to the Spanish merchants, her olive trees must come down and her vines must come up by the roots, for it was clearly understood that Spain was to be protected, and that colonies existed only for the benefit of the mother country. It is hard to see how such a system could have been carried out honestly, or, if this were possible, how it could have been endured. But the administrators of Spain made the colonial system a means for recuperating distressed fortunes, while the colonists utilized the cupidity of their rulers to develop an extensive, illicit and profitable foreign commerce.¹

No community of interest could well exist in the

¹ E. G. Bourne, *Spain in America* (New York, 1906), gives a detailed account of the Spanish colonial system. He had already edited a chapter from Roscher, *Kolonien, Kolonialpolitik und Auswanderung*, under the title *The Spanish Colonial System* (New York, 1904). His analysis is more sympathetic than the one here given.

population of the Spanish American colonies. Excepting their American residence, and common dependence on a mother country, there are few generalizations that can be made regarding the people living in the southern Americas. Some families were Castilian, were insolently proud of their birth in the peninsula, and looked to a speedy return to civilization and Spain. At the other end of the social scale were negroes and Indians of unmixed blood. Between these was an immense population made up of creoles on the one hand, and on the other of various degrees of mestizos and mulattos, for the Spanish settlers in America had amalgamated with the native and lower races as only peoples of Latin blood have done. Caste and class flourished in Latin America, and gave a clear promise of permanence to Spanish dominion which was the one unifying principle on the continent. Without the assistance of Spain no other common fact could come to exist, and no dangerous spirit of revolution could prevail without some other common facts.

South America, strange as it may seem, in spite of centuries of misgovernment and blindness on the part of the mother country, was patriotic during those early years of the last century, when patriotism was almost the only asset of the Spanish peoples. The colonial system had been atrocious, but, keeping

those at the bottom of the social scale in dense ignorance, and allowing those at the top to enrich themselves by illicit means, it had been successful. The history of 1806 and 1807 proves this with reasonable conclusiveness.

Three great names stand forth in the history of South American Liberation.² To José de San Martín and Simon Bolívar belongs the credit of accomplishing the emancipation; to Francisco de Miranda that of inaugurating the movement.³ The first liberator, Miranda, was a man of good family, a native of Caracas, in Venezuela, and a wanderer of much experience.⁴ Born in 1754, he had fought in the American revolution with the French allies, and had

² The history of the wars of liberation is yet to be written. They are the subject of a bulky Latin American literature, much of which is lowered in value by its partisan character and its lack of critical spirit. Little use has been made of this in the above chapter, although references to it are included in the foot-notes. The principal sources of the chapter are the memoirs and travels of foreigners in South America during the revolutionary period, the British and American foreign correspondence, and the original documents accompanying the files of the latter. Bulletins of the armies, pamphlet laws and constitutions, and the like, are preserved in great number in the archives.

³ W. S. Robertson, "Francisco de Miranda and the Revolutionizing of Spanish America," in *Amer. Hist. Asso. Ann. Report*, 1907, I: 189-539, gives the best account of the inception of the movement for liberation, and describes in substantiated detail the career here alluded to.

⁴ Documents on the revolutionary career of Miranda are in Alph. Comte O'Kelly de Galway, *Francisco de Miranda: Général de Division des Armées de la République (1791-1794); Héros de l'Indépendance Américaine (1756-1816)*. (Paris, 1913.)

there formed the resolution to repeat the process in his own land. Years of travel over all of Europe, broken into by service at the head of a French republican brigade, and by visits to London and conferences with British and American statesmen, had confirmed the resolution, and it was only a change in the conditions of Europe that kept Pitt from backing a filibustering expedition under his leadership in 1798. Another change of conditions brought the object of his ambitions within his reach, and in February, 1806, the *Leander* sailed from New York, under one Martin,⁵ who at sea turned into Miranda, the leader of a revolutionary expedition against Venezuela.⁶ After touching at a port of San Domingo, the *Leander* proceeded to the north coast of Venezuela, where a Spanish force drove it back. But Lord Cochrane, from the West Indian station, was induced to convoy the expedition to an easy landing in the neighborhood of Coro, whence he convoyed it once more to Trinidad and safety a few days later. The days at Coro had been spent in vigorous revolutionary propagandism, to no effect.

⁵ *Annals of Congress*, 11th Cong., 1st Sess., 257.

⁶ The diary and letters of Henry Ingersoll, who accompanied the *Leander* expedition as a printer, are given in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, III: 674.

The one thing essential to a revolution was lacking—the people of Venezuela would not revolt.⁷

The experience of Miranda with an apathetic and timorous population was duplicated in the same year by the experience of another filibustering expedition, this time directed against the viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres. While the British ministry was considering the plans of Miranda, in 1804, Sir Home Riggs Popham had been designated as commander of a possible British contingent, and had been placed in communication with the South American adventurer.⁸ Thus Popham had come to consider the possibilities of South American independence. And when the capture of Cape Colony, in January, 1806, left him free to act with his fleet, he listened to the tales of

⁷ *The History of Don Francisco de Miranda's Attempt to effect a Revolution in South America, in a Series of Letters, by a Gentleman who was an Officer under that General, to his Friend in the United States. To which are annexed Sketches of the Life of Miranda, and Geographical Notices of Caracas* (Boston, 1808), 110; *Annual Register*, 1806, 239; *A. S. P. F. R.*, III: 256; *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, VI: 508; *Annals of Congress*, 11 Cong., 1 Sess., 257-315; J. H. Latané, *The Diplomatic Relations of the United States and Spanish America* (Baltimore, 1900), 21-29; *Colombia, Being a geographical, statistical, agricultural, commercial, and political Account of that Country, adapted for the general Reader, the Merchant and the Colonist.* (2 vols., London, 1822) II: 302, — perhaps by Zea, the Colombian agent since it is a tract in favor of Colombian loans and contains the documents on recognition by the United States.

⁸ C. W. Vane, ed., *Correspondence, Despatches, and other Papers of Viscount Castlereagh, Second Marquess of Londonderry* (12 vols., London, 1851-), VII: 288.

the captain of an American merchantman, borrowed Lord Beresford and twelve hundred men, and sailed west to free Montevideo and Buenos Ayres from the Spanish tyranny under which they groaned, and to open to British merchants their valuable commerce.⁹ The Spanish viceroy was so hopelessly incompetent that Buenos Ayres fell before Beresford's handful of troops, in July. But the groaning and oppressed people united under the lead of a French officer in the Spanish service, Liniers, and shortly made Beresford and his soldiers prisoners of war.¹⁰ So successful was their resistance that when General White-locke arrived with nine thousand reinforcements, and a commission as civil governor of the province, he was forced to give up hostilities and return to England to be court-martialed and cashiered.¹¹

Thus the attempts to revolutionize South America under British auspices proved to be premature. With

⁹ C. W. Vane, *Castlereagh Corresp.* VII: 302; W. M. Sloane, in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, IV: 449-453; see text of proclamations in S. H. Wilcocke, *History of the Viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres; containing the most accurate Details relative to the Topography, History, Commerce, Population, Government, etc., etc., of that valuable Colony* (London, 1807), 356.

¹⁰ Joseph Andrews, *Journey from Buenos Ayres, through the Provinces of Cordova, Tecuman, and Salta, to Potosi, thence by the Deserts Carauja to Arica, and subsequently, to Santiago de Chili and Coquimbo . . . in the years 1825-26* (2 vols., London, 1827), I: 34.

¹¹ C. W. Vane, *Castlereagh Corresp.*, VII: 314; Latané, *Dipl. Rel.*, 29-31; and *Dictionary of National Biography*.

all their grievances the colonists were not yet prepared for independence. And when at last the first step was taken that led to the ultimate separation, the motive was not love of freedom, but a patriotic desire to maintain Spanish authority in Spanish colonies.

When Napoleon established his brother on the throne of Spain he gave the signal for the erection of patriotic juntas throughout the peninsula. The inhabitants of Spanish-America were no less determined than those of Ferdinand's European possessions not to submit to French rule. With some friction¹² caused by the desire of the regency of Cadiz to rule the colonies as well as Spain, they took matters into their own hands and set up independent local governments in the name of Ferdinand. At Buenos Ayres the viceroy Cisneros met with opposition from the minute of his arrival, in May, 1809.¹³ A year later he was deposed by a movement inspired by a writer of pamphlets, Moreno, who became the soul of the new "junta gubernative" that succeeded him.¹⁴ Valparaiso followed the example of Buenos

¹² *Colombia . . . Account*, II: 320.

¹³ J. R. Rengger, *The Reign of Doctor Joseph Gaspard Roderick de Francia in Paraguay; being an Account of a Six Years' Residence in that Republic, from July, 1819, to May, 1825* (London, 1827), *Intro.*, xiv.

¹⁴ John Miller, *Memoirs of General Miller, in the Service of the Republic of Peru* (2 vol., London, 1828), I: 59. These memoirs of

Ayres, in July, 1810, deposed the president Carrasco, and turned the municipal cabildo into a patriotic junta.¹⁵ Santiago did the same in September, and with a remarkable unanimity Chile determined no longer to form a captain-generalcy under the viceroy of Peru, and met in her first free congress in the spring of 1811.¹⁶ In the northern viceroyalty of New Granada, Quito had set up the first junta in August, 1809.¹⁷ Caracas joined in the movement six months later, and abolished slavery, in addition to proclaiming Ferdinand and forming a federative government for Venezuela.¹⁸ Bogota acted in similar manner in July, following this in December, 1810, with a congress and a "Republic of Cundinamarca" to be ruled by a president and vice-president in the name of the old King of Spain.¹⁹ And on 5th

the most successful foreign officer in the service of the liberating army form the most valuable single source on the history of the war. The military operations are particularly well treated.

¹⁵ W. B. Stevenson, *A historical and descriptive Narrative of a Twenty Years' Residence in South America* (3 vol., London, 1825), III: 176.

¹⁶ Miller, *Memoirs*, I: 105.

¹⁷ *The Republic of Colombia: an Account of its Boundaries, Extent . . . and History. Printed from the Article in the Seventh Edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica* (New York, 1836), 45-49.

¹⁸ Simon de Schryver, *Esquisse de la Vie Bolivar* (Brussels, 1899), 13; Jonathan Elliott, *The American-Diplomatic Code* (2 vols., Washington, 1834) I: 14.

¹⁹ Bernard Moses, "Political Constitution of Colombia," in *Ann. Amer. Acad. of Pol. and Soc. Science*, III: 57.

July, 1811, the first motion of independence of Spain was adopted by the Congress of Venezuela.²⁰

The widespread popular feeling which showed itself in the movements here described was founded on loyalty to Spain.²¹ Many of the leaders of the day were individually in favor of a complete independence, but there was as yet no public opinion to support them. Even so much as had been attained was soon lost, as throughout the greater part of South America the popular governments were suppressed, with varying degrees of difficulty. But the fact of independence was established. Although in name Spain continued to rule the Americas for several years to come, her rule had now ceased to be effectual, and the principle of commercial restriction upon which her colonial policy was founded ceased to be operative. The great English trade which came at once into existence made the restoration of the old system more impossible every day, and gave strength to the real movements for political independence which at once began. The overthrow of Ferdinand in Spain had established the economic independence of the colonies.

²⁰ *Republic of Colombia*, 51; *The Present State of Colombia*; by an Officer, late in the Colombian Service (London, 1827), 29.

²¹ William Walton, *An Expose of the Dissensions of Spanish America . . . intended as a means to induce the mediatory Interference of Great Britain* (London, 1814), 100.

The overthrow of Spanish rule in America is the result of two simultaneous movements which originated in local disturbances in Venezuela and Buenos Ayres, which spread gradually northward and southward along the western coast of the continent developing leaders as they advanced, and which finally united within the limits of the present republic of Ecuador, to continue the advance together into the heights of upper Peru, until the attainment of a complete and perfect independence.²² The name of Simon Bolivar, who was the spirit of the northern movement, is better known than that of San Martin, who accomplished a greater work in the southern half of the continent.

When economic independence was forced upon the Spanish provinces, about the year 1810, and their ports were opened more widely than ever before to foreign commerce, there began an invasion of capital and commercial adventurers that had a permanent influence on the history of the colonies.²³ There had

²² A great calendar of documents bearing upon the liberation was published in 1912 by Pedro Torres Lanzas, Director of the General Archive of the Indies at Seville, under the title *Independencia de América: Fuentes para su Estudio. Catálogo de Documentos conservados en el Archivo General de Indias de Sevilla*. (6 vols., Madrid 1912). These volumes will be indispensable to the definitive historian of the movement.

²³ *A Five Years' Residence in Buenos Ayres during the Years 1820 to 1825, containing Remarks on the Country and Inhabitants, and a Visit to Colonia del Sacramento. By an Englishman* (2 ed., London, 1827), 33; Wilcocke, *Viceroyalty*, preface.

always been much foreign commerce in spite of Spanish colonial system, but it had paid a heavy unofficial tax, and the goods were distributed through Spanish hands. Now began the establishment of commercial houses in the large cities and the permanent investment of foreign capital, which was mostly English. It was not long before those houses and this capital were forced into politics, and, owing their life to the existence of an illegal condition, they necessarily fought to maintain that condition and enlisted heartily in the cause of independence. The materials are not yet collected to show how far Spanish American independence was due to the Liverpool and Manchester merchants, but such as are available seem to show that commercial pressure was the great influence in keeping the patriots patriotic. Particularly was this true in the chief port of entry for the southern provinces, Buenos Ayres.

The *junta gubernative*, which was set up in Buenos Ayres on the 25th of May, 1810,²⁴ was the beginning of an independent régime that has endured in that territory, in one form or another, from that day to this. It was a doubtful period of political instability that followed the erection of this government for ten

²⁴T. C. Dawson, *The South American Republics* (2 vols., 1903, 1904, in "The Story of the Nations"), I: 90. Dawson gives an intelligent popular survey of South American affairs.

years or more. War was almost constant on three parts of the frontier: Artigas dominated in the city of Montevideo, and declined to submit to the authority of Buenos Ayres; Dr. Francia shut himself up in the city of Paraguay and maintained a permanent embargo on the inhabitants of the province under his control; and on the northern frontier of the viceroyalty the Spanish forces from upper Peru were constant in their depredations.

Meanwhile, within the frontiers thus harassed, partisan politics was doing its worst, and between the rivalries of revolutionary chieftains and the jealousies existing between the rural districts and the city of Buenos Ayres the province had little domestic stability.²⁵ Moreno, who led the attack on the viceroy Cisneros, in 1810, dominating the junta that succeeded him, seems to have been an honest man and too severe for his time.²⁶ He died while on a forced mission to England. Saavedra, who drove him out, was himself forced to leave abruptly before the end

²⁵ *An account, historical, political and statistical, of the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata; with an Appendix concerning the Usurpation of Monte Video by the Portuguese and Brazilian Governments. Translated from the Spanish* (London, 1825) 9, et seq., — this is a semi-official account, prepared at the request of the British agent, and contains an excellent map and numerous documents.

²⁶ Miller, *Memoirs*, I: 60, et seq.; Don Vicente Pazos, *Letters on the United Provinces of South America, addressed to the Hon. Henry Clay* (New York and London, 1819), 49.

of 1811. And after an interregnum of several months Juan Martin Pueyrredon arrived from the army and took command at Buenos Ayres.²⁷ In the last month of 1813 the position of Supreme Director was established, to be filled for the first time by Gervasio Antonio de Posadas. He was followed by General Alvear,²⁸ later the victim of another revolution, succeeded by Alvarez, *pro tempore*, and by Pueyrredon, who was chosen Supreme Director in March, 1816, by the Congress of Tucuman.²⁹

Throughout this period of strife Buenos Ayres was in an anomalous condition. She had revolted in the name of Ferdinand VII. She did not issue any declaration of independence until 1816. Spain was maintaining that her own sway was still unbroken: "the Laws of the Indias (which are still in force) do not permit any Foreign Vessel to approach or carry on commerce with" the port of Buenos Ayres. Yet when the British Foreign Office sent a consul to that city the junta declined to grant him an *exequatur*, because in his commission the independence of Buenos Ayres was not acknowledged. The congress that met at Tucuman in 1816 ended this uncertainty. By this time negotiations entered into for the estab-

²⁷ Bland, in *Annals of Congress*, 15th Cong., 1st Sess., 2146.

²⁸ Halsey to Secretary of State, May 5, 1815. *State Dept. Mss.*

²⁹ Bland, in *Annals of Congress*, 15th Cong., 1st Sess., 2149.

lishment of a Spanish prince on the throne of Buenos Ayres had failed because of the unalterable determination of Spain, after the restoration, to reconquer the colonies.³⁰ So the representatives of the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata declared their independence at Tucuman on July 9th, 1816, and issued a manifesto of causes on the 25th of the following month.³¹

The series of military successes that was destined to lead to South American independence began at Tucuman in the fall of 1812, and at Salta on February 20th, 1813.³² In these battles the Spanish forces from upper Peru were driven back as they crossed the frontier of Buenos Ayres, and at the latter the royalist general Tristan was decisively defeated by the patriot Belgrano. But on the 1st of October, of the same year, the royalists, violating their parole given after Salta, destroyed Belgrano's army at Vilcapujio. This was a distinct service to the patriots, for it placed in command of the remnants of Belgrano's force José de San Martín, just returned

³⁰ Sir Woodbine Parish, *Buenos Ayres and the Provinces of the Rio de la Plata: from their Discovery and Conquest by the Spaniards to the Establishment of their political Independence* (2d ed. London, 1852), 75, 386.

³¹ *Annals of Congress*, 15th Cong., 1st Sess., 1877, 2045; *Annual Register*, 1816 [159]; J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, IV: 30.

³² *North American Review*, CLXV: 556; Miller, *Memoirs* I: 76.

from twenty years of honorable service in the Spanish armies to aid his countrymen in their fight.

San Martin recognized at once the futility of attacking Spain in the mountains of upper Peru, with more than four hundred leagues of impassable roads³³ between his army and his base of supplies.³⁴ He conceived the idea of forcing Spain to defend her own base at Lima and Callao, and to this purpose elaborated a plan for an invasion of Chile, a capture of Valparaiso, and a combined military and naval attack on the capital of Peru. To this end he willingly gave up the command of his northern army to General Alvear, taking for himself, in September, 1814, the governorship of the backwoods province of Cuyo, Mendoza the capital, at the eastern end of the Uspallata pass over the Andes.³⁵

³³ In 1908 and 1909 Hiram Bingham, of Yale University, in connection with his visit to the First Pan-American Scientific Congress at Santiago, made the overland trip along the old road from Buenos Ayres to Bolivia and Peru. He describes and illustrates the supreme difficulties that would have impeded San Martin in an overland conquest of Peru in *Across South America, An Account of a Journey from Buenos Aires to Lima by Way of Potosi* (Boston, 1911), 50, ff.

³⁴ Peter Schmidtmeier, *Travels into Chile, over the Andes, in the Years 1820 and 1821* (London, 1824), 132, gives the distance from Buenos Ayres to Tucuman as 328 leagues, and to Salta 415 leagues.

³⁵ J. H. Latané, *Dipl. Rel.*, 37; Alexander Cadcleugh, *Travels in South America during the Years 1819-20-21, containing An Account of the present State of Brazil, Buenos Ayres and Chile* (2 vols., London, 1826), I: 293-297.

A popular revolt had occurred in Chile a short time after the overthrow of the viceroy at Buenos Ayres, the cabildo of Valparaiso advancing the pretext that the captain-general could not save the province for Ferdinand. Following a common line of development this revolt ripened into a popular congress in June, 1811, only to fall in December of the same year before "the unprincipled ambition" of three gifted brothers Carrera. Encouraged by the factions so soon developed in Chile, the viceroy of Peru seized the opportunity to send down an army in the early months of 1813. The Chileños at once put aside their strife, met the invaders, and under the leadership, first of José Miguel Carrera, and then of Bernardo O'Higgins, extorted a truce at Talca on the 5th of May, 1814. By this truce the existing order in Chile was acknowledged. The truce was the signal for the renewal of partisan strife between O'Higgins and the Carreras, who had been forced to surrender to him the command of the patriot army. But once more they came to a forced reconciliation, when the news arrived that the viceroy repudiated the truce of Talca, and that General Osorio was on his way south with another royalist army. The patriots were hopelessly weakened by their domestic strife, however, so that a decisive victory at Rancagua, on 1st October, 1814, marked

a complete restoration of Spanish authority in Chile.³⁶ O'Higgins and a few of his officers escaped from the wreck of their army, crossed the Andes, and placed themselves under the command of San Martin, the new governor at Mendoza.³⁷

San Martin settled down at Mendoza with a handful of recruits—the number is stated at 160—and a great plan. In a few weeks he was joined by another handful of Chileños, who escaped destruction at Rancagua. Then he began the long task of building up a weak province, collecting and organizing an army, and educating the authorities of Buenos Ayres in the strategic necessities of the war. From the city he had chosen for his capital it was only a short journey to the coast cities of Chile. But the passage of the Andes was considered impossible for an army, and few stratagems were needed to close the eyes of the Spanish forces to the possibility of danger from this side.

His long experience in the Spanish army had given San Martin a thorough knowledge of the art of war.

³⁶ Miller, *Memoirs*, I: 105-118; Stevenson, *Narrative of Residence*, III: 176-181; Maria Graham, *Journal of a Residence in Chile during the Year 1822; and a Voyage from Chile to Brazil in 1823* (London, 1824), 16. The history of this period is based on memoirs, the public records having been destroyed to keep them from the Spaniards. Graham, *Introd.*, 3.

³⁷ Samuel Haigh, *Sketches of Buenos Ayres and Chile* (London, 1829), 160.

To this were added a character that inspired confidence, and a greater amount of industry than was common to Latin Americans. Recruiting proceeded at Mendoza with considerable rapidity; constant drilling turned the raw recruits into first-rate soldiers; from the foreign merchants at Buenos Ayres, whose confidence had early been gained, came a supply of material ³⁸ things that made the equipment of an army possible.

After two years of quiet organization the new army was ready to move, and notice to this effect was served in an indirect way on the Spanish authorities in Chile. Relying confidently on the insincerity of the native Indians, San Martin summoned them to a great conference and celebration in the fall of 1816. Here, under pledge of profound secrecy, he told the chiefs of his purpose, and marked out for them a line of march across the Andes that he had no intention of following.³⁹ Having thus successfully misled his enemy, San Martin moved from Mendoza on the 17th of January, 1817, with a force of about 4,000 men. After a terrible journey over the Uspallata pass, four thousand feet higher than another more famous one, of St. Bernard, he descended the western slope

³⁸ Miller, *Memoirs*, I: 88.

³⁹ Miller, *Memoirs*, I: 89-102; Graham, *Journal*, 29.

of the Andes and fell upon the Spanish outpost at La Guardia, on 7th February.⁴⁰

The liberation of Chile, the second step in San Martin's plan, of which the creation of an army at Mendoza was the first, was the work of fifteen months. Osorio, who had become captain-general of Chile after his victory at Rancagua, in 1814,⁴¹ had been suspecting danger as he watched the proceedings across the mountains, and soon had an army ready to be sacrificed before the invader at Chacabuca, on February 12th.⁴² Two days later the liberating army entered Santiago. During the succeeding months the patriot government in Chile was erected again. A congress met to offer the Supreme Directorship to San Martin, and then to O'Higgins, when the former refused it; while on the first day of the ensuing year the independence of Chile was proclaimed.⁴³ Meanwhile the Spanish army, in its refuge at Talcahuana, in the south of Chile, was gathering reinforcements from Peru. Then Osorio

⁴⁰ C. R. Markham, *A History of Peru* (Chicago, 1892), 239; Miller, *Memoirs*, I: 120.

⁴¹ Miller, *Memoirs*, I: 120.

⁴² Stevenson, *Narrative of Residence*, 182; *Journal of a Residence in Chile. By a Young American, detained in that Country during the revolutionary Scenes of 1817-18-19* (Boston, 1823), 1-17; Schmidtmeier, *Travels*, 351.

⁴³ *Annual Register*, 1818, 44.

marched⁴⁴ against the patriots with 8,000 men, and defeated them completely at Talca, 19th March, 1818.⁴⁵ But this was only the dark before dawn, for the patriots, who rallied under San Martin and O'Higgins, melted down their plate and sold their jewels, and in three weeks placed a new army in the field. On the 5th of April, 1818, the virtual independence of Chile was achieved on the plain of Maypu.⁴⁶ Spain never again had any considerable force in the province.

With Chile cleared of Spanish troops, and with Valparaiso at his service for a base of supplies, San Martin was ready to enter upon the next stage of his work, the liberation of Peru. From this point in his career he is no longer to be considered as a general of Buenos Ayres. He is become the Liberator, with larger plans than the home faction that appointed him can comprehend. We are not at this place concerned with the internecine strife that continued in Buenos Ayres regardless of his successes, or with his summons by, disobedience to, and final rupture with the Buenos Ayrean authorities. San Martin realized

⁴⁴ Graham, *Journal*, 33; Miller, *Memoirs*, I: 179; Basil Hall, *Extracts from a Journal written on the coasts of Chili, Peru and Mexico in the years 1820, 1821, 1822* (2 vol., Edinburgh, 1824), I: 58, a valuable account by an outsider skilled in travel and observation.

⁴⁵ *Journal by a Young American*, 40-71.

⁴⁶ Haigh, *Sketches*, 190-239; Cadcleugh, *Travels*, II: 31.

that extinction of Spanish power was more important than local politics, and continued on the course he had mapped out in spite of the orders and pleadings that he come home and restore peace.⁴⁷

1820
Another period of two years elapsed between the decisive victory at Maypu and the definitive invasion of Peru. It was a period, like that at Mendoza, filled with recruiting, organizing, drilling and educating. A series of proclamations prepared the Peruvians for their emancipation; the friendship and protection of the Liberator were promised them; while a treaty of alliance between Buenos Ayres and Chile guaranteed the independence of a new State to be erected by their joint army in Peru.⁴⁸

At this time arrived in Valparaiso a most considerable addition to the patriot force in the person of Thomas, Lord Cochrane, later tenth Earl of Dundonald. Cochrane, who was an energetic and able naval officer, had been thrown out of the British navy on a rather doubtful charge, and had been engaged, in 1817, by Alvarez, the Chilian agent in London,⁴⁹ to go out and organize a naval force for

⁴⁷February, 1820. Miller, *Memoirs*, I: 258.

⁴⁸Graham, *Journal*, 481; *British and Foreign State Papers*, XII: 811.

⁴⁹Thomas Cochrane, Tenth Earl of Dundonald, *Narrative of Services in the Liberation of Chili, Peru and Brazil, from Spanish and Portuguese Domination* (2 vols., London, 1859), I. This is one of

Chile. His arrival in November, 1818, introduced at once an element of efficiency in the branch of the service on which San Martin was most dependent for success in Peru.⁵⁰ But it also introduced feelings of jealousy among the native officers thus superseded that well nigh wrecked the whole enterprise.

An active naval warfare was at once begun against the Spanish forces, and before long reports began to come to Europe and the United States of the piratical proceedings of insurgent cruisers in the Pacific, of seizures of neutrals, and of paper blockades.⁵¹ The first expedition of Cochrane anchored off Callao on 28th February, 1819, after a twelve days' voyage from Valparaiso.⁵² The following day a blockade of the Peruvian coast was instituted.⁵³ But this attack accomplished nothing of consequence. With a fleet of eight vessels Cochrane sailed for a second time in

the best accounts of the war, but is violently prejudiced against San Martin. Cochrane also published *The Autobiography of a Seaman* (2 vols., London, 1860); which was completed in *The Life of Thomas, Lord Cochrane, Tenth Earl of Dundonald* (2 vol., London 1869), by the Eleventh Earl of Dundonald and H. R. Fox Bourne. On his earlier career, see J. B. Atlay, *The Trial of Lord Cochrane before Lord Ellenborough* (London, 1897), and *The Guilt of Lord Cochrane, A Criticism* (London, 1914), by Lord Ellenborough, grandson of the Lord Chief Justice.

⁵⁰ Stevenson, *Narrative of Residence*, III: 147.

⁵¹ *Niles Register*, XVII: 191.

⁵² Stevenson, *Narrative of Residence*, III: 139; Cochrane, *Narrative*, I: 5.

⁵³ *Annual Register*, 1819, II: 154.

September of this same year, only to find, when he met the enemy, that his rockets were filled with sand instead of powder. The Chilian authorities had frugally employed Spanish prisoners in the manufacture of ammunition.⁵⁴ In spite of this disappointment, however, Valdivia was captured by the fleet, and at once Spain was deprived of her best harbor in the Pacific, and San Martin was enabled to devote his whole attention to Peru.⁵⁵ By this time the latter was ready to move his new army, and in August, 1820, a combined military and naval expedition departed from Valparaiso.

Peru, the stronghold of Spanish power in America, had undergone less violent revolutionary movements than any other part of the continent; and in August, 1820, was fully under the control of General Don Joaquin de la Pezuela, forty-fourth viceroy after Pizarro. But it was three years now since Pezuela had written home that he stood over a volcano liable to burst into action at any time.⁵⁶ To understand San Martin's campaign against the viceroy, and his illegitimate successor, La Serna, we must remember that San Martin realized this condition and labored to produce an eruption of the volcano, to induce the Peruvians to free themselves.

⁵⁴ Miller, *Memoirs*, I: 220.

⁵⁵ Miller, *Memoirs*, I: 246.

⁵⁶ Markham, *Peru*, 237.

On August 21st, 1820, the liberating squadron sailed from Valparaiso with San Martin, Cochrane and some 4,500 troops on board. On 12th September these were landed at the bay of Pisco, and two weeks later the viceroy concluded a truce at Miraflores.⁵⁷ This was the beginning of what seemed to Lord Cochrane to be a series of dilatory movements inspired by irresolution and incapacity, if not by actual cowardice. Cochrane was a strenuous leader, and could not understand a war conducted without fighting. All his life he had been engaged in conflicts with his superiors in the navy, magistrates and committees. Now began the misunderstanding that led to an open rupture between the leaders, and finally induced the admiral to abandon a service where he considered himself ill-treated, to enter what he hoped would be a more congenial service in Brazil. The truce of Miraflores came to nothing, for Pezuela had no power to treat on the only basis San Martin would consider—that of independence. So hostilities were soon resumed. The campaign was one of education. "I come to fulfil the expectations," proclaimed the Liberator, "of all those who wish to belong to the country that gave them birth, and who desire to be governed by their own laws. On that day when Peru shall freely pronounce as

⁵⁷ Hall, *Extracts from Journal*, 1: 70; Graham, *Journal* 67-69.

to the form of her institutions, be they whatever they may, my functions shall cease, and I shall have the glory of announcing to the government of Chile, of which I am a subject, that their heroic efforts have at last received the consolation of having given liberty to Peru, and security to the neighboring States."⁵⁸ To a British officer on duty in South American waters, San Martin declared that he desired to convert thinking men, but had no ambition to figure as a conqueror.⁵⁹

After a few weeks at Pisco the army was again placed on its transports and moved off Callao, where it remained long enough for Cochrane to cut out a Spanish frigate, the *Esmeralda*, which lay in the harbor. Then it was moved to a bay some twenty-nine leagues north of Callao and disembarked at Huacho on 9th November. Here, "having shown sufficiently what his army and fleet were capable of,"⁶⁰ San Martin settled for a period of six months, and continued the dissemination of revolutionary principles.⁶¹

Colonel Arenales was perhaps the most efficient educator employed by the patriots. While the army lay at Pisco, he set out with 1,000 troops, crossed the Andes, marched north through the heart of the

⁵⁸ October 13, 1820. Stevenson, *Narrative of Residence*, III: 286.

⁵⁹ Hall, *Extracts from Journal*, I: 210.

⁶⁰ Hall, *Extracts from Journal*, I: 83.

⁶¹ Miller, *Memoirs*, I: 270; Cochrane, *Narrative*, I: 82.

Spanish territory, and rejoined the main body of the army at Huacho. As he marched around Lima, Arenales spread a feeling of independence among the inhabitants. Troops sent against him from Lima were defeated. A long line of revolutionized towns was left in his wake; while Spanish soldiers by the hundred deserted and marched over to the patriot army.⁶³

Meanwhile the effects of war were being felt by the royalists in Lima. Cochrane was maintaining a rigorous blockade of Callao, and San Martin and Arenales were investing the city from the land. Faction and dissatisfaction prevailed, so that when General La Serna came down from Upper Peru, on his way to Spain, he went no further than the capital. Here he was promoted by the viceroy Pezuela to the command of the royalist armies; and by the favor of the army he deposed Pezuela and inaugurated himself as viceroy in his place.⁶⁴ This was on the 29th of January, 1821. No general actions occurred during the ensuing months. Miller, the only English officer who fought through the whole war, was engaged in an expedition similar to that of Arenales, when news came to him of the conclusion of another armistice on the 23d of May.⁶⁴ La Serna, in the

⁶³ Stevenson, *Narrative of Residence*, III: 303.

⁶⁴ Miller, *Memoirs*, I: 281.

⁶⁴ Miller, *Memoirs*, I: 284.

negotiations which now occurred, was more pliable than Pezuela had been during the truce of Miraflores. He was thoroughly convinced of the hopelessness of his fight, and was ready to recognize the independence of Peru, and permit the establishment of a provisional government until a Bourbon prince could come out to take the throne. But his officers forced him to abandon those terms and end the truce. Spain made no terms with rebels; but her position in Lima had become untenable, and at daybreak on the 6th of July, 1821, she marched her army out of the city.⁶⁵

With deliberation, San Martin moved his army into the capital thus evacuated. He had long since proclaimed that he did not come as a conqueror, and now he delayed his entry until the fiery Cochrane was almost blind with anger, and the cabildo sent a deputation of magnates to invite him to take possession.⁶⁶ Even then he did not move his troops until he had thoroughly policed the town.

Although Lima was in his hands, the political education of the Peruvians was by no means completed, and harmony had ceased to exist in the ranks of the patriots. At the suggestion of the Liberator an assembly of eminent citizens, the cabildo, the arch-

⁶⁵ Hall, *Extracts from Journal*, I: 217; Markham, *Peru*, 249.

⁶⁶ Markham, *Peru*, 250.

bishop, the prelates and the nobles, met on the 15th of July and declared the independence of Peru, which was publicly proclaimed a little later: "Peru is from this moment free and independent, by the general vote of the people, and by the justice of her cause, which *God* defend!"⁶⁷ This act accomplished, the erection of a government was the next problem to be solved. It "was necessary that an authority should be created capable of restoring the movement of this grand machine, by preparing it to receive new forms and modifications. Imperious circumstances pointed out the person on whom the supreme power was to fall."⁶⁸ Accordingly, on 3d August San Martin issued a proclamation assuming the supreme power, giving himself the title of Protector, and promising to surrender the government to the people as soon as Peru should be free.⁶⁹ It was a curious paper, wrote Basil Hall, "it has little of the wonted bombast of such documents, and though not sparing of self-praise, is manly

⁶⁷ *British and Foreign State Papers*, IX: 393; Stevenson, *Narrative of Residence*, III: 341.

⁶⁸ Bernardo Monteagudo, *Peruvian Pamphlet: Being an Exposition of the administrative Labours of the Peruvian Government, from the Time of Its Formation, till the 15th of July, 1822; Presented to the Council by the Minister of State and Foreign Relations, . . . in Conformity with a protectorial Decree of the 18th of January* (London, 1823), 12. Monteagudo's work is partisan in character, but as a confidential agent of San Martin he was in a position to know his facts.

⁶⁹ *British and Foreign State Papers*, VIII: 1271.

“and decided; and, as I believe, from a number of collateral circumstances, perfectly sincere.”⁷⁰ But by this time the controversy between the Protector and the Admiral had become so bitter that there was no longer hope of reconciliation, and the former had to order the latter, with his fleet, to leave the coast of Peru. “It now became evident to me,” is Cochrane’s story, “that the army had been kept inert for the purpose of preserving it entire to further the ambitious views of the general, and that with the whole force now at Lima the inhabitants were completely at the mercy of their pretended liberator, but really their conqueror.”⁷¹ “It is almost unnecessary to say,” complained one of his partisans, “how ill this self-constituted authority agrees with the promises made by the Supreme Director of Chile in his proclamation to the Peruvians; and in that of General San Martin, issued after his arrival in Peru.”⁷² San Martin was not unmindful of the difficulties of his position when he reported to his superior, O’Higgins, that he would retain his authority “until the meet-

⁷⁰ Hall, *Extracts from Journal*, I: 266.

⁷¹ Cochrane, *Narrative* I: 125.

⁷² Stevenson, *Narrative of Residence*, III: 352; John Miers, *Travels in Chile and La Plata, including Accounts respecting the Geography, Geology, Statistics, Government, Finances, Agriculture, Manners and Customs, and the mining Operations in Chile* (2 vol., London, 1826), 64; Gilbert F. Mathison, *Narrative of a Visit to Brazil, Chile, Peru, and the Sandwich Islands, during the Years 1821 and 1822* (London, 1825), 243.

“ing of the sovereign congress, composed of representatives from all the districts, into which august body I will resign my command, and to which I will be answerable for what I may have done.”⁷³

The wisdom of this assumption of power at this critical period of Peruvian history is hardly to be contested. These were the decisive campaigns of the war of liberation. The future of Buenos Ayres and Chile, of New Granada and Venezuela, of all the Spanish provinces, depended on the battles that were now to be fought in the mountains of Peru. For this was the royalist heart of South America. San Martin was not destined to fight these final battles, but he has the honor of conceiving the plan of action, of executing it almost to the end, and of showing a moderation and modesty unparalleled among Latin American politicians.

The great popularity of the Liberator seems to have begun to wane shortly after this time. It is said on excellent authority that he always retained the affections of the common people, but jealousy and distrust had split his co-workers into hostile factions. There was little plunder to be shared by the followers of San Martin; there was little military glory to be achieved, for his policy was never one of fighting. The greatest blow he sustained was per-

⁷³ Montesgudo, *Peruvian Pamphlet*, App., 88, et seq.

haps one that came a month after his accession of power. Spain, in evacuating Lima, had retained the port of Callao, and on 10th September, 1821, she marched reinforcements into the fort. San Martin, with what his apologist well calls the "prudence of real courage," declined to fight, and permitted the Spanish force to pass unmolested within sight of his army. The fact that in eleven days Callao was quietly evacuated, without loss of life, and with consequent discredit to the royalists, was as nothing in the minds of the general's detractors. As they told the story, habitual cowardice alone kept him out of action.⁷⁴

For a year San Martin remained in Peru. It was a year of great activity on his part, but of no permanent result. His effective contribution had been made. The organization of a government was his first work; ⁷⁵ a provisional constitution was promul-

⁷⁴ Miller, *Memoirs* I: 336; Hall, *Extracts from Journal*, II: 69; Stevenson, *Narrative of Residence*, III: 374; D. Gerónimo Espejo, *Recuerdos históricos: San Martín y Bolívar. Entrevista de Guayaquil (1822), . . . ilustrada con dos retrados* (Buenos Ayres, 1873), 12, contains an attack on Cochrane. Espejo was at Guayaquil during the interview; Monteagudo, *Peruvian Pamphlet*, 16, 30; Markham, *Peru*, 253.

⁷⁵ "I never mentioned a wish to San Martin, or to Monteagudo, that was not granted, and granted immediately, in the most obliging manner. After their going away, I scarcely mentioned anything I wished done that was not refused." James Thomson, *Letters on the moral and religious State of South America, written during a Residence of nearly seven Years in Buenos Ayres, Chile, Peru, and Colombia* (London, 1827),

gated; a committee was started on a general code; and a representative congress was summoned. In the meantime the northern movement, under the direction of Simon Bolivar, was approaching Peru, arriving at Guayaquil in the spring of 1822. The meeting of the two Liberators marks the end of San Martin's career. Appointing as *Supremo Delegado* the Marquis of Torre Tagle, a member of the old nobility, who had turned patriot, and leaving the actual administration of affairs in the hands of Bernardo Monteagudo, San Martin set sail for Guayaquil in February, 1822.⁷⁶ A change in Bolivar's plans making a meeting impossible at this time, he returned to Lima in a few weeks, but did not resume the government. This was unfortunate. Monteagudo, whose ability was undoubted, was "a most zealous patriot," but, "besides being very unpopular in his manners, was a bitter enemy to the whole race of Spaniards."⁷⁷ His enemy tells us he was "of the lowest rank in society, of spurious offspring, and African genealogy."⁷⁸ Ultimately a mob at Lima rewarded his actions by taking his life in the streets. Under Monteagudo a series of proscriptions of

70. Thomson was an English missionary and teacher of the Lancastrian school system. In his latter capacity he was employed by the revolutionary government.

⁷⁶ Stevenson, *Narrative of Residence*, III: 432.

⁷⁷ Hall, *Extracts from Journal*, II: 85.

⁷⁸ Stevenson, *Narrative of Residence*, III: 281.

Spaniards took place that brought the administration into great disfavor.⁷⁹ An incompetent general lost a whole division of the liberating army.⁸⁰ And when San Martin, for the second time, went to Guayaquil, in July, the city rose in revolt.

Various accounts, and none of them authentic, have recorded the meeting of the two leaders at Guayaquil, on the 26th of July, 1822. According to Lord Cochrane, Bolivar "bitterly taunted San Martin with the folly and cruelty of his conduct towards the Limeños; to such an extent, indeed, that the latter, fearing designs upon his person, precipitately left Guayaquil and returned to Callao."⁸¹ Such taunts would not have come well from the lips of Bolivar. More reasonable and more in harmony with precedent and subsequent facts is the conclusion of Sir Clements R. Markham: "General Bolivar came to the port of Guayaquil flushed with victory, and full of ambition to add to the lustre of his name by the liberation of Peru. General San Martin was a pure patriot,⁸² with little personal ambition. He saw clearly that there could be no room for himself and Bolivar in the same sphere of action, and it was necessary for the welfare of the common cause that

⁷⁹ Hall, *Extracts from Journal*, II: 86; Mathison, *Narrative of Visit*, 234.

⁸⁰ Monteagudo, *Peruvian Pamphlet*, 33; Miller, *Memoirs*, I: 350.

⁸¹ Cochrane, *Narrative I*: 225.

⁸² Thomson, *Letters*, 52.

one of them should retire. He did not hesitate to make the sacrifice."⁸³ And so, after a conference of a single day, San Martin returned to the revolted city of Lima. Here he remained for a short time restoring order and preparing for an expedition into upper Peru;⁸⁴ then upon the meeting of the first Peruvian Congress, he "resigned the supreme authority he had assumed a year before,"⁸⁵ accepted the honorary title of *Generalissimo* and a pension,⁸⁶ issued a proclamation of farewell, and returned to Chile. A few months later he passes out of history, causing a mild flutter at the Foreign Office as he came from Buenos Ayres to London, bringing his little daughter to be educated.⁸⁷

It is now necessary to take up the other chain of events of the war of liberation, to bring it down to the point reached by San Martin, and to carry it on to the successful termination of the struggle.

We have already seen how the premature attempt of Miranda to revolutionize South America met with failure in 1806, and how in 1810 the patriotic wave established at Caracas and Bogota juntas ruling in the name of Ferdinand VII.⁸⁸ Simon Bolivar, who,

⁸³ Markham, *Peru*, 254. ⁸⁴ Monteagudo, *Peruvian Pamphlet*, App. 63.

⁸⁵ Hall, *Extracts from Journal*, II: 88. ⁸⁶ Cochrane, *Narrative*, I: 226.

⁸⁷ Parish to Canning, April 25, 1824. *F. O. Mss.*

⁸⁸ José Gil Fortoul, *Historia Constitucional de Venezuela* (2 vol., Berlin, 1907, 1909), is described by H. Bingham as "a most interesting

like Miranda and San Martin, came of an honorable American family, at once placed his services at the disposition of the Venezuelan junta.⁸⁹ Miranda arrived a few months later; and in March, 1811, the first congress met. This body, after four months of deliberation, abandoned the policy with which the revolution had started and proclaimed the independence of Venezuela.⁹⁰

The movement which had thus fallen into the hands of the extremists advanced rapidly. The congress framed a liberal constitution and presented it to the people of Venezuela for approval.⁹¹ But the patriot cause was literally shattered by an unfortunate earthquake that occurred on Holy Thursday of 1812, and gave the clergy of the province a chance to preach the wickedness of insurrection and the terrors of divine vengeance.⁹² This moral blow was closely followed by a series of military successes on the part of Spain. Dissensions arose among the leaders. Bolivar deserted Porto Cabello, Miranda and the in-

and satisfactory account" by "a really notable historian." *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, XV: 907.

⁸⁹ De Schryver, *Bolivar*, 13.

⁹⁰ *Present State of Colombia*, 29. ⁹¹ *Republic of Colombia Account*, 53.

⁹² For an account of the destruction which left Caracas in ruins and reduced Cucuta from 12,000 to 3,000, see *Letters written from Colombia during a Journey from Caracas to Bogotá, and thence to Santa Martha in 1823* (London, 1824), 76; R. Bache, *Notes on Colombia, taken in the Years 1822-3. With an Itinerary of the Route from Caracas to Bogotá; and an Appendix. By an Officer in the United States Army* (Philadelphia, 1827), 38.

surgent army leaving them to the mercy of the Spaniards, who promptly took the city. Miranda himself was captured as he attempted to escape, and his partisans maintain that the deliberate desertion of Bolivar was the cause of his being surrendered to the Spanish general Monteverde. While that general, beginning a policy that became common among royalist officers, coolly violated the pledge of safety he had given to his prisoner, and sent him to Spain, where he speedily died in prison.⁹³

The valley of the Orinoco, extending east and west across three-fourths of the continent, is the backbone of Venezuela. It is separated by the high mountain wall of the Andes from the north and south valley of the Magdalena, which similarly is the backbone of New Granada. The wall is so solid that the two provinces were practically isolated, the one land route of importance being a road running from Caracas to the southwest, crossing the Andes between Barinas and Merida, and continuing its course up the valley of the Magdalena from San Rosario de Cúcuta, through the city of Tunja, to Santa Fé de Bogota, in the district of Cundinamarca.⁹⁴ But the

⁹³ *Republic of Colombia Account*, 58; Markham, *Peru*, 267.

⁹⁴ Partly for the purpose of studying the difficulties overcome by Bolivar, Hiram Bingham has made the journey which he has recorded in *The Journal of an Expedition Across Venezuela and Colombia, 1906-07* (New Haven, 1909).

road was long and the journey one of many weeks, so that land communication between the capitals was considered out of question for large bodies of troops. The situation was similar to that of Buenos Ayres and Chile, which were thought to have no military communication by land until San Martin did the impossible and crossed at Uspallata.

The elimination of Miranda gave Simon Bolivar full sway in the military and political councils of the northern provinces. His vigor and activity were equal to the opportunity. When the disastrous results⁹⁵ of the spring of 1812 destroyed the insurgents in Venezuela, and gave their cities into the hands of the royalists, he crossed into New Granada for the time. There he found no powerful Spanish force in the upper country; but, instead, the patriots themselves were quarreling over the principle of federation, the City of Bogota standing out in determined resistance against the Congress of New Granada.⁹⁶ In the fall of the year, under authority of this Congress, Bolivar was able to open the mouth of the Magdalena to the patriots. A little later, with six hundred men, he struck the Spanish at Cúcuta, passed through Merida and over the Andes to Barinas, proclaiming "War to the Death." On the 4th of August, 1813, he entered Caracas once

⁹⁵ *Colombia Account*, II: 334.

⁹⁶ *Colombia Account*, II: 337.

more.⁹⁷ Here the Dictatorial career of the Liberator began. Disregarding his orders from the Congress of New Granada, to reassemble the Congress of Venezuela, Bolivar called an assembly of notables in Caracas, told them what he had done, confided to them his plans, and resigned into their hands his authority. As was to be expected, his notables at once reinvested him with Dictatorial power, to last until a union between Venezuela and New Granada should come.⁹⁸ With a promising beginning, 1814 came to a disastrous end. Royalist successes drove the Liberator out of Venezuela. Returning to New Granada, the Congress, then sitting at Tunja sent him against the stubborn city of Bogota, which he reduced to membership in the federation.⁹⁹ As a reward, the Congress made him Captain-General of its armies, arousing thereby a feeling of discontent among its officers that defeated all his plans. Even darker days were to follow.

The restoration of Ferdinand VII. to the throne of Spain was the beginning of an absolutist reaction in the peninsula, and of a determined attempt at reconquest in the colonies. By this time the movements

⁹⁷ *Colombia Account*, II: 345. *Republic of Colombia Account*, 61.

⁹⁸ January 2, 1814. *Present State of Colombia*, 35; *Colombia Account*, II: 351; *Republic of Colombia Account*, 64.

⁹⁹ G. Mollien, *Travels in the Republic of Colombia, in the Years 1822 and 1823*. Translated from the French (London, 1824), 136.

that had started in favor of the monarchy had developed into struggles for political independence. Spain showed no disposition to conciliate the provinces, failed to recognize the changes that a decade of economic independence had wrought, and by her own fatuous policy made her rehabilitation as an American power impossible. For a time, however, she had the appearance of success in all her provinces but Buenos Ayres.

In the spring of 1815 it was announced that an extensive armament was preparing for the subjugation of South America. In July General Morillo, as skillful and experienced a soldier as Spain possessed, arrived off Carthagena with two ships of the line, six frigates, seventy transports and twelve thousand veteran troops.¹⁰⁰ For a time the patriot forces repulsed Morillo from this city, but the latter settled down before it with so rigorous an investment that after six months' siege an evacuation took place, and the insurgent troops departed for Aux Cayes.¹⁰¹ At the end of the year the Spanish general made the premature but significant boast that he had not "left alive, in the kingdom of New Granada, a single individual of sufficient influence or talents to conduct

¹⁰⁰ *Annual Register*, 1815, [127]; Mollien, *Travels*, 141.

¹⁰¹ December 6, 1815. *Annual Register*, 1816, [157].

“the revolution.”¹⁰² After another period of six months the boast might have been well founded, for in June, 1816, the invading army completed its march up the Magdalena and entered the capital city of Bogota in triumph.¹⁰³

With the arrival of Morillo in the Vermillion Sea, Bolivar abandoned the continent, went to Jamaica, and thence to the island of St. Domingo. Then at Aux Cayes he was joined by the garrison at Carthage, and in May, 1816, he started an expedition to Venezuela. No permanent success rewarded this attempt. In a few weeks the Liberator was back in Aux Cayes preparing a second expedition, which was able to possess itself of the island of Margarita in December.¹⁰⁴ Co-operating with Sir Gregor M'Gregor who had taken Caracas for the patriots in October, Bolivar advanced from Margarita to the mainland and set up his government at Barcelona, some two hundred miles east of Caracas. But Morillo had moved his army to Margarita, after the capture of Bogota in June, 1816, and now opposed himself to the Liberator in Venezuela.¹⁰⁵ In April, 1817, the royalists took Barcelona. Bolivar moved

¹⁰² *Present State of Colombia*, 40, quoting *Cádiz Journal* of January 6, 1816.

¹⁰³ *Annual Register*, 1816, [158].

¹⁰⁴ *Annual Register*, 1816, [158]; *Colombia Account*, II: 367.

¹⁰⁵ *Annual Register*, 1818, 18.

his capital to the lower valley of the Orinoco, where he placed it in the city of St. Thomas de Angostura.

The campaign of 1818 was undecisive. Morillo held the valley of the Magdalena and the cities of New Granada with almost uncontested authority, while he was well established, also, on the northern coast of Venezuela, in the vicinity of Caracas. Bolivar was at Angostura organizing his government and worrying the enemy. In February he shut up the Spaniard within the walls of Calabozza, and later forced him to withdraw hurriedly to the north. In the fall he established a Council for Foreign Relations at Angostura, and issued writs for an assembly to meet in 1819.¹⁰⁶ The second Congress of Venezuela convened at Angostura on 15th February, 1819, pursuant to the call of the Liberator. Before this body Bolivar made a long and eloquent speech, and again resigned his Dictatorial authority, only to be elected to the same position once more.¹⁰⁷ Meanwhile, in July and August of the previous year, most important reinforcements to the patriot cause had arrived at Margarita, in the shape of various Irish

¹⁰⁶ *Republic of Colombia Account*, 81.

¹⁰⁷ *Colombia Account*, II: 376; *Republic of Colombia Account*, 88; Simon Bolivar, *South American Independence! The Speech of His Excellency, Gen. Bolivar, on the Act of Installation of the Second National Congress of Venezuela, on the 15th day of February, 1819. . . . With an accurate Account of the Proceedings on that interesting Occasion* (London, 1819).

and Albion brigades, forming a Foreign Legion, and recruited in Great Britain from the discharged veterans of the Napoleonic wars.¹⁰⁸ With the aid of these disciplined adventurers Bolivar was prepared to make significant advances in 1819.

In the spring of 1819 Morillo advanced from Caracas inland towards the Orinoco with ten thousand men. Bolivar, from Angostura, sent Santandar west to head off Spanish reinforcements coming down the New Granada road, sent Marino north to head off Morillo's left wing at Barcelona, established his foreign auxiliaries on Margarita to move as directed, and, with Paez, marched himself against the main column of Morillo.¹⁰⁹ The strategy of the campaign was completely successful. Barcelona fell before the combined attack of Marino and the Eng-

¹⁰⁸ *Recollections of a Service of three Years during the War-of-Extermination in the Republics of Venezuela and Colombia. By an Officer of the Colombian Navy* (2 vol., London, 1828), I: 6-19; James Hackett, First Lieutenant of the late Venezuelan Artillery Brigade, *Narrative of the Expedition which sailed from England in 1817 to join the South American Patriots, comprising every Particular concerned with its Formation, History and Fate; with Observations and authentic Information elucidating the real Character of the Contest, Mode of Warfare, State of the Armies, etc.*, (London, 1818); George Laval Chesterton, late Captain and Judge Advocate of the British Legion, raised for the Service of the Republic of Venezuela, *A Narrative of Proceedings in Venezuela in South America, in the Years 1819 and 1820; with general Observations on the Country and People; the Character of the Republican Government, and its leading Members* (London, 1820).

¹⁰⁹ *Annual Register*, 1819, [241].

lish.¹¹⁰ Santandar checked his opponent in the west. And the Liberator left Paez to drive Morillo into a corner at the mouth of Lake Maracaibo, while he himself joined Santandar's wing,¹¹¹ made an unexpected crossing of the Andes, struck the Spaniards at Tunja¹¹² on the 25th of July, and won the decisive battle of Boyaca¹¹³ on the 7th August. The following day the liberating army marched into Santa Fé de Bogota.¹¹⁴

The battle of Boyaca was decisive in the affairs of New Granada. The Spanish army was wrecked, its general was a prisoner, and the viceroy was a fugitive. From this time Spain never had an effective force in the upper valley of the Magdalena, and her forts at the mouth of the river were soon lost. The Liberator lingered in New Granada for some weeks; then he made a quick trip back across the Andes and down into Angostura, where he reported his successes to the Venezuelan Congress.¹¹⁵ It speaks well for this influence over that body, that on the day after his arrival it promulgated a Fundamental Law for

¹¹⁰ Chesterton, *Proceedings in Venezuela*, 29.

¹¹¹ Colombia, *Account*, II: 418; Charles Stewart Cochrane, *Journal of Residence and Travels in Colombia during the Years 1823 and 1824* (2 vols., London, 1825), I: 477.

¹¹² *Republic of Colombia Account*, 90; *Recollections of a Service*, I: 21.

¹¹³ *Present State of Colombia*, 45; *Letters from Colombia*, 137.

¹¹⁴ *Niles Register*, XVII: 328; *Annual Register*, 1819, 245.

¹¹⁵ *Recollections of a Service*, II: 28.

the union of New Granada and Venezuela as the Republic of Colombia,¹¹⁶ and but little later summoned a general Congress of two houses, representing both provinces, to meet at the city of Rosario de Cúcuta, on the eastern frontier of New Granada. The law was issued December 17, 1819; the Congress met in May, 1821. Meanwhile the last steps in the liberation of Colombia had been taken.

During the year 1820 there was no fighting of consequence in Venezuela. It was a period rather of negotiation, tentative on the part of the Spanish officials, definite on the part of Bolivar. Morillo opened the correspondence, addressing the Congress of Angostura in June, calling the patriots brothers, summoning them to peace on a constitutional basis, and announcing the beginning of negotiations for an armistice preliminary to a reconciliation.¹¹⁷ This was an act under orders, for Ferdinand VII. had experienced a change of heart in the spring of 1820. He had accepted a revolution, and with it a constitution for the Spanish monarchy. On this basis he sought a peace. "Vanquished, expelled, or rather effaced from the American soil," wrote the Abbé de Pradt, "impotent to re-establish herself, and tor-

¹¹⁶ *British and Foreign State Papers*, IX: 407; *Colombia Account*, II: 439; Moses, *Const. Colombia*, 13.

¹¹⁷ *Niles Register*, XVII: 463; Cochrane, *Residence in Colombia* I: 506.

“mented by the two-fold feeling of this impotency and the greatness of a loss, the sorrowful weight of which was exaggerated in her eyes by the want of reflection, Spain has, since the period of the last revolution, adopted various expedients in order to neutralize the consequences of a position, which a secret instinct informed her she could not escape.”¹¹⁸ This expedient, however, was wasted, for the Congress of Angostura, meeting in a special session, promptly replied to General Morillo that they would hear with pleasure any proposals based on an “absolute acknowledgment of the entire sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Colombia,”¹¹⁹ and no others whatsoever. Later in the year pacific overtures were more successful, and Bolivar signed an armistice with the royalist leaders at Truxillo on the 25th of November.¹²⁰

The truce had not been on for many weeks before Bolivar realized that it was a mistake on his part. He had met the royalist leaders at Truxillo, had embraced and eaten and drunk with them, and had joined in fervent protestations of undying frater-

¹¹⁸ Abbé de Pradt, *Europe and America in 1821; with an Examination of the Plan laid before the Cortes of Spain for the Recognition of the Independence of South America. Translated from the French . . . by J. G. Williams* (2 vols., London, 1822) II: app., 11.

¹¹⁹ *Niles Register*, XVII: 463.

¹²⁰ *British and Foreign State Papers*, VIII: 1225.

nity. But no results came.¹²¹ Instead, as the months went on, and the time passed when a reply from Spain could have been expected, his troops dwindled and suffered. It was almost impossible to hold a patriotic army together except by the immediate prospect of fighting. And so, in March, 1821, he took advantage of a clause providing for renewal of hostilities on forty days' notice, and declared the truce at end.¹²² La Torre was now in command of the Spanish armies, for Morillo had seized the opportunity afforded by the truce to return to Spain, where he played a great part in the domestic revolution.

The final campaign in the Colombian war now followed. As it went on, there was sitting in the sacristy of the parish church at Rosario de Cúcuta the first general congress of Colombia.¹²³ Here the Act of Union of Angostura and the principle of centralization were debated for three months. Here, on 12th July, it was declared that "We, the Representatives of the People of New Granada and Venezuela, in General Congress assembled" do decree that these same provinces "shall remain united, in one single National Body," forever to be independent

¹²¹ *Recollections of a Service*, II: 109.

¹²² *Annual Register*, 1821 [261]; *British and Foreign State Papers*, VIII: 1233.

¹²³ *Moses, Const. Colombia*, 16; *Letters from Colombia*, 106; *British and Foreign State Papers*, IX: 410.

and a republic.¹²⁴ And here, on the 30th of August, was promulgated a constitution in which the principle of centralization prevailed over that of federation.¹²⁵

The last important battle had been fought before the constitution was proclaimed. The truce expired on 28th April, with the Spanish under La Torre and Morales concentrated around Valencia. Caracas changed hands several times in the early weeks. Bermudez took this city for the patriots in May, only to be driven out in twelve days.¹²⁶ In another month he re-entered, to be driven out again just before the decisive battle. These were skirmishes. The armies met on June 24th at Carabobo, where Paez, Sedeno, and Mackintosh with his English brigade, led the patriots to a complete victory that virtually ended the war in the north.¹²⁷ Bolivar marched into Caracas at once.¹²⁸ La Guayra and

¹²⁴ *British and Foreign State Papers*, IX: 696.

¹²⁵ *British and Foreign State Papers*, IX: 698; *Republic of Colombia Account*, 105.

¹²⁶ *Annual Register*, 1821, 262; *Republic of Colombia Account*, 103.

¹²⁷ *Niles Register*, XXI: 15; *Annual Register*, 1821, [262]; *Recollections of a Service*, II: 196; Bache, *Notes on Colombia*, 144; H. L. V. Decoudray-Holstein, *Memoirs of Simon Bolivar, President Liberator of the Republic of Colombia; and of his principal Generals; secret History of the Revolution, and of the Events which preceded it, from 1807 to the present Time* (Boston, 1829) 281, gives an adverse view, by Bolivar's former chief of staff.

¹²⁸ Decoudray-Holstein, *Bolivar*, 286.

Carthagena yielded to the insurgents, and at the end of the year Spain held only Porto Cabello and Panama. On the 3d of October, 1821, the Liberator once more, and for the third time, was induced, under pressure, to take the oath of office as President of the Republic.¹²⁹ With plans of larger conquest in mind he soon moved the capital from Cúcuta up the valley of the Magdalena to Santa Fé de Bogota. San Martin had just entered the city of Lima.

It has already been seen how José de San Martin fathered a series of patriotic successes, extending from the city of Mendoza, in the viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres, to the city of Lima, in the viceroyalty of Peru. In the summer of 1821 the two liberating armies were drawing close together, with only the territory known to-day as Ecuador lying between them. To gain this territory, and complete the deliverance of South America from the hands of her master, was the patriotic aim of both the Liberator of Colombia and the Protector of Peru. The former, however, had the easier task and the better chance to reach the goal, for the Spanish armies still existing in South America were massed, not in the territory intervening between the patriot forces, but in the mountains around and to the southward of Lima. Bolivar had less to fear from royalist move-

¹²⁹ *Annual Register*, 1821, [264]; *British and Foreign State Papers*, IX: 414.

ments than San Martin, who was in danger of extinction by an army of upper Peru at any time.

The city of Guayaquil, the chief port of Ecuador, lying at the head of the Gulf whose name it bears, erected a junta and declared its independence in the fall of 1820.¹³⁰ This act, it is said, convinced General Morillo of the utter hopelessness of all efforts at reconquest, and caused him to return to Spain to insist upon a peace.¹³¹ The patriots helped the new junta when they could. Cochrane, with his fleet, called at Guayaquil from time to time, while San Martin sent a division of his army as soon as he was established at Lima.¹³² It was left for Bolivar to take the really effective action. After his victory at Carabobo the Liberator left Paez to hold Morales in check along the seacoast, and returned himself to the capital of Colombia, which he soon moved up the river to Bogota. From this city, in the spring of 1822, he marched on up the valley towards the city of Quito. At Bompono, on 7th March, he destroyed a considerable Spanish force;¹³³ while his right hand, Sucre, who had been sent on ahead won a more decisive battle at Pichincha, on 24th May. The narratives of the battle tell us that a dash of Colombian cavalry decided the day after its burden and heat had

¹³⁰ Espejo, *Recuerdas*, 26. ¹³¹ *Republic of Colombia Account*, 100.

¹³² Espejo *Recuerdas*, 87: Stevenson, *Narrative of Residence*, III: 414.

¹³³ De Schryver *Bolivar*, 260.

been borne by the Peruvian division and the English battalion.¹⁸⁴ Quito, a league from Pichincha, fell at once, and four days later an assembly of its prominent men agreed upon an act of union with Venezuela and New Granada.¹⁸⁵ The idea of the Liberator of a grand federation of American republics, under his guidance, was one step nearer attainment.

From Quito, over the mountains to Guayaquil, was the next move. San Martin's enemies say that now the Limeños were secretly begging the Liberator to advance even to Peru and free them at once "from the Protector and the Spaniards,"¹⁸⁶ and that Sucre was now hurried on to the coast to make sure that Guayaquil might not fall into Peruvian hands. Certain it is that Bolivar, following up the victories of his lieutenant, made his triumphal entry into Quito on the 16th of June; on the very day, could he but have known it, that Don Manuel Torres was informed by John Quincy Adams that the President of the United States was ready to receive him as Chargé d'Affaires from the Republic of Colombia.¹⁸⁷ The occupation of Guayaquil was peaceful.

¹⁸⁴ Espejo, *Recuerdas*, 55; *Republic of Colombia Account*, 109; Miller, *Memoirs*, I: 353.

¹⁸⁵ De Schryver, *Bolivar*, 261.

¹⁸⁶ Cochrane, *Narrative*, I: 219; Miers, *Travels in Chile*, II: 80.

¹⁸⁷ J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, VI: 23.

The Peruvian division, needed at home, and no longer of use in Ecuador, was embarked on its transports in July, while the Liberator offered to lend San Martin some regiments of Colombian troops for service in Peru.¹³⁸ At the same time treaties of union, league and confederation, were signed at Lima for the preservation of South American independence and the gathering of a pan-American Congress at Panama.¹³⁹ A week later a proclamation of the Liberator annexed Guayaquil to Colombia.¹⁴⁰

On the 26th of July, 1822, San Martin disembarked at Guayaquil; on the 28th he left that port for Callao.¹⁴¹ What occurred at the meeting of the generals, as has been seen, is not really known, but the result is clear. Up to this day there are two dominant forces to be considered in the war; after this day Bolivar becomes the one center of activity, and under his leadership, along the lines mapped out by San Martin, the final blows are struck and the final peace is attained. We have no occasion here to enter into the controversy waged over the merits of

¹³⁸ Espejo, *Recuerdas*, 57.

¹³⁹ July 6, 1822. *British and Foreign State Papers*, XI: 105; *Annual Register*, 1823, 204,* [247].

¹⁴⁰ Espejo, *Recuerdas*, 75; Miller, *Memoirs*, I: 304.

¹⁴¹ Espejo, *Recuerdas*, 94.

these men.¹⁴² The steps in the achievement of actual independence alone concern us.

Had the Protector been sincere, cried his opponents, who had cried loudly at his assumption of supreme authority the year before, he would not have abandoned Peru at this critical period.¹⁴³ In April, Canterac, one of the ablest and boldest of Spain's generals in America, had surprised and routed completely a whole division of the patriot army at Ica. During the last two months of his protectorship, San Martin worked to repair this loss, with the result that at his departure he left an army of eight thousand, under Alverado and Arenales, for the protection of the country. But the new government failed to make effective use of this force. The provisional junta kept half the army idle, and sent the other half down to Arica, and thence up into the country, where, at Moquegua, at the beginning of the next year Canterac again destroyed a republican army.¹⁴⁴ The Congress meanwhile busied itself with

¹⁴² J. P. Hamilton, *Travels through the interior Provinces of Colombia* (2 vols., London, 1827), I: 229. Hamilton, who was British commissioner in Colombia, gives a friendly view of Bolivar.

¹⁴³ Stevenson, *Narrative of Residence*, III: 458.

¹⁴⁴ *Annual Register*, 1823, [248]; Robert Proctor, *Narrative of a Journey across the Cordillera of the Andes, and of a Residence in Lima and other Parts of Peru, in the Years 1823 and 1824* (London, 1825), 126.

treaties of alliance and bases for constitutions.¹⁴⁵ As the fragments of the dismembered army drifted into Lima, the Congress, with its three-headed junta, became unpopular, was declared unfit to govern, the army mutinied, "and the people of Lima rose and deposed them, & placed a popular leader of the name of Riva-Aguero at the head of affairs."¹⁴⁶

With Don José de la Rive-Aguero as president, the Peruvian revolution was for the first time, and last, in the hands of native Peruvians. Santa Cruz was put in command of the troops, and his activity was at once reflected in their higher discipline. The foreign merchants were won over to the side of the government, while Bolivar was summoned to take up the work San Martín had dropped. Sucre had already appeared in Lima as his agent.¹⁴⁷ In May Santa Cruz was sent to Arica with another army, to regain the ground lost by the defeat at Moquegua. Almost as he left, the army of Canterac approached Callao and occupied the capital¹⁴⁸ on 16th June, 1823. The Congress at once lost its head and prepared for instant flight. Before it left, "after much

¹⁴⁵ *British and Foreign State Papers*, IX: 919, X: 606-696, XII: 813.

¹⁴⁶ Robertson to Parish, May 7, 1823. *F. O. Ms.*

¹⁴⁷ Miller, *Memoirs*, II: 57; Proctor, *across the Cordillera*, 129.

¹⁴⁸ Proctor, *Across the Cordillera*, 148; Hall, *Extracts from Journal*, II: 93; Miller, *Memoirs*, II: 63, says June 18.

“boisterous discussion, Sucre was named supreme military chief, with powers little short of a dictatorship, a step imperiously demanded by the critical situation of the patriots.”¹⁴⁹ With the elevation of Sucre came the practical end of the career of Rive-Aguero. He was probably the victim of Colombian intrigues that induced Congress to put Sucre in his place until the arrival of Bolivar. He was allowed, however, to accompany the Congress in its flight to Truxillo, where he ran an isolated course until Bolivar suppressed him in November.¹⁵⁰ On the first day of September the Liberator entered the city of Lima, and received from the welcoming people the new title of Deliverer.

Early in June Santa Cruz sailed for Arica, whither Miller followed him with reinforcements in July.¹⁵¹ The march of the patriots into upper Peru was successfully accomplished. They passed by the bridge of the Inca, over the Desaguadero, on 25th July, and two weeks later entered the city of La Paz.¹⁵² On 25th August they marched out from that city to defeat Valdez, who had come up against them by a long and rapid march. But soon Valdez was joined by La Serna, the viceroy, and Olañeta brought further aid to the royalists, while the patriots began

¹⁴⁹ Miller, *Memoirs*, II: 63. ¹⁵⁰ Proctor, *Across the Cordillera*, 135.

¹⁵¹ Proctor, *Across the Cordillera*, 160. ¹⁵² Miller, *Memoirs*, II: 67.

an inevitable retreat to the coast. With the royalists following, the retreat turned into a precipitate and shameless flight. A third army had been sacrificed. Sucre had marched to support Santa Cruz after the evacuation of Lima by the royalists [July 17th, 1823]. Now he returned to the capital.¹⁵³

The task of Bolivar, to drive the Spanish forces from their almost impregnable situation in the mountains of Upper Peru, seemed great at the end of 1823. The defeat of the army of Santa Cruz, in September, had left them with as strong a hold as ever on Potosi, La Paz and the Desaguadero; while his own time had been frittered away in suppressing the *ci-devant* president, Rive-Aguero, and erecting a new Congress to continue the work of constitution making. But the Spaniards themselves came royally and unexpectedly to his assistance. Ferdinand VII., whose heart had become constitutional in 1820, experienced another change in 1823, when the Holy Allies lent him troops. The domestic troubles were reflected in the colonies. "We have pretty late accounts from the *Interior* of Peru," wrote one of the British merchants, "and they are at last, & in the least expected way truly favorable for the cause of the patriots. The Royalists have gone to Loggerheads among themselves! Olañeta, the Commander-

¹⁵³ Miller, *Memoirs*, II: 76.

“in-chief at Potosi, has declared for the absolute Ferdinand, and the Catholic religion, as 'twas an hundred years ago. La Serna & Canterac cry, Long live the Constitution, & down with the serviles! and there seems little chance of a composition between these doughty Chiefs. Blood has already been shed in the quarrel; and the advocate of absolute power & blind obedience, & breathes nothing but vengeance & death to the Traitors & Innovators who would betray their Country. The Patriots could have hit upon no better plan than their own Enemies have done, to get rid of the whole of the latter.”¹⁵⁴

The campaign of 1824 opened with a mutiny of patriot troops in the fortress of Callao that gave that place into the hands of the royalists and threatened serious injury to the Peruvian cause.¹⁵⁵ The Congress, startled by the sudden danger, ceased its constitutional debates, “named General Bolivar dictator, and dissolved itself. Thus, at least, closing their political existence with an act of unquestionable wisdom.”¹⁵⁶ With his accustomed professions of reluctance the Liberator accepted the dictatorial

¹⁵⁴ John Parish Robertson & Co., to Mr. Parish of Bath, March 10, 1824. *F. O. Mss.*

¹⁵⁵ Proctor, *Across the Cordillera*, 339; Miller, *Memoirs*, II: 98; Parish to Canning, No. 11, April 25, 1824. *F. O. Mss.*

¹⁵⁶ Miller, *Memoirs*, II: 102; *British and Foreign State Papers*, XI: 866.

power and proceeded to justify his possession of it. He suppressed the mutiny. "By his firmness, activity, and seasonable severities, he checked further defections, and obtained the respect and entire confidence of every faithful patriot. There was a charm in the name of Bolivar, and he was looked up to as the only man capable of saving the republic."¹⁵⁷ Then, with the mutiny quelled, he abandoned Lima to the royalists, who had already obtained Callao, and marched against Canterac.

From Huaraz, on the coast, and sixty leagues north of Lima, the armies of Bolivar marched up into the country. A new discipline appeared in the regiments as the result of his activity. A new spirit of contentment prevailed, for he saw to it that the wages of the soldiers were paid to the soldiers.¹⁵⁸ In June he crossed the Andes in three divisions,¹⁵⁹ making long marches through the mountains that would have been impossible, perhaps, to any European armies. In July he drew near to Pasco, where Arenales had won a noted victory as he marched around Lima at San Martin's command in 1820. In August he came up to Canterac, who marched confidently to meet him. Emboldened by their recent successes, the royalists had been content to leave

¹⁵⁷ Miller, *Memoirs*, II: 106.

¹⁵⁸ Miller, *Memoirs*, II: 113.

¹⁵⁹ Parish to Canning, No. 44, September 26, 1824. *F. O. Mem.*

Valdez to struggle with Olañeta, the absolutist, in the mountains around Potosi. With some nine thousand men Canterac met the rebels on the plain of Junin, at the southern end of Lake Chinchaycocha, on the 6th of August, 1824, only to have his victory turned into an utter defeat by a despairing charge of the Peruvian lancers.¹⁶⁰ Satisfied with the work of the campaign, Bolivar left his army to go into cantonments for the rainy season, and returned to direct in person the operations around Lima.

The river valleys run from the plain of Junin up into the southeast for a hundred leagues to the ancient city of Cuzco; thence in the same direction a second hundred leagues extend beyond Lake Titicaca to the city of La Paz, at its southeast corner; a third hundred, bearing somewhat more to the south, covers the distance from La Paz to Potosi and Chuquisaca. At the southern end of this long chain of valleys Olañeta and Valdez were giving a death-blow to their own cause. La Paz and Cuzco were strongholds of the royalist army. At Junin Sucre was in command of the patriots, at last victorious in Peru.

Sucre failed to put his troops into cantonments as Bolivar had expected, but spent two months manœuvring in the valleys, and watching the armies of La Serna and Canterac. On 3d December the viceroy

¹⁶⁰ Miller, *Memoirs*, II: 127, gives map; De Schryver, *Bolivar*, 263.

met the patriots and defeated them.¹⁶¹ On 9th December he came up with them again half way between Cuzco and Junin. The royalists were flushed with confidence, for they already had one victory to their credit in that week. The patriots were hungry, hard-pressed and discouraged. But when the eighty minutes of battle on the plain of Ayacucho were over, La Serna, the viceroy, was dead, and Canterac, a prisoner, signed a capitulation for his whole army.¹⁶² The war as such was ended. Gamarra, with an advance guard of the patriots, entered Cuzco on Christmas day, with the rest of the army close behind him.¹⁶³

Olañeta still held out for his master in Upper Peru. Although possessed of great mining estates, he resisted, even to the end, all overtures of the patriots to exchange his lost cause for his property. He kept up the warfare in this final stronghold of Spanish authority against the armies of Buenos Ayres, under the veteran Arenales, and against the armies of Peru, under the English veteran Miller. For fifteen years an active state of war had existed in the country between Salta and Potosi, the country which San Martin had wisely despaired of conquer-

¹⁶¹ *Annual Register*, 1825, [209].

¹⁶² *F. O. Mss. Buenos Ayres*, Vol. VIII; *Niles Register*, XXVIII: 156; *Annual Register*, 1825, 148.*

¹⁶³ Miller, *Memoirs* II: 183.

ing ten years before.¹⁶⁴ On Christmas day, 1824, the patriots reached Cuzco; in March, 1825, they came to La Paz, whence Miller was sent on to end the struggle. At the close of March Olañeta was beaten, and his own troops slew him. Miller entered Potosi, April 25th.¹⁶⁵

Bolivar had meanwhile reassembled the Peruvian Congress on 10th February, and had gone through the ceremony of resigning and accepting for another year his dictatorial authority.¹⁶⁶ Then he had departed for a triumphal progress through the country. At Arequipa he confirmed a Congress for Upper Peru that Sucre had called; its proceedings were to be subject to the action of the Peruvian Congress of 1826, while Sucre himself should be the government for the intervening year.¹⁶⁷ This Congress, meeting at Chuquisaca, later rebaptized Sucre, declared for the independence of Upper Peru, on August 6th, 1825, and five days later adopted the name of the Liberator for the new republic.¹⁶⁸ Peru and Buenos Ayres joined in confirming the independence of

¹⁶⁴ Andrews, *Journey from Buenos Ayres*, II: 252.

¹⁶⁵ Miller, *Memoirs*, II: 200; Andrews, *Journey from Buenos Ayres*, I: 296; Parish to Canning, No. 10, February 10, 1825. *F. O. Ms.*

¹⁶⁶ *British and Foreign State Papers*, XII: 885; De Schryver, *Bolívar*, 267; *Annual Register*, 1825, [211].

¹⁶⁷ Parish to Canning, No. 55, August 6, 1825. *F. O. Ms.*

¹⁶⁸ *British and Foreign State Papers*, XII: 859.

Bolivia in the following spring. The Spanish surrendered the port of Callao on 19th January, 1826. From this port, nine months later, the Liberator sailed for Guayaquil, never to return. From Guayaquil he journeyed down to Bogota and reassumed his functions as President of Colombia.

CHAPTER II

SOUTH AMERICAN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES

Liberty and independence have always been names to conjure with in the United States. Popular sympathy has always gone out to a party or a people struggling with these as their watchwords. Yet it is rarely that the government has allowed them to blind its eyes to its international duties or interests. The wave of feeling engendered by the French revolution threatened for a time to drive the country into an active foreign alliance, but its ultimate result was only to bring about the enunciation of a system of neutral obligations that has endured to this day. The sufferings of the Greek patriots called forth the eloquence of Henry Clay and Daniel Webster and Edward Everett; called forth money by thousands from the pockets of liberty-loving citizens; but failed to move for an instant the administration from its proper course. At a later time the misery of Cuba aroused the national emotion, but an entirely different cause precipitated a war. So it was in the South American struggle for independence.

Before the contest had really begun it had become evident that the events in South America would be

watched with a more eager interest than our semi-hostile relations with Spain could explain. When it came to the issue Jefferson was unwilling to implicate the country in movements hostile to Ferdinand, but the ease with which Miranda had secured audience of the president and his secretaries, and had won over to his enterprise prominent federal officials of New York, indicated that few were unfriendly to a South American cause as such. And when some two years after the failure of his expedition the petition of thirty-six American citizens incarcerated in the fortress of Carthagená came before Congress a lively interest in their behalf was at once called forth.¹ The story told by these young filibusters, with variations, had become a familiar tale: their expedition was the prototype of innumerable later expeditions, extending through the times of William Walker to the days of John D. Hart, the *Three Friends* and the *Laurada*; their career was the familiar one of great expectations veiled in alluring mystery, doubtful expedients, suspicion, and utter, hopeless failure; and now they came to Congress to find friends who should urge an intervention in their behalf.

For two weeks, in the beginning of June, 1809, weeks in which the South Americans were over-

¹ *A. S. P. F. R.*, III: 257.

throwing their viceroys and erecting juntas in the name of Ferdinand, the petition of the Miranda men was under consideration in the House of Representatives. It was accompanied by a favorable report from a special committee, and a resolution recommending that the President, if convinced that they were involuntarily drawn into the unlawful enterprise, should use every effort to obtain their release.² The debate ran on for several days, reviewing laws of neutrality and relations with France and Spain, until at last the Committee of the Whole, from sympathy and the underlying conviction that Spain had no rights in her colonies which a friend of liberty was bound to respect, passed the resolution.³ Before the House, the opposition, with John Randolph at its head, became more insistent. Here the latter continued his heavy fire of sarcasm and vituperation that had already brought Pearson, of North Carolina, to offer him his blood, until the sentimental inclinations of the House were in a measure overcome. He alluded particularly to the rupture of relations with Spain, which had occurred upon the elevation of Joseph, raising for the first time the question of the recognition of the South American provinces. To accomplish the release of

² *A. S. P. F. R.*, III: 258; *Annals of Congress*, 11 Cong., 1 Sess., 257.

³ June 13, 1809. *Annals of Congress*, 11 Cong., 1 Sess., 283.

the prisoners an agent must be sent to Caracas. But we cannot send this agent, declared Randolph, "without acknowledging the independence of the colonies of South America, and then involving ourselves in a war with France, or addressing ourselves, in the first instance, to the Government of France."⁴ The truly American doctrine that a premature recognition is a cause for war, was thus declared. Later in the same day, by the vote of the Speaker, the resolution was defeated.⁵

Two years later this tendency of the House was revealed in connection with the President's message. In November, 1811, Madison alluded to the interesting scenes "developing themselves among the great communities which occupy the southern portion of our own hemisphere."⁶ The special committee to which this portion of the message was referred read the declaration of independence of Venezuela and reported a resolution expressing a friendly solicitude in the welfare of these communities and a readiness, when they should have become nations "by a just exercise of their rights," to unite with the executive in establishing with them such relations as might

⁴ *Annals of Congress*, 11 Cong., 1 Sess., 306.

⁵ June 14, 1809. *Annals of Congress*, 11 Cong., 1 Sess., 315.

⁶ J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents I*: 494.

become necessary.⁷ This was an indication of the sentiment of Congress. Evidently the sentiment might become more pronounced if events in South America should become more active.

President Madison realized the significance of the movements that took place throughout South America in 1809 and 1810. He saw clearly that they might in time call upon the United States for political action, and that already there were commercial interests to be protected and developed. As early as 1807 the State Department had been informed of the embarrassments under which American commerce struggled at Buenos Ayres.⁸ The commerce was admittedly illegal, but it was tolerated, and the need of an agent to protect it was avowed. The Jefferson administration took no action in this direction, but on 28th June, 1810, Secretary Smith instructed an agent to visit South America.

Joel Roberts Poinsett,⁹ of South Carolina, had

⁷ *A. S. P. F. R.*, III: 538: *Annals of Congress*, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., 427.

⁸ David C. De Forest to James Madison, Oct. 4, 1807. *State Dept. Mes.*

⁹ In the library of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania are the papers of Joel Roberts Poinsett, in some fourteen folio volumes. They contain not only duplicates of his correspondence with the State Department, but even many of the originals, for which search may be made in vain in Washington. A short "Life and Public Services of Joel R. Poinsett," by C. J. Stillé is in *Pa. Mag. of Hist. and Biog.*, XII: 129, 257.

already seen much of the world when Madison appointed him to this new mission. Possessed of independent fortune, he had traveled over Europe, visited Siberia and the interior of Russia, and declined to enter the service of the Czar. Later he became a center of contention in Mexico and played a part in the emancipation of Greece. Now, as American agent, he journeyed into Buenos Ayres and Chile, and in the latter country led a brigade of the patriot army against the Spaniards.¹⁰ In spite of this lapse from duty—which went unblamed—he seems to have been one of the ablest and best representatives of the United States in South America. He seems not to have engaged in privateering or commerce. Some years later it is declared that there was not a single American in Buenos Ayres who was not interested in privateering. The list is quite long of improper persons, English and American, who were sent to South America.

“As a crisis is approaching,”¹¹ went Poinsett’s instructions, “which must produce great changes in the situation of Spanish America, and may dissolve altogether its colonial relations to Europe, and as the geographical position of the United States and other

¹⁰ Graham, *Journal*, 23.

¹¹ R. Smith to J. B. Poinsett, June 28, 1810. *S. D. Mss.*

“obvious considerations give them an intimate interest in whatever may affect the destiny of that part of the American Continent, it is our duty to turn our attention to this important subject, and to take such steps not incompatible with the neutral character and honest policy of the United States, as the occasion renders proper. With this view you have been selected to proceed without delay to Buenos Ayres, and thence, if convenient, to Lima in Peru or Santiago in Chile or both. You will make it your object whenever it may be proper, to diffuse the impression that the United States cherish the sincerest good will towards the people of South America as neighbors, as belonging to the same portion of the globe, and as having a mutual interest in cultivating friendly intercourse; that this disposition will exist whatever may be their internal system or European relations, with respect to which no interference of any sort is pretended; and that in the event of a political separation from the parent country and of the establishment of an independent system of National Government, it will coincide with the sentiments and policy of the United States to promote the most friendly relations and the most liberal intercourse between the inhabitants of this Hemisphere, as having, all a common interest, and as lying under a common obligation to maintain that system

of peace, justice and good will, which is the only source of happiness for nations.

“ Whilst you inculcate these as the principles and dispositions of the United States, it will be no less proper to ascertain those on the other side, not only towards the United States, but in reference to the great nations of Europe, as also to that of Brazil, and the Spanish branches of the Government there; and to the Commercial and other connections with them respectively, and generally to inquire into the State, the characteristics, intelligence and wealth of the several parties, the amount of the population, the extent and organization of the military force and the pecuniary resources of the country.

“ The real as well as ostensible object of your mission is to explain the mutual advantages of a commerce with the United States, to promote liberal and stable regulations, and to transmit seasonable information on the subject.”¹²

¹² Until about 1835 the State Department kept two series of letter-books, one containing copies of instructions to American ministers abroad, and the other all notes sent to the legations in Washington. In addition, two files were kept for each country, comprising, respectively, the despatches from the American minister and the notes received from the legations. After this date the consolidated letter-books were abandoned, and manuscripts in the State Department are most easily traced through C. H. Van Tyne and W. G. Leland, *Guide to the Archives of the Government of the United States in Washington* (Carnegie Institution, 1907).

With these objects in view, Poinsett was given the title of Agent for Seamen and Commerce in the Port of Buenos Ayres. Ten months later Louis Goddefroy was appointed "Consul for Buenos Ayres and the ports below it on the River Plate,"¹³ and Poinsett was raised to Consul General. "The instructions already given you," wrote Monroe,¹⁴ "are so full that there seems to be little cause to add to them at this time. Much solicitude is felt to hear from you on all the topics to which they relate—the disposition shown by most of the Spanish provinces to separate from Europe and to erect themselves into independent States, excites great interest here. As Inhabitants of the same Hemisphere, as Neighbors, the United States cannot be unfeeling Spectators of so important a moment [movement?]. The destiny of these provinces must depend on themselves. Should such a revolution however take place, it cannot be doubted that our relation with them will be more intimate, and our friendship stronger than it can be while they are colonies of any European power."

For a period of six years the United States maintained consuls or agents in South America. William R. Lowry was sent to Caracas as Poinsett was sent

¹³ Monroe to Goddefroy, April 30, 1811. *S. D. Mes.*

¹⁴ Monroe to Poinsett, April 30, 1811. *S. D. Mes.*

to Buenos Ayres.¹⁵ But the representation in Venezuela was not kept up as steadily as that in the south of the continent, for the patriotic movements in that region were but spasmodic in the beginning and finally succumbed to the pressure of Morillo's armies. In the south representation, like the independent government, was maintained steadily after 1810. The status of the American agents, however, is not entirely clear. There existed no intent to recognize the governments at this time, and the administration was not sure that the juntas would give public recognition to United States consuls who could not give reciprocal recognition to them.¹⁶ So Poinsett went out as an unofficial but accredited agent for seamen and commerce with letters similar to those held by various agents in the West Indies. Yet in 1811 he was commissioned as consul-general and a consul was appointed under him while the State Department constantly addressed him and his successors by these titles. No trace has been found of an *exequatur* issued to any of these agents, but they speak in their despatches of being formally received.¹⁷ In March, 1812, the junta of Buenos Ayres definitely refused

¹⁵ Smith to Lowry, November 6, 1810. *S. D. Mss.*

¹⁶ Smith to Poinsett, August 7, 1810. *S. D. Mss.*

¹⁷ *Poinsett Mss.*, Vol. I.

an *exequatur* to Robert Staples, British Consul, because he could not acknowledge its independence.¹⁸

Through these agents the State Department kept itself informed on events in Spanish America. In their despatches can be found accounts of the frequent revolutions that made government in Buenos Ayres a hazardous and fascinating pastime. The military events on the frontiers are told with considerable exactness, and original bulletins of the junta and the liberating army are frequently enclosed. At times the agents themselves played a part in the local events. Poinsett went from Buenos Ayres into Chile, there to make friends with the Carreras and fight in their armies. He returned to Buenos Ayres just in time to escape the disasters of Rancagua that sent O'Higgins and his handful of survivors to swell the forces of San Martin at Mendoza.¹⁹ Thence, dodging the British cruisers, he returned to the United States to be congratulated by Monroe in the name of the President on the ability, zeal and success with which he had conducted his delicate mission.²⁰ At a later day his successor, Devereux, guaranteed a loan, that snatched the existing government from the hands of its enemies.

¹⁸ Memorandum dated June 26, 1823. *F. O. Mss.*

¹⁹ Halsey to Sec. State, Feb. 11, 1815. *S. D. Mss.*

²⁰ Monroe to Poinsett, July 16, 1815. *Poinsett Mss.*

Less successful than Poinsett, this agent was disavowed and dismissed.²¹

The South Americans were as eager to give information as the United States to receive it. Their Directors and Dictators constantly addressed the northern President with news of victory and requests for arms, accompanied by expressions of profound friendship. At the same time their agents appeared at Washington as well as at London. Venezuela sent Don Luis Lopez Mendez to the latter city in 1811,²² having already sent Don T. Orea to the United States in 1810.²³ In 1816 the first representative from Buenos Ayres appeared at Washington with an apology for the delay and an assurance that a declaration of independence would soon be passed. "In the meantime," his credentials went on,²⁴ "our deputy near your Excellency will not be invested with a public character, nor will he be disposed to exceed the object of his mission, without an understanding with your Excellency and your Ministers. That these views may be exactly fulfilled, I have selected a gentleman who, from his personal qualities, will not excite suspicion that he is sent by the Government invested with so serious and im-

²¹ Rush to Halsey, April 21, 1817. *S. D. Mss.*

²² *Present State of Colombia*, 86.

²³ *Aurora*, October 29, 1817.

²⁴ *Annals of Congress*, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., 1876.

“portant a commission. He is Colonel Martin Thompson. . . . I hope your Excellency will give him full credit, and secure for him all the consideration which, in a like case, we would give and secure to the Ministers whom your Excellency may think proper to send to these provinces.”

The Spanish minister in the United States, Don Luis de Onis, failed to view the development of these friendly, though unofficial, relations with equanimity. For six years in his informal capacity he had watched the growth of a sentiment in favor of South America. Arriving with credentials from the Regency of Cadiz, in the early days of Madison's first administration, he had been refused a reception on the ground of the uncertain character of that government. Madison never recognized the revolutionary and Napoleonic governments in Spain, so it was not until the restoration of Ferdinand VII. in 1815 that the Spanish minister was received in his official capacity. Thereupon the latter took up in a formal way the protests he had long been making informally.

The South American situation was at this time bound up with the aggressions of the United States in the Floridas and the piratical establishments in the Gulf of Mexico. In their broadest extent the demands of de Onis comprehended the complete exclu-

sion of the various South American flags from the ports of the United States. To these pretensions the Secretary of State replied with proper dignity that the United States could pay no attention to the flags of vessels seeking admission to its harbors and obeying its laws.²⁵

But Spain had reasonable grievances enough without resorting to preposterous demands.

The neutrality laws of the United States, although adequate in spirit, failed in their details to meet the situation created by the revolt of Spain's American provinces. Based upon the great proclamation of the first President, and enacted in 1794, the law contemplated wars between independent States. So far it was correct in spirit and formulated for the first time the principles of international law upon the subject. But the law was difficult of execution, for no authority was given in it for the seizure of vessels suspected of intention to violate neutrality, and its provisions did not sufficiently cover acts done by aliens within the limits of the United States. At a later day the courts discovered that services in behalf of unrecognized governments were not unneutral in the eye of the law, for this contemplated only offenses in behalf of sovereign States.²⁶

²⁵ Monroe to de Onis, January 19, 1815. *National Intelligencer*, November 12, 1817.

²⁶ *Gelston vs. Hoyt. Wheaton, III: 246.*

Through these inadequacies in the law, the sympathies and commercial interests of the Americans had come to the support of the southern patriots. Blank commissions for privateers issued from the South American capitals in shoals, and from Baltimore the vessels thus equipped put out to prey upon Spanish commerce;²⁷ too often upon any commerce that was not armed to protect itself. At times with scrupulous regard for the dictates of neutrality, the privateer would go to a port in South America before commencing its cruise; too often, it was enough to have cleared from Baltimore or New Orleans for such a port. And when the cruise was ended, no privateer or ship of war hesitated to put into a United States port to refit and recruit, to restore or augment its armament. The issuing of commissions within the United States, the equipment of vessels to destroy the commerce of Spain, and the augmentation of their strength, were all manifest violations of neutrality. Against them the Spanish minister protested with propriety. When the prizes of South American privateers came within the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, these examined into the antecedents of the captors, and did not hesitate

²⁷ Adams to Halsey, January 22, 1818; Halsey to Adams, August 21, 1818. *S. D. Mss.* Halsey was dismissed for dealing in such commissions. He defended himself by alluding to the notorious equipment of privateers in the United States.

to restore the prize to the proper owners. But this possibility of redress had little effect upon the crime. And so, through the imperfections of the law, and the prevalence of a popular sympathy that made jury convictions well-nigh impossible, the Latin-Americans made the United States a base for their naval operations with impunity.

When the fourteenth Congress met, in the fall of 1816, for its last session, the question of the recognition of the South American provinces did not exist. There was widespread sympathy for those provinces in their struggle, and a general, genuine interest in the events transpiring in their continent. Few would have disclaimed a hope in their ultimate independence and recognition, or a feeling that there is a real American community of interest; in spite of the scornful epigram of Mr. Adams, "As to an American system, we have it; we constitute the whole of it."²⁸ But no person of consequence had so much as intimated that the time was ripe for an acknowledg-

²⁸J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs* (12 vols., Philadelphia, 1874-1877), V: 176. The archives of the Adams family, now deposited in the building of the Massachusetts Historical Society, are rich in materials on foreign affairs. Here are to be found duplicates of most of the correspondence of John Quincy Adams, while Secretary of State, as well as the manuscript of his journal and the papers of his father and his son. From this collection W. C. Ford has drawn materials for his various writings on the Monroe doctrine as well as for his edition of *The Writings of John Quincy Adams* (1913-).

ment of the independence of these States. Indeed, all the States but Buenos Ayres had been extinguished within the past year by the triumphant armies of the restored Ferdinand. Before the end of the session the South American question had been again reviewed and the customary expressions of friendship had been once more evoked.

On 14th January, 1817, Forsyth, from the House Committee on Foreign Relations, reported a bill²⁹ which came to be "called, and properly called, a bill for making peace between His Catholic Majesty and the town of Baltimore."³⁰ It was a revision of the neutrality act, that had been suggested by the President in a special message of 26th December.³¹ The debate on this new neutrality act extended over the rest of the session and did not end until the third of March. Much opposition was shown to strengthening the legislation in the interests of Spain; an act which was felt to be hostile to the rebellious colonies. Some were almost ready for a positive intervention on the side of these. Henry Clay thought the existing acts went far enough, agreed that a professed neutrality must be maintained, but

²⁹ *Annals of Congress*, 14 Cong., 2 Sess., 477.

³⁰ By John Randolph, January 24, 1817. *Annals of Congress*, 14 Cong., 2 Sess., 732.

³¹ Richardson, *Messages*, I: 582, *Annals of Congress*, 14 Cong., 2 Sess., 39.

admitted a strong hope for the independence of the colonies. Even he was not insistent upon an immediate recognition. When the next Congress met, recognition had been made a question.

During the winter and spring of 1817 the news from South America indicated that affairs had taken a more hopeful appearance for the patriots. A new order seemed to have been born to Buenos Ayres, where a Congress of the provinces had come together at Tucuman, and issued, on 9th July, 1816, a declaration of independence in the name of the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata.³² Its manifesto reminded the nations of the world that Buenos Ayres had maintained an uncontested independence for six years. The patriot armies too had begun to retrieve their losses. San Martin, in his province of Mendoza, had nearly completed the period of recruiting, and before the spring was far advanced the news reached Washington that he had broken camp, made a marvelous march across the Andes and defeated the Spanish army at Chacabuco. With more results to feed upon, popular and governmental interests in South America took a new life. The President determined to learn the truth about the revolution, to be ready for any event. In the House

³² *Annals of Congress*, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., 1877; *Annual Register*, 1816 [159].

of Commons, Henry Brougham interrogated the ministry on the subject.³³

In his efforts to find a suitable agent for this mission, President Monroe turned once more to Joel R. Poinsett. On April 25th, 1817, he wrote him a personal note, asking him to make the trip to Buenos Ayres in a public ship, and offering him "liberal compensation." "The progress of the revolution in the Spanish Provinces," he wrote, "which has always been interesting to the U. States, is made much more so, by many causes, and particularly by a well-founded hope, that it will succeed."³⁴ But Poinsett had entered the Legislature of South Carolina and declined the appointment.³⁵ Forced to give up this plan, the President settled upon a Commission, invited Cæsar A. Rodney, of Delaware, and John Graham to serve upon it, and departed from the capital for his tour through New England and the West,³⁶ leaving Richard Rush as Secretary of State to carry out his designs. Through the months of July and August Rush labored zealously to carry out the wish of his superior, but without avail. One commissioner resigned. Rodney was detained at home by the illness of a son. And the secretary

³³ March 19, 1817. Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, XXXV: 1194.

³⁴ Monroe to Poinsett, April 25, 1817. *S. D. Mss.* The original is in the *Poinsett Mss.*

³⁵ *Poinsett Mss.*

³⁶ J. B. McMaster, *Hist. of the People of the United States*, IV: 377.

did not dare to send a single commissioner. As the President was out of communication with Washington for several weeks the matter had to drop until his return in September. Then the business was resumed, with the result that on 4th December the frigate Congress sailed from Hampton Roads,³⁷ carrying Cæsar A. Rodney, John Graham and Theodorick Bland as commissioners, and H. M. Brackenridge as secretary.³⁸ At the same time John B. Prevost was sent to Chile and Peru on a similar mission, with the additional charge to take possession of the Oregon country.³⁹ There is considerable justice in the statement that "several" of the men chosen were known to be fanatics in the "cause of emancipation;"⁴⁰ Brackenridge, in particular, was a "mere enthusiast;" Judge Bland started out as one.⁴¹

In the instructions to the commissioners, Richard Rush stated the policy of the United States: "The contest between Spain and the Spanish colonies in the southern parts of this continent has been, from

³⁷ Bland's Report in *Annals of Congress*, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., 2106.

³⁸ H. M. Brackenridge, *Voyage to South America. Performed by Order of the American Government, in the years 1817 and 1818, in the Frigate Congress* (2 vols., Baltimore, 1819). Brackenridge became a strong partisan of the South Americans.

³⁹ Rush to Prevost, July 18, 1817; J. Q. Adams to Prevost, September 29, 1817. *S. D. Mss.* ⁴⁰ W. F. Reddaway, *Monroe Doctrine*, 25.

⁴¹ J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, IV: 156-388.

“its commencement, highly interesting, under many views, to the United States. As inhabitants of the same hemisphere, it was natural that we should feel a solicitude for the welfare of the colonists. It was nevertheless our duty to maintain the neutral character with impartiality and allow of no privileges of any kind to one party which were not extended to the other. The government of Spain viewing the colonies as in a state of rebellion, had endeavored to impose upon foreign powers in their intercourse with them, the conditions applicable to such a state. This pretension has not been acceded to by this government, which has considered the contest in the light of a civil war, in which the parties were equal. An entire conviction exists that the view taken on this point has been correct, and that the United States have fully satisfied every just claim of Spain.

“In other respects we have been made to feel the progress of this contest. Our vessels have been seized and condemned, our citizens made captives and our lawful commerce, even at a distance from the theatre of the war, been interrupted. Acting with impartiality towards the parties, we have endeavored to secure from each a just return. In whatever quarter the authority of Spain was abrogated and an independent government erected, it was essential to the security of our rights that we should enjoy its

“friendship. Spain could not impose conditions upon other powers incident to complete sovereignty in places where she did not maintain it. On this principle the United States have sent agents into the Spanish colonies; addressed to the existing authority, whether of Spain or of the colony, with instructions to cultivate its friendship and secure as far as practicable the faithful observance of our rights.

“The contest by the extension of the revolutionary movement, and the greater stability which it appears to have acquired, becomes daily of more importance to the United States. It is by success that the colonies acquire new claims on other powers which it may comport neither with their interest nor duty to disregard. Several of the colonies having declared their independence and enjoyed it for some years, and the authority of Spain being shaken in others, it seems probable that, if the parties be left to themselves, the most permanent political changes will be effected. It therefore seems incumbent on the United States to watch the movement in its subsequent steps with particular attention, with a view to pursue such course as a just regard for all those considerations which they are bound to respect may dictate.

“Under these impressions, the President deems it a duty to obtain, in a manner more comprehen-

“sive than has heretofore been done, correct information of the actual state of affairs in those colonies. . . .”⁴²

By the time the commissioners bearing these instructions sailed, in December, 1817, the whole question of recognition had assumed a new shape. It had become the subject of a factious opposition waged by Henry Clay. When Monroe became President, the Speaker had set his heart on the position of Secretary of State, which had come to be that of heir-apparent. “In the government of the United States,” said Simon Bolivar, in one of his addresses, “it has latterly been the practice to nominate the prime minister as successor to the president. Nothing can be more suitable to a republic than this method.”⁴³ With his eye fixed upon the presidency, Clay was prepared to be disgusted and thrown into the opposition when Monroe looked over his head and recalled Adams from the Court of St. James to take the post.⁴⁴ He declined the portfolio of war, as he had declined it in the previous year, when Madison had offered it. The British mission was, in his

⁴² Rush to Rodney and Graham, July 18, 1817. *S. D. Mes.* The commissioners sailed in December with these instructions. Adams was then Secretary of State.

⁴³ Address to the Congress of Bolivia, May 25, 1826. *British and Foreign State Papers*, XII: 865-893; Miller, *Memoirs*, II: 409.

⁴⁴ C. Schurz, *Henry Clay*, I: 126, 141; McMaster, *Hist. People*, IV: 376; J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, IV: 63.

mind, no adequate substitute, and he returned to Congress eager for a subject upon which to fight. The question of the recognition of the Latin-American States that were waging such a stubborn war of liberation was an admirable theme for a romantic orator. As the friend of liberty he might force the hand of the administration, or perhaps overturn the succession at the end of Monroe's term. At any rate, he might force his enemies to appear the friends of Spain and the upholders of a heartless tyranny.⁴⁵ The mutterings of the coming storm were heard during the recess of Congress.

During the summer of 1817 news from South America occupied a prominent place in the newspapers. The progress of San Martin, in Chile, and the doings of Bolivar and his Congress of Angostura, were described in detail that grew more elaborate as the weeks advanced. In September the topic of immediate recognition was broached in the *Richmond Enquirer*. In a series of seven letters, which were immediately reprinted in the *National Intelligencer*, "Lautaro" addressed the Hon. Henry Clay.⁴⁶ He

⁴⁵Schurz, I: 146 *et seq.*, thinks Clay's advocacy was due to sympathy and was not inspired by a desire to oppose the administration. He shows that Clay had expressed sympathy as early as 1816. There is a distinction, however, between active sympathy and a demand for immediate recognition. There is no doubt that in the former Clay was sincere. ⁴⁶*National Intelligencer*, September 30 to October 18, 1817.

traversed the whole subject and policy of the war of independence, concluding with a recommendation of recognition of Chile and Peru, as the most difficult of access to Spain of all her former provinces. Other writers elaborated and controverted various points of his argument. It is suspected that Mr. Adams himself, over the name of "Phocion," entered the controversy in behalf of conservatism. Six weeks before the opening of Congress the editor of the *Intelligencer* announced that if the President should neglect to treat the matter adequately in his message, he was warranted in saying that it would be broached in the House of Representatives, where it would form a good theme for the display of oratorical abilities.⁴⁷

Monroe saw the storm coming and questioned his cabinet on the subject. An immediate recognition would remove this fertile topic from the reach of Clay. But Mr. Adams, though realizing the essential rivalry between himself and the Speaker, did not hesitate to avow "my opinion that it is not now expedient for the President to acknowledge the Government of Buenos Ayres."⁴⁸ He continued the preparations begun by Mr. Rush for sending the commissioners to South America, determined not to act without real knowledge of the subject.

⁴⁷ *National Intelligencer*, October 21, 1817.

⁴⁸ J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, IV: 15.

On 3d December, 1817, the day before the "Congress" sailed, Henry Clay rose in the House and offered an amendment instructing the Committee on the Message to inquire what was necessary to secure to the South Americans their rights as belligerents.⁴⁹ The motion was accepted without opposition. The period of factious advocacy had begun.

The Secretary of State was by no means blind to the nature of the opposition. Before the first week of the session ended he wrote that Mr. Clay "had already mounted his South American great horse . . . [in his effort] to control or overthrow the Executive by swaying the House of Representatives,"⁵⁰ and as the subsequent weeks passed he began to fear that his opponent might succeed.⁵¹ Clay did not force the fighting rapidly. One of his allies called for the papers relating to the independence and condition of South America on December 5th.⁵² Three days later he himself directed the debate on Amelia Island and Galveston to a discussion of the hostility of the administration towards the revolting provinces.⁵³ A little later he opposed in

⁴⁹ *Annals of Congress*, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., 401.

⁵⁰ J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, IV: 28.

⁵¹ J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, IV: 61.

⁵² *Annals of Congress*, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., 406.

⁵³ *Annals of Congress*, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., 409, 1890, 1897; *A. S. P. F. R.*, IV: 173-183.

vain an amendment to the neutrality act. At the same time, stirred up by the attitude of the opposition, if not directly inspired by its members, the South American agents in Washington began their importunities for immediate recognition. None of them had presented credentials justifying demands of a diplomatic nature, but now one at least offered to conclude a treaty, without instructions. On 25th March, 1818, the President sent to Congress a mass of correspondence on South America, together with a critical report by Adams on the demands of the agents. The day before, Clay had come out with the beginning of his great speech. With the general appropriation bill under consideration, he had moved an item of eighteen thousand dollars to provide for a minister to the Provinces of Rio de la Plata.⁵⁴

Candid members of Congress, as their recorded votes show, realized that there was no pressing need for haste in recognizing countries that had not even sent ministers to demand it.⁵⁵ Mr. Clay's devoted biographer finds in this "daring philanthropy" of his subject, better described as rancorous benevolence by Mr. Adams, "a law of instructions and authority for the president to act upon. It was a step—a large step in advance, not only of the coun-

⁵⁴ J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, IV: 67; *Annals of Congress*, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., 1469.

⁵⁵ Peck, *Jacksonian Epoch*, 76.

“try and of the government, but of the whole civilized world.”⁵⁶ Clay himself later discovered that it was a “course exclusively American,” opposed to the course desired by the President, who contemplated a simultaneous recognition with European powers.⁵⁷ The speech was able, and seems to have been appreciated by the countries in whose behalf it was made. “We have learned from a gentleman who has traveled in South America, that the noble speeches, pronounced by Mr. Clay in support of his motion for the recognition of Colombian Independence, were printed and suspended in the Legislative Halls and Council Chambers of that country, and that his name was mentioned only to be blessed by the people whose cause he had so ably and so eloquently espoused.”⁵⁸

For several hours on 25th March, 1818, Clay urged upon the House the claims of South America.⁵⁹ He was as consistent as his position at the head of a factious opposition would permit. He disclaimed a desire for war with Spain, or for a departure from the customary course of neutrality, maintaining that a mere recognition was no cause for hostilities. Yet

⁵⁶ Calvin Colton, *The Life and Times of Henry Clay* (2 ed., 2 vols., New York, 1846), I: 216.

⁵⁷ Colton, *Clay*, I: 225. Speech of Clay at Lexington, June 7, 1820.

⁵⁸ Littell, *The Clay Minstrel, or National Songster*, 43.

⁵⁹ *Annals of Congress*, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., 1474-1500.

in the same breath he urged that Spain be pressed vigorously for redress for the wrongs she had done to the United States, and that pressure be brought not by the seizure of the Floridas, but by a recognition of her provinces. 7

With the manifesto of the Congress of Tucuman in his hand, he drew an eloquent picture of an oppressed people, revolting not against "a mere theory of tyranny," as the North American colonies did, but against an actual tyranny of centuries, horrible, bloody and destructive. Playing on the sympathies of the House with one hand, with the other he played upon its greed, as he showed the extent of South American commerce, the value of its exports, and the deep and abiding interest of the United States therein. At the same time he calmed the fears of the timorous by showing that Spain was in no condition to enter into a war—for which he had already said she would have no just cause; that the allies had lost their principle of cohesion since Waterloo; that England, the only dangerous power of Europe, had a commercial interest in independence even greater than our own.

As to recognition, he showed that the United States had already established a policy of acknowledging the *de facto* government without regard to its legitimacy. The recognition of the revolutionary

governments of France, one after another, proved this conclusively. The refusal to recognize either government in Spain from 1808 to 1815 confirmed his contention. And so, he maintained, our duty to ourselves bound us to recognize the independence of la Plata, which possessed an organized government and an unmolested independence of eight years' duration.

In conclusion he urged the co-ordinate right of Congress in recognition, holding it proper for either Congress or President to take the initial step.

The debate on Clay's amendment continued for four days, revealing a general sympathy for the patriots that brought members from sick bed to speak in their behalf. The heart of the House was generous, but its head leaned strongly to expediency and propriety in spite of Clay's admonition that the former was the better guide. Even Forsyth, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and defender of the administration, expressed a strong, hopeful interest in the colonies, opposing the amendment on the grounds of its impropriety,—for he denied the fact of independence—its influence on other foreign relations, and the insincerity of its origin. "Notice had been given from this city, and was now ringing through the western country, that questions were to be brought in view, by whose de-

“cision the people would be able to discriminate between those who were just and unjust to the patriotic cause—between the friends and the enemies of freedom.” On the 28th of March the motion was lost by the decisive vote of 115 to 45.⁶⁰

The first session of the fifteenth Congress closed with the issue of South American recognition well before the public, and with Henry Clay pledged as its advocate. When the Congress met for its second session, the commissioners, sent in December, 1817, had returned, and their reports were transmitted by the President. Unfortunately, no two of the commissioners could agree in interpreting what they saw. Bland soon had lost confidence in the patriots; then Rodney, under the influence of their secretary, Brackenridge, perhaps, wrote an enthusiastic report, which Graham was unwilling to sign.⁶¹ Accordingly three reports by the commissioners were sent to Congress by the President in November and December, 1818, together with a fourth by Joel R. Poinsett.⁶²

No new facts of importance were given out in the

⁶⁰ *Annals of Congress*, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., 1500-1522, 1646.

⁶¹ J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, IV: 156, 158.

⁶² Message of November 17, 1818, and reports of Rodney and Graham. *A.S.P.F.R.*, IV: 217-348. Message of December 15, 1818, and reports of Bland and Poinsett. *Annals of Congress*, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., 2104-2316.

reports of the commissioners. Traveling in a public ship and in an official capacity, the agents had caused some little flutter in South America. At Rio de Janeiro the Spanish minister had hastened to announce that his master had petitioned the European allies to mediate between him and his rebellious subjects, and that Great Britain had responded favorably.⁶³ At Buenos Ayres and Montevideo they had been received with every courtesy and honor that they would accept. On this their reports agree. But the very character of their mission made it difficult to go below the surface in the politics of South America. They were forced to accept such facts as were brought officially to their notice. Their generalizations upon these facts varied with their prejudices.

The reports told the same story that had run in the journals for eight years. It was the story of political instability. Buenos Ayres, since the erection of her junta, in 1809, had enjoyed independence of Spain, but nothing more. At no time had she possessed a central government whose authority was recognized throughout all the provinces of the old vice-royalty. Several times she had experienced revolutions. All the time she had been in danger, on her northern frontier, of attacks by the Spanish

⁶³ Adams to Gallatin May 19, 1818. *S. D. Mss.*

forces in upper Peru. On the east, Paraguay refused resolutely to deal with Buenos Ayres; while the Banda Oriental stood in continued revolt against her authority, under the lead of the partisan general, Artigas, and encouraged by Brazil, who claimed the province.

With this condition before him, Monroe was non-committal in his message.⁶⁴ He could see no prospect of a "speedy termination" of the war. He described briefly the condition of the rebellious governments. He expressed with satisfaction the conviction that the allies at Aix-la-Chapelle would confine themselves "to the expression of their sentiments, abstaining from the application of force." Inferentially, the message declared to Congress and the world "the determination of the United States to stand neutral in the great contest between Spain and her colonies till success shall decide it."⁶⁵

Henry Clay failed to return to the attack in this session, although it would have been well for his future had he done so. Recognition and liberation were essentially popular topics. In a way they were a manifestation of the feeling towards Spain that showed itself in popular approval of General Jackson's career in Florida. Instead of choosing a sub-

⁶⁴ Richardson, *Messages*, II: 43, 44; J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, IV: 166.

⁶⁵ *Annual Register*, 1819, 233.

ject for opposition in which the people could be with him, Clay felt bound to attack the conduct of the "military hero." For several weeks of the session, which was the short one, he kept up the fight, to the exclusion of the safer question of recognition. Towards the end of the session Monroe sent to Congress another collection of documents, bearing this time on his refusal to grant *exequaturs* to consuls from South America.⁶⁶ Thereupon Clay arose and apologized for not speaking at length in favor of a recognition, pleaded illness and pressure of business as an excuse, declared that his conviction as to its propriety was unshaken, and promised to return to the subject when Congress should meet again.⁶⁷

The administration was more than content not to have recognition pressed at this time. Relations with Spain were in a delicate condition; a treaty was in process of negotiation. Determined to support the acts of Jackson and to acquire Florida, it was well not to aggravate Spain needlessly on the score of her colonies. The treaty was signed 22d February, 1819. A revival of the recognition question in the following session well-nigh prevented its ratification by the King of Spain, and certainly postponed it.

The sixteenth Congress met to receive a message

⁶⁶ *A. S. P. F. R.*, IV: 412; J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, IV: 223.

⁶⁷ February 10, 1819. *Annals of Congress*, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., 1148.

that marked an advance towards recognition. Monroe was moving as rapidly as events would allow and Adams would countenance. The latter had little confidence in the South Americans, was unwilling to allow a sentimental sympathy to compromise the government, and argued out of the message an invitation to France and Great Britain to act with the United States in a joint recognition.⁶⁸ France and Russia were both exerting pressure to prevent the act. Accordingly the message confined itself to a strong expression of sympathy.

Clay remembered his promise of the last winter and renewed his attempt to hasten the steps of the administration.

During the winter of 1819-1820 the relations with Spain, already confused, became more complicated by the revolution in the peninsula and the acceptance of a new constitution by Ferdinand. The treaty had not yet been ratified. The Spanish minister had been instructed to get a pledge from Monroe that he would not recognize the colonies as a preliminary to ratification. On 9th May, 1820, the President stated the situation to Congress in a temperate message.⁶⁹ He transmitted at this time correspondence with the envoy of his Catholic Majesty over the treaty of

⁶⁸ Richardson, *Messages*, II: 58; J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, IV: 461.

⁶⁹ Richardson, *Messages*, II: 70.

22d February, 1819. He commented upon the complaints of the latter respecting the hostility of the citizens and the unfriendly policy of the government of the United States towards the subjects and dominions of Spain, maintaining that both were "utterly destitute of foundation. . . . In regard to the stipulation proposed as the condition of the ratification of the treaty, that the United States shall abandon the right to recognize the revolutionary colonies in South America, or to form other relations with them when in their judgment it may be just and expedient so to do, it is manifestly so repugnant to the honor and even to the independence of the United States, that it has been impossible to discuss it." But, considering the domestic troubles of Spain, he asked Congress, "Is this the time to make the pressure? If the United States were governed by views of ambition and aggrandizement, many strong reasons might be given in its favor; but they have no objects of that kind to accomplish, none which are not founded in justice and which can be injured by forbearance." In conclusion, he urged Congress not to decide the question until the next session.

On the 4th of April, Clay had moved that it was expedient to provide outfit and salary for such ministers to South America as the President might deem

it expedient to send.⁷⁰ On the 10th of May, the day after the reception of the message, he brought up his motion in the House. Clay disliked the Spanish treaty. He was unwilling to compensate Spain for the Floridas, which we must at any rate ultimately obtain. He was strongly opposed to a southwestern boundary that left Texas outside the United States. Now he seized the opportunity at once to frighten Spain into a definite refusal to ratify the obnoxious treaty, and to attack the policy of the administration. The speech contained little that was new. It was a defiance of Spain. Forgetting his maxim that recognition was no violation of neutrality, Clay regretted that the United States had not recognized the provinces two years before, when they really needed assistance. He urged the creation of an American system, with the United States as its center, in defiance of the despotisms of the Old World. And he deprecated the deference of the administration to the wishes of a Castlereagh and a Nesselrode. To his surprise, perhaps, and certainly to the surprise of the President, his motion passed the House. The next day Mr. Adams had the satisfaction of telling the French minister, de Neuville, that if Spain was vexed she had only herself to

⁷⁰ *Annals of Congress*, 16 Cong., 1 Sess., 1781.

thank; that the administration contemplated no change of policy.⁷¹

At the next session, second and last of the sixteenth Congress, Clay brought this motion up once more. The message of Monroe, as it referred to South America, had been short, friendly and, as usual, non-committal.⁷² This was Clay's last opportunity, for he had declined a re-election that he might resume the practice of law and restore his private affairs to some sort of order. On 3d February, 1821, he moved once more the resolution that had passed in the preceding May, and asked that it be referred to the Committee of the Whole.⁷³ Here, three days later, he called it up to speak in its defence, a speech that has not been preserved. His colleague, Robertson, replied.

Robertson discountenanced this method of forcing the hand of the President. He objected to the use of an abstract resolution of the House as an expression of an overwhelming popular sentiment. Foreign affairs were the business of the executive, and in his conduct of these he should not be embarrassed. "I voted with my colleague last Winter, . . ." he declared,⁷⁴ "because I was aiding him in that which

⁷¹ The vote was 80 to 75. *Annals of Congress*, 16 Cong., 1 Sess., 2223-2229; Adams, *Memoirs*, V: 108, 111. ⁷² Richardson, *Messages*, II: 77.

⁷³ *Annals of Congress*, 16 Cong., 2 Sess., 1029.

⁷⁴ *Annals of Congress*, 16 Cong., 2 Sess., 1042-1053.

“ was to him a splendid triumph, and one which was achieved without sacrifice of principle. I knew that he would soon leave us (which I regret), and I was anxious that he should retire with honor and applause; and, in regard to that retirement (which I hope will be only temporary), I thought it but due to his distinguished services that his country should say to him, as Jove did to Hector:—

“ ‘Yet live, I give thee one illustrious day,
One blaze of glory, ere thou fad’st away.’

“ Sir, the vote of last Winter, by giving success to his exertions for the Patriots, did crown him with laurels. I would not wither them, or pluck one leaf from the bright wreath. I wish they may flourish and be forever green. But I cannot water them with the vote I am about to give. I hoped that the subject was buried last Winter, and that it should not be resuscitated. To carry the motion can confer no additional honor on the mover; to lose it, may diminish the glory of the triumph he has won. If he would be content with an abstract expression of our feelings towards the Patriots, although it is unnecessary and superfluous (having done this before), I would vote for it, because it will speak only what I feel in common with my constituents, and will not be liable to the principal objections which I have

“to the proposition which he has made. And why would not such a resolution satisfy all his wishes? Why annoy the Executive, session after session, with our opinion and advice, when we know that he does not desire them, and will not conform to them? And why do this, too, when every legitimate and desirable object has been already achieved, and can be again effected if desired, as far as the Patriots are to be benefited, in the manner which I have just suggested?”

This motion failed in the Committee of the Whole; it was lost again when brought up in the House on February 9th. But Clay saw that its rejection was due to form rather than substance, and on the 10th offered a new resolution to the effect that the House joined with the people of the United States in their sympathy with the South Americans; that it was ready to support the President whenever he should think it expedient to recognize their governments. The question was divided on the insistence of one of the members, and the first part was carried by the overwhelming majority of 134 to 12. The second followed with 86 to 68. In the words of his eulogist, Mr. Clay “had fought and won, before the country, before the world—a pity to say, against his own government—one of the most brilliant battles for humanity, and for the rights of man, which history

“records.”⁷⁵ It was a fitting end to his period of factious opposition when “the triumph of Mr. Clay was signalized in the house of representatives by adopting the unusual course of appointing a special committee to wait on the president with a copy of the resolution, as a mode of advising him [sic] a result of their action in the case. The usual mode was to transmit a certified copy of the journals by the hand of an officer of the house. But on this occasion, in consideration of the importance of the transaction in the cause of freedom, of the notoriety which the debates on the subject had attained, of the growing interest of the public mind, which had been raised to an excitement, and, inasmuch as the whole transaction was avowedly designed for moral effect—it could have been no other—Mr. Clay thought proper to move for this Committee, which was promptly granted, and himself, as a mover, was of course placed at the head of it.” For years he had been in a sort of “*quasi* opposition,” which “the president did not think best openly to oppose.” Mr. Monroe and his friends saw in the committee a studied insult, “but, of course, Mr. Clay performed his part with the greatest delicacy and courtesy toward the executive, though, after all

⁷⁵ *Annals of Congress*, 16 Cong., 2 Sess., 1055, 1071, 1081; Colton *Clay*, I: 239.

“that had passed, it could hardly have been very desirable to that functionary.”⁷⁶

With this session Clay retired into private life. His triumph had been a barren one. Save for emphasizing his position and crowning his opposition, it stood for nothing. The executive, unmoved by the resolution, continued calmly on the course it had marked out for itself. Recognition did not come a day earlier because of the advocacy of Henry Clay.

The departure of the South American commissioners in December, 1817, marked the commencement at once of Clay's factious opposition and of a more active policy on the part of the administration. The inclination of Monroe to yield before the threats of the opposition was checked by John Quincy Adams. It was changed into a determination to learn the actual condition of the republics and to ascertain the attitude which the European powers would take towards recognition when it should come. For the administration, no less than Clay, sympathized with the struggle and contemplated recognition in the near future.

The sympathy of Mr. Adams was tempered with misgivings. “The mention of Buenos Ayres,” he wrote in one of his political letters,⁷⁷ “brings to my

⁷⁶ Colton, *Clay*, I: 242, 243.

⁷⁷ J. Q. Adams to Alexander H. Everett, December 29, 1817. Letter-book of J. Q. Adams, Private, No. 2. *Adams Mss.*

“mind an Article that I have lately seen in the Boston Patriot, and which I concluded was from your pen. Its tendency was to show the inexpediency and injustice there would be in our taking side with the South Americans in their present struggle against Spain! It was an excellent article, and I should be glad to see the same train of thought further pursued. As for example by a discussion, . . . by what *right* we could take side? and who in this state of civil war has constituted us the *judges*, which of the parties has the righteous cause? then by an enquiry what the cause of the South Americans is, and whether it really be as their partisans here allege the same as our own cause in the War of our Revolution? Whether for instance if Buenos Ayres has formally offered to accept the Infant Don Carlos as the absolute Monarch upon condition of being politically Independent of Spain, their cause is the same as ours was? Whether if Bolivar, being at the head of the Republic of Venezuela, has solemnly proclaimed the absolute and total emancipation of the Slaves, the cause of Venezuela is precisely the same as ours was? Whether in short there is any other feature of identity between their cause and ours, than that they are as we were Colonies fighting for Independence. In our Revolution there were two distinct Stages. In the first of which we contended

“for our *Civil Rights* and in the second for our *Political Independence*. The second, as we solemnly declared to the World was imposed upon us as a means of necessity after every practicable effort had been made in vain to secure the first.

“In South America, Civil Rights if not entirely out of the question appear to have been equally disregarded and trampled upon by all parties. Buenos Ayres has no constitution; and its present ruling powers are establishing only by the entire banishment of their predecessors. Venezuela though it has emancipated all its slaves has been constantly alternating between an absolute Military Government, a Capitulation to Spanish Authority, and Guerillas, Black and White, of which every petty chief has acted for purposes of War and Rapine as an Independent Sovereign. There is finally in South America neither unity of cause nor unity of effort as there was in our Revolution.

“Neither was our revolution disgraced by that buccaneering and piratical Spirit which has lately appeared among the South Americans not of their own growth, but I am sorry to say chiefly from the contamination of their intercourse with us. Their Privateers have been for the most part fitted out and officered in our Ports and manned from the Sweepings of our Streets. . . . [yet] such is the propensity

“ of our people to sympathize with the South Americans, that no feeble exertion is now making to rouse a party in this Country against the Government of the Union, and against the President for having issued orders to put down this host of free-booters at our doors.”

The attitude of the Powers toward South America seemed likely to undergo a change during 1818. Mr. Adams watched it with a jealous interest. The earliest despatches of the commissioners told how at Rio de Janeiro “ the Spanish Minister, Count Casa-Flores, appears to have been so much alarmed by the suspicion that the object of the mission was the formal acknowledgment of the government of la Plata, that he thought it his duty to make to Mr. Sumter an official communication that he had received an official despatch from the Duke of San Carlos, the Spanish Ambassador at London, dated the 7th of November last, informing him, *that the British Government had acceded to the proposition made by the Spanish Government of a general mediation of the powers to obtain the pacification of South America, the negotiation of which, it was on the point of being decided, whether it should be at London or Madrid.*”¹⁸

On the receipt of this news, the Secretary of State

¹⁸ Adams to Gallatin, May 19, 1818. *S. D. Mes.*

wrote to the American minister in Paris, Albert Gallatin, complaining of the reserve with which the European powers treated the United States. He regretted at length that they had seen fit to conceal this proposed mediation. If its object "be any other than to promote the total independence political and commercial of South America, we are neither desirous of being invited to take a part in it, nor disposed to accept the invitation if given. Our policy in the contest between Spain and her colonies has been impartial neutrality. Is the proposed general mediation to be a departure from that line of neutrality? If it is, which side of the contest are the allies to take? the side of Spain? on what principle and by what right? As contesting parties in a civil war, the South Americans have rights, which the other powers are bound to respect as much as the rights of Spain; and after having by an avowed neutrality, admitted the existence of those rights, upon what principle of justice can the allies consider them as forfeited, or themselves as justifiable in taking sides with Spain against them?

"There is no discernible motive of justice or of interest which can induce the allied sovereigns to interpose for the restoration of the Spanish colonial dominion in South America. There is none even of policy; for if all the organized power of Europe is

“combined to maintain the authority of each Sovereign over his own people, it is hardly supposed that the sober senses of the allied cabinets will permit them to extend the application of this principle of union to the maintenance of colonial dominion beyond the Atlantic and the Equator.

“By the usual principles of international law, the state of *neutrality*, recognizes the cause of both parties to the contest, as *just*—that is, it avoids all consideration of the merits of the contest. But when abandoning that neutrality, a nation takes one side, in a war of other parties, the first question to be settled is the *justice* of the cause to be assumed. If the European allies are to take side with Spain, to reduce the South American colonies to submission, we trust they will make some previous enquiry into the justice of the cause they are to undertake. As neutrals we are not required to decide the question of justice. We are sure we should not find it on the side of Spain.”

These general principles Mr. Gallatin was instructed to communicate informally to the French minister. He was to assure him “That it is our earnest desire to pursue a line of policy, at once just to both parties in that contest, and harmonious with that of the European allies. That we must know their system, in order to shape our own measures

accordingly; but that we do not want to join them in any plan of interference to restore any part of the Spanish supremacy, in any of the South American Provinces.”⁷⁹

In the same frame of mind, and in some of the same paragraphs, Adams wrote to Richard Rush in London the following day.⁸⁰ He conjectured wisely, in conclusion, that the British Cabinet “will soon discover the great interest of Great Britain in the total Independence of South America, and will promote that event just as far as their obligations towards Spain will permit. The time is probably not far remote, when the acknowledgment of the South American Independence will be an act of friendship towards Spain herself—when it will be kindness to her to put an end to that self-delusion under which she is wasting all the remnant of her resources, in a war, infamous by the atrocities with which it is carried on, and utterly hopeless of success. It may be an interesting object of your attention to watch the moment when this idea will become prevalent in the British Councils, and to encourage any disposition which may consequently be manifested to a more perfect concert of measures between the United States and Great Britain towards that end; the total

⁷⁹ Adams to Gallatin, May 19, 1818. *S. D. Mss.*

⁸⁰ Adams to Rush, May 20, 1818. *S. D. Mss.*

“Independence of the Spanish South American Provinces.” . . .

Thus in the spring of 1818 the policy of the United States was outlined in the instructions to Rush and Gallatin, and later to George W. Campbell at St. Petersburg.⁸¹ It was unmistakably the policy of John Quincy Adams. It was a policy distinctly friendly to South America, Mr. Clay to the contrary, notwithstanding. It watched with considerable apprehension the gathering of the sovereigns at Aix-la-Chapelle; but had a well-founded suspicion that the interests of these same sovereigns would confine their activities to their own side of the Atlantic. It took such shape that the Russian minister in the autumn could express satisfaction “to see a navy growing up on the other side of the Atlantic, that might one day act as a *ballance*, as he expressed himself to that on this side.”⁸² From broad principles of policy Mr. Adams now had to turn his attention to the doings of agents, North and South American.

The embarrassments caused to the administration by Henry Clay hardly exceeded those for which the agents of the patriots in the United States, or of the United States in the southern republics, were respon-

⁸¹ June 28, 1818. *S. D. Mss.*

⁸² G. W. Campbell to Adams, from St. Petersburg, October 7, 1818. *S. D. Mss.*

sible. These of the agents were not confined to sessions of Congress, like the former, but were perennial. Don Manuel Hermenegildo de Aguirre had arrived from Buenos Ayres in 1817, bearing a commission from the Supreme Director, Pueyrredon, accrediting him as "Agent of this Government near that of the United States of North America," and asking for him "all the protection and consideration required by his diplomatic rank and the actual state of our relations."⁸³ Once in the United States, he engaged in the patriotic work of equipping privateers. In odd moments he addressed the Secretary of State,⁸⁴ to demand recognition and countenance, to complain of the injustice done his country by the neutrality acts, to explain the workings and describe the situation of his government, to emphasize the moderation of his demands, and to threaten the United States with severance of commercial relations. Mr. Adams was not a timid man to be frightened into recognition nor was he a weak man to be driven into hostility to the patriots by their lack of consideration. He continued unmoved, though with some irritation, his friendly, conservative course. In the summer of 1818 he was forced to refuse com-

⁸³ *Annals of Congress*, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., 1879, 1880.

⁸⁴ December 16, 24, 26 and 29, 1817; January 6 and 16, 1818. *Annals of Congress*, 15 Cong., 1 Sess., 1877-1897.

pliance with the demands of one de Forrest to be granted an *exequatur* as Consul General for Buenos Ayres in the United States. Here he laid down the doctrine that the granting of an *exequatur* is a recognition. His own agents caused him the greatest trouble. In one of the revolts in Buenos Ayres, Devereux guaranteed a loan that saved the life of the existing government. For this he was dismissed in 1817 by the predecessor of Mr. Adams. His successors, Worthington and Halsey, did little better. The former, "swelling upon his agency" until he broke out "into a self-accredited Plenipotentiary," negotiated a commercial treaty on his own responsibility. The latter entered into privateering schemes and sent blank commissions to the United States. He was summarily removed. On the whole, the position of the Secretary of State was not a happy one. He was the great restraining influence; politicians were shouting for recognition; agents of all sorts were embarrassing the government, and his own colleagues in the cabinet were discussing the expediency of sending a naval force into southern waters to encourage the insurgent states.⁸⁵

President Monroe was ready to move more rapidly in the direction of recognition than was Mr. Adams.

⁸⁵ J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, IV: 70, 88, 91, 158. Rush to Halsey, April 21, 1817; Adams to Halsey, January 22, 1818. *S. D. Mss.*

In July, 1818, he wanted to propose to England a co-operation in behalf of the South Americans. If the journal of Mr. Adams, which is the only authority on the point, can be accepted, the President was influenced by the eager demands of the *Richmond Enquirer*, and only the arguments of the Secretary of State restrained his benevolence.⁸⁶ Evidently these arguments were effective, for the proposal was not made. In its place a circular was directed to the American ministers at London, Paris and St. Petersburg in August, asking what part these governments "will take in the dispute between Spain and her colonies, and in what light they will view an acknowledgment of the Independence of the Colonies by the United States? Whether they will view it as an act of hostility to Spain, and in case Spain should declare war against us, in consequence, whether . . . [they] will take part with her in it?"⁸⁷

When the responses to this circular began to come in, it was clear that Mr. Adams had not misjudged the attitude of the Powers. From London, Rush wrote in October that a recognition would certainly meet with popular approval in England, while the ministry, although "high-toned in its aristocracy,"

⁸⁶ J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs* IV: 118.

⁸⁷ Adams to Rush, August 15, 1818; to Gallatin and Campbell, August 20, 1818. *S. D. Mss.*

would not be likely "to take Spain by the hand in a war against us." France, wrote Gallatin, would view a recognition with disfavor because of the peculiar nature of her family ties with Spain; but she would not fight over this cause. Russia would not fight alone, was Campbell's estimate of the situation at his court.⁸⁸ She might uphold the rights of Spain in concert with the allies, but without them she would not move. A little later Rush intimated that the vigorous determination of the President to have nothing to do with any scheme for coercing the colonies had helped to decide the Court of St. James in the matter.

The Congress at Aix-la-Chapelle adjourned without taking action acceptable to Spain. It recommended a mediation through the Duke of Wellington,⁸⁹ which England accepted on the condition that in event of his failure to reconcile the combatants there should be no resort to coercion.

But before these responses reached Washington Congress had convened, and the President once more had been forced to decide upon a policy. By this time the discordant reports of the three South

⁸⁸ Rush to Adams, October 12 and November 20, 1818; Gallatin to Adams, November 5, 1818; Campbell to Adams, December 22, 1818; *S. D. Mss.*

⁸⁹ Campbell to Adams, February 18, 1819. *S. D. Mss.*

American Commissioners were at hand. With the picture of political disorder revealed by these reports before his eyes, and with his mind uncertain as to the policy of the allies, Adams could have no hesitation in counselling delay.⁹⁰ A year before Monroe had thought seriously of an immediate recognition; now he seems to have agreed with his Secretary. "From the view taken of this subject," he announced, "founded on all the information that we have been able to obtain, there is good cause to be satisfied with the course heretofore pursued by the United States in regard to this contest, and to conclude that it is proper to adhere to it, especially in the present state of affairs."⁹¹

The session which began in November, 1818, the second of the fifteenth Congress, is the one in which Clay built up his opposition on Florida rather than on South America. Attacking the conduct of Jackson with all his strength, he gave the administration opportunity to pursue its own policy unhampered. Mr. Adams was obliged, however, to develop the domestic portion of his policy to meet the demands of the South American agents. David C. De Forest from Buenos Ayres, and Don Lino de Clemente, from Venezuela, were at this time demanding recog-

⁹⁰ J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, IV: 166. ⁹¹ Richardson, *Messages*, II: 44.

nition as consuls from their respective republics. The latter was not given even a hearing, for the commission of a privateer, with his signature annexed, had come to the hand of the State Department. The former was heard in full, but his solicitations met with no success, for Adams felt, as already stated, that granting an *exequatur* is tantamount to a recognition. De Forest did not rest easily upon his refusal, but protested bitterly. The House called for papers upon the applications, and received from the Secretary a careful report that described the sins of Clemente, the unauthorized treaty of Worthington and De Forest's petition based upon it, and the weakness of the latter's argument that granting an *exequatur* is not a recognition.⁹²

Although not yet ready for a recognition at the end of 1818, Monroe felt that the time for it was rapidly approaching. As December passed away the prospect of European intervention in behalf of Spain grew less and less. At the beginning of January, 1819, the Secretary of State was ordered to draft a new instruction to the minister in London. The document bears date the 1st of January. It was

⁹² Adams to Clemente, December 16, 1818; De Forest to Adams, January 8, 1819. *S. D. Mas.*; J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, IV: 223; *Annals of Congress*, 15 Cong., 2 Sess., 544, 1606, 1612.

not despatched until the month was several days advanced.⁹³

The policy of the United States towards the rebellious provinces of Spain, wrote Adams, in substance, has been one of rigid neutrality. We have not recognized them as independent, nor received their consuls, which were an equivalent act. But we have considered it an obligation of our neutrality to give the parties as equal rights as possible; so we have always listened to the representations of their agents. Thus far our neutrality operates against Spain, as an inevitable consequence of the nature of the struggle. With the preponderating success of one of the parties to the civil war, this condition will cease, as it has done in Mexico and seems likely soon to do in Buenos Ayres. Spain has solicited the mediation of the allies to prevent this separation, but such mediation, as Great Britain clearly saw, would be a departure on their part from the line of neutrality. We are opposed to a third-party intervention of any sort. We believe "that the contest cannot and ought not to terminate otherwise than by the total Independence of South America," but we desire to do our duty by Spain and maintain the

⁹³ Adams to Rush, January 1, 1819. *S. D. Mss.* The copy in the *Adams Mss.* is endorsed as being sent January 4 by Mr. Bagot's messenger.

good-will of the Powers, and so have taken no decisive step as yet. Now that we are convinced that the power of Spain cannot be restored, we desire Europe to consider how important it is that the new States should be recognized and held in their responsibilities as independent bodies. We have it in contemplation ourselves to acknowledge the government of Buenos Ayres at no remote period unless something should occur to justify a further postponement of the act. It would be gratifying should England see fit to adopt similar measures at the same time and in concert with the United States. "When adopted it will be a mere acknowledgment of the fact of Independence, and without deciding upon the extent of their Territory, or upon their claims to sovereignty, in any part of the Provinces of La Plata, where it is not established and uncontested."

The unforeseen seems to have happened on the 3d of January, 1819, when it was learned that the success of the Florida negotiations would be endangered by a recognition. For more than two years, until the treaty was signed and safely ratified, recognition was postponed. Agitation did not cease during these two years; factious opposition did its worst; Don Manuel Torres, a new agent from Colombia, created a long series of entries in Mr. Adams's journal. There is no absolute evidence that fear of

Spain was the inspiring motive of the administration's conservatism. But Adams ceased to worry over the attitude of Europe during these years. He announced a policy of forbearance for the time to the Russian minister. There is abundant proof in the correspondence with Spain that recognition was a determining cause in the delay of the latter to ratify the treaty. And it is certain that recognition did not come until the winter of 1822.

The message of 1819, expurgated by the Secretary of State, until it was harmless, made some slight advance toward recognition. Mr. Adams felt that the less said about South America at this time the better it would be.⁹⁴ Three months later he opposed in the Cabinet a tendency to grant arms to the Colombians, denouncing the scheme as dishonorable, unneutral, unconstitutional, and an act of war. At the same time, outside the Cabinet, he resisted the efforts of an "ambidexter personage," agent of Venezuela in Washington, to get himself appointed as agent of the United States to Venezuela.⁹⁵ The whole burden of foreign policy seems to have been laid upon the broad shoulders of John Quincy Adams. To conciliate Spain and induce her to ratify a treaty forced upon him by the administration, he

⁹⁴ J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, IV: 209, 379, 461.

⁹⁵ J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, V: 45-51.

had to fight at once the opposition of the Speaker of the House, the pretensions of the South Americans and the unneutral disposition of his own cabinet. When the President transmitted his message of 9th May, 1820, with its hard words for the demands of Spain, the first storm broke, and Clay, as has been seen, gained his first triumph.

The summer of 1820 saw more agents sent to South America, charged to protest against the acts of insurgent privateers and to acquire news. Charles S. Todd went as Agent for Seamen and Commerce to Colombia. "With regard to the formal recognition by the Government of the U. S. of the Republic of Colombia," were his instructions, "should anything be said to you, the obvious reply will be that you have not been authorized to discuss the subject. As a reason for this reserve it may be alleged that besides the actual War still waged by Spain, during which the Independence of the other party could not be acknowledged without a departure from our avowed and long-established system of neutrality, the changes still occurring will require some lapse of time to give to the Republic that character of permanency which would justify the formal acknowledgment of it by foreign powers."⁹⁶

J. B. Prevost, agent at Lima, had been trans-

⁹⁶ Adams to Todd, June 5, 1820. *S. D. Mes.*

ferred to Buenos Ayres in 1819 on the dismissal of Halsey and Worthington; but his sphere of activity covered also Chile and Peru. Uncertain as to his location, Adams commissioned John M. Forbes to Chile or Buenos Ayres, as there should be a vacancy, in June, 1820. The instructions of Forbes are dated 5th July, 1820. Further and more significant instructions were issued to him after the arrival of a despatch from Prevost a week later.⁹⁷ In these the Secretary reviewed recent upheavals in Buenos Ayres, warning Forbes, as Todd had been warned, not to discuss a recognition. Now that the old central government had been swept away, if we were "to recognize the single province of Buenos Ayres, the recognition upon reaching that city might probably find it no longer independent.

"You will take occasion to remark whenever it may be proper that the Government of the United States have never intended to secure to themselves any advantage, commercial or otherwise, as an equivalent for acknowledging the Independence of any part of South America. They do not think it a proper subject for equivalent; and they have entire confidence that no exclusive privilege will be granted

⁹⁷ Adams to Prevost, May 3, 1819; Adams to Forbes, July 12, 1820. *S. D. Mes. Annals of Congress*, 17 Cong., 1 Sess., 2059; *British and Foreign State Papers*, IX: 370.

“to any other nation to the prejudice of the U. S. They think themselves entitled to this, and consider it as essential to the Independence itself to be acknowledged—aware that no such privileges can be granted but by a sacrifice of the interests of the nation which grants them, they have never intended to ask them to the detriment of others, as they rely that they will not be conceded to others in detriment to them.”

The early despatches of Forbes show a most distracted condition prevailing in Buenos Ayres in 1821. The news from Prevost, dated 30th April, 1820, was of a successful revolt against the Congress and the Supreme Director Pueyrredon. The latter, with his faction, had been engaged in secret negotiations with France and Spain, having in view the establishment of a Bourbon dynasty in South America. A revolt overthrew him and started a prosecution of the leaders of his party for high treason, thus continuing a decade of turmoil. “Up to 1820 . . . the History of these Provinces comprises little but a Series of Military Operations. . . . The Successes of their Armies have been splendid and extraordinary, but a Review of their internal Government for the first ten years presents

"nothing but a Picture of Anarchy and Confusion."⁹⁸ This was the time when General San Martin, engaged in Chile in his large projects against Peru, disobeyed the orders of his government to return home and restore peace.⁹⁹

Pueyrredon went into exile in the early part of 1820. He was succeeded in quick succession of dictatorship by Aguirre, known in North America; Sarratea and Balcarce, until the affairs of the provinces became hopeless. As Forbes reached Rio de Janeiro on the way to his post, in September, 1820, he learned that "a kind of political Auction is to take place at which the rights of a distracted Country are to be struck off to the highest bidder.—England will offer maritime protection and Commercial abundance and, notwithstanding that the most impenetrable mystery covers everything here, it is inferred from the gaiety and good humor of the Spanish mission that the nature of the proposals they are about to make is not without charms and hope."

Preceded by rumors that he bore a formal recognition, Forbes was received by the local government at Buenos Ayres with distinguished honors. State coach and aide-de-camp were forced upon him; a

⁹⁸ Report of Woodbine Parish, June 25, 1824. *F. O. Mss. An Account . . . of the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata* (London, 1825), 9, 20-24.

⁹⁹ Sketch of Occurrences in Buenos Ayres, 1820. *S. D. Mss.*

public mansion was offered for his residence; while on the other hand, he was embarrassed by the evil rumors that he attributed to disgruntled South American agents who had returned from Washington to justify their failure by attacking the United States. But Forbes could not be lured into partisan politics. He sat outside, watching the game of factions, sometimes hazarding "the opinion that a permanent and good government is very important."

The government at Buenos Ayres, by the end of the year, had become a "mere military police," living a precarious existence from day to day, and awaiting the action of a Congress of the provinces assembling at Cordova. It was a war between republicanism in the provinces and monarchical tendency at Buenos Ayres. The Congress gathered with true Castilian deliberation, to perform an enormous task. It "requires little short of Omnipotence," wrote Forbes, "to create order out of such utter Chaos as now exists." By the 1st of April, 1821, he was reduced to wish for a popular general and a victorious republican army, for the country seemed "in the most utter darkness of despair and without one ray of hope." On 20th April, Good Friday, Pueyrredon landed, having returned from exile at the call of the government. In two weeks more the clouds of anarchy had broken.

About 1st May, 1821, there appeared in Buenos Ayres a new journal, edited by two patriots, Bernardo Rivadavia and Manuel José Garcia, of whom the former had once been at the head of the government, while both had just returned from an extended diplomatic mission in Europe. Before the end of the month it appeared to the American agent that the party of Pueyrredon was falling into disrepute. In July the administration fell, Rivadavia came in as Minister of State, while Garcia took the Treasury. This was the beginning of an orderly government in Buenos Ayres. Garcia at once inaugurated a policy "without example in the history of the Revolution," by paying the debts of the government, and paying them in gold. Rivadavia, after some correspondence with Forbes, issued a decree recalling all privateers sailing under the flag of Buenos Ayres and revoking their commissions. At the same time glad tidings came from across the mountains. "At the moment I am writing," wrote Forbes on 2d September, "a salvo of Artillery and the most extravagant demonstrations of joy through the streets, announce the capture of Lima by San Martin's besieging army. If this news be true, it puts the Seal to the Independence of South America. The Spanish Royalty, driven from its last hope in these Provinces, and enlightened by a Representative Government, will, I

“think, within six months, acknowledge their Independence.”

The news was true. Progress during the past months had not been confined to the limits of Buenos Ayres or to the leadership of Rivadavia and Garcia. We have already traced the steps of the armies of liberation. San Martin, in July, 1821, had really marched into the city of Lima, after a year's campaign of education in its vicinity. Bolivar had ended the truce with Morillo to defeat the royalists at Carabobo on 24th June. On 12th July his Congress at Cúcuta had proclaimed the permanent union of Venezuela and New Granada; while on 30th August it had proclaimed a federative constitution for the new republic.

The year 1821 was marked by successes of the republican armies and by the erection of orderly governments in the most important of the South American States, while on the other side of the Atlantic it seemed probable that Spain had come to her senses. The successful revolution of 1820, establishing Ferdinand VII. as constitutional monarch, was followed by an attempt to reconcile the colonies and the mother country. It could not be foreseen that an armed intervention would overthrow the constitution, while the Cortez would recall its pacific overtures.

In Mexico, on 24th August, 1821, the Spanish General O'Donoju concluded a treaty of peace on the basis of independence. Later this was disavowed; "yet his private instructions found among his papers," it is said,¹⁰⁰ "clearly proved beyond a possibility of doubt, that he was fully authorized to act as he did, and in the event of their Independence being declared, to make the most eligible terms he possibly could in favor of Old Spain. . . ." Morillo, too, had made a truce with his opponent, though Bolivar had terminated it before a treaty had been arranged. From Spain the news came that Mexican and Colombian commissioners were on hand, that they were demanding complete independence, that the Cortez was listening to their demands and petitioning the ministry to come to some conclusion.¹⁰¹

In other words, the South American provinces in 1821 had achieved their independence, and a recognition had become fully justifiable. The United States, relieved by the final ratification of the Spanish treaty in February, 1821, of the necessity for

¹⁰⁰ His authority is doubtful. Mackie's Report, March 17, 1823. *F. O. Mss.*

¹⁰¹ Thomas L. L. Brent to Adams, April 10, 1821. *S. D. Mss. British and Foreign State Papers*, IX: 394.

silence, came to this conclusion as the fall and winter advanced.

The seventeenth Congress met in December, 1821, Clay being out of it.¹⁰² With him had disappeared the ardent desire for recognition. "It has long been manifest," declared Monroe in his message, "that it would be impossible for Spain to reduce these colonies by force, and equally so that no conditions short of their independence would be satisfactory to them. It may therefore be presumed, and it is earnestly hoped, that the Government of Spain, guided by enlightened and liberal councils, will find it to comport to its interests and due to its magnanimity to terminate this exhausting controversy on that basis. To promote this result by friendly counsel with the Government of Spain will be the object of the Government of the United States."¹⁰³

As the weeks ran on, the despatches of Forbes convinced the administration that the time had come. In January Adams replied to one of the

¹⁰² W. S. Robertson, "The United States and Spain in 1822," in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, XX: 781, adds much new information to our knowledge of the effect of recognition upon the relations of the United States and Spain, and upon those of Spain and the European allies: a phase of recognition not considered above. He has made extensive use of the archives at Washington and Madrid.

¹⁰³ Richardson, *Messages*, II: 105.

frequent demands of the Colombian agent that the President had the matter of recognition under consideration. Ten days later he wrote to Todd, who had returned from Colombia, "It is probable that the formal recognition of the Republic of Colombia will ensue at no distant day."¹⁰⁴ Before the next month was over the chief clerk of the Department of State announced to Forbes the preparation of a report and documents in response to a call of the House. "I know not how the cat jumps in relation to this great question," he wrote, "but am apt to believe that a discretionary power will be given to the President, to acknowledge, or not, according to his views of circumstances, the sovereignty and Independence of any or all of these Governments. That of Buenos Ayres has given a good moral Lesson to older and long-established States, in the formal suppression of Privateering under its flag."¹⁰⁵

On the 8th of March, 1822, responding to a call for documents of 30th January, President Monroe recommended that the independence of the South American republics be acknowledged.¹⁰⁶ The President sketched briefly the long struggle of the col-

¹⁰⁴ Adams to Torres, January 18, 1822; Adams to Todd, January 28, 1822. *S. D. Mss.*; *Annals of Congress*, 17 Cong., 1 Sess., 2099.

¹⁰⁵ D. Brent to Forbes, February 19, 1822. *S. D. Mss.*

¹⁰⁶ Richardson, *Messages*, II: 116.

onies, the sympathy of the people of the United States and the policy of neutrality that had checked that sympathy. Now he was compelled to conclude, from a review of the situation in South America, "that its fate is settled, and that the Provinces which have declared their independence and are in the enjoyment of it ought to be recognized." He presumed that Spain would soon become reconciled to the separation, though he admitted that he had received no recent information on the subject from Spain or from the other Powers. Some time since, it had been understood that these latter were not yet prepared for recognition. "The immense space between those powers, even those which border on the Atlantic, and these Provinces makes the movement an affair of less interest and excitement to them than to us. . . .

"In proposing this measure it is not contemplated to change thereby in the slightest manner our friendly relations with either of the parties, but to observe, in all respects, as heretofore, should the war be continued, the most perfect neutrality between them. Of this friendly disposition an assurance will be given to the Government of Spain, to whom it is presumed it will be, as it ought to be, satisfactory. The measure is proposed under a thorough conviction that it is in strict accord with

"the law of nations, that it is just and right as to the parties, and that the United States owe it to their station and character in the world, as well as to their essential interests, to adopt it. Should Congress concur in the view herein presented, they will doubtless see the propriety of making the necessary appropriations for carrying it into effect."

With the departure of Henry Clay from the House of Representatives the question of recognition had fallen back to its proper place, the Department of State. In his absence there was no one whose interests impelled him to make use of a generous popular sentiment to drag the foreign policy of the government into Congress. The sentiment continued to exist, strong as ever, fed by the frequent columns of South American news in the papers. But the emotion was humanitarian rather than political. It was felt by Adams and Monroe as keenly as by Congress and the people. The purely factious nature of Clay's advocacy of recognition is shown by the fact that the seventeenth Congress felt no necessity to take the matter from the hands of the President. Even after the call for documents in January, 1822, the papers paid no attention to the subject. The message of 8th March was received with calmness, though with general satisfaction. It does small credit to Clay's political wisdom that he spent four

years in advocacy of an assured cause, and that for all his efforts he could not hasten by a day the advance of the government in the direction whither he was urging it.

The rest of the story can be quickly told: how the message was received at home; how it was received abroad; the actual steps in formal recognition.

During the weeks following the 8th of March, 1822, the message, with its accompanying documents, was reprinted generally throughout the country. The information transmitted at this time was not new, and was received without general enthusiasm. The *Aurora* and the *Enquirer*, long the advocates of recognition, did their best by it, now it had come. The former expressed its satisfaction that the President had at last done justice to the South Americans and hailed him as a benefactor of the republics.¹⁰⁷ The *Baltimore Patriot* worked itself up to declare the message the most intrinsically important state paper it had seen. But South America had already gained its independence, so that recognition was an acknowledgment of a fact rather than a prop to a wavering cause. It came too late to be considered as an emotional appeal.

The Spanish minister in Washington, Don Joaquin

¹⁰⁷ *Aurora*, March 11, March 12, March 15, 1822.

de Anduaga, fired his "diplomatic blunderbuss" at the Secretary of State as soon as the message of Monroe reached him.¹⁰⁸ His note was of the character that was to be expected. Where is "the right of The United States," he demanded, "to sanction and declare legitimate a rebellion, without cause, and the event of which is not even decided?" He denied the fact of independence, and in the language of injured, surprised innocence, registered a formal protest against the act of recognition, reserving to Spain all her rights in the provinces despite the act. In his reply of a month later, Adams justified the action of the executive, admitted the reservation of Spain's rights, for recognition has no effect upon existing rights, and closed the controversy. No other European power expressed formal disapprobation of the policy of the United States.

News of the message reached Paris at a time when Europe was excited over a threat of commercial discrimination by Colombia. "The United States, as we write," said the *Journal des Débats*,¹⁰⁹ "have probably recognized the independence of the Spanish American governments. This resolution is not surprising from a government which has established

¹⁰⁸ Anduaga to Adams, March 9, 1822; Adams to Anduaga, April 9, 1822. *British and Foreign State Papers*, IX: 752, 754.

¹⁰⁹ *Journal des Débats*, April 17, 1822.

“as a maxim of public law ‘that when a province maintains itself victoriously in independence against the mother country it has a right to demand recognition as a sovereign state.’ The president of the United States would have been wise not to talk of *principle*, RIGHT and LAW OF NATIONS: for suppose Boston with the five New England States should one day separate from the American Union. . . . Then England with his message in her hand could say amicably to Congress, ‘We do not wish to change any of our relations with the Union, but the five states east of the Hudson demand our recognition, they have beaten your armies and you are absolutely incapable of subduing them; so according to the law of nations established by yourselves, they have a right to be recognized. So we shall recognize them without injuring you. Our ambassador at Washington is instructed to assure you of our sympathy and that we act from no motive of interest.’ . . .

“The preliminary measures regarding the new governments have been skilfully conducted by the president of the United States. He sent agents or commissioners who after coasting slowly along South America submitted somewhat contradictory official reports. Thus the United States showed their regard for the new governments without injuring

“Spain, and after three years of negotiation and preliminary measures came to a point where the European situation is such that they can safely establish with their neighbors what relations they please. . . .

“Is it possible that the old governments of Europe cannot keep up with the march of the prudent young republic? We hope our statesmen will find means to conciliate the interests affected by this important question.”

The formal steps in recognition occupied three months in the spring of 1822. The message of the President was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, which on 19th March reported resolutions vigorously sustaining the policy of the administration and instructing the Committee on Ways and Means to report a bill for the salaries of ministers to South America. Nine days later, after slight debate, the resolutions were adopted with but one dissenting vote. On 10th April the debate on the bill for the missions was commenced;¹¹⁰ it was signed by the President some three weeks later, in spite of the unpleasant news that the Cortez had disavowed the concessions to the provinces and declared that the recognition of their independence by other powers would be considered as a violation of their treaties with Spain. On the 19th of June, 1822,

¹¹⁰ *Annals of Congress*, 17 Cong., 1 Sess., 1314, 1382, 1518.

John Quincy Adams "presented Mr. Manuel Torres as Chargé d'Affaires from the republic of Colombia to the President. This incident was chiefly interesting as being the first formal act of recognition of an independent South American Government." The next day the Secretary proposed to the President to offer the Colombian mission to Henry Clay.¹¹¹

¹¹¹ J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, V: 489, VI: 23, 26.

CHAPTER III

BRITISH RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AMERICA

There seems to have been no connection between the interests that inspired Pitt to keep in touch with Francisco de Miranda in the last years of the eighteenth century and the early ones of the nineteenth, that impelled Sir Home Riggs Popham to attack the Viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres on the broad grounds of commercial advantage and injury to Spain, and those later interests that developed a mercantile opposition in England to embarrass the ministry as Henry Clay's political opposition embarrassed the American administration of John Quincy Adams and his president, James Monroe. In England there is a distinct break between these periods. From an attitude of hostility to Spain in the earlier years, Great Britain passed through a stage of friendly protection that drove the French out of the peninsula, into another period of semi-hostility to the restored Ferdinand. During this last period, beginning roughly in 1815, the interests of Great Britain were divided. On the one hand an enormous trade with Latin America was threatened with destruction, should Spain's colonial policy come back with Spain's king.

On the other, were the political interests of England in Europe, the body of treaties concluded during the wars against Napoleon, the newly-developed policy of joint action by the Powers. With the United States recognition was a question of American policy; with England it was merely one of the ramifications of European politics. At no time was the British ministry in a position to treat it on its merits; instead it struggled for a decade to avert action, to cherish at once the commerce with the colonies and the friendly relations with Spain. It was not until the clamorings of the merchants drowned the protests of the Bourbons that England recognized the South American republics.

Once an ally of Spain, the disposition of England to respect the rights of the former in her provinces became pronounced. In 1811 one Robert Staples was commissioned as consul to Buenos Ayres, but when the Regency of Cadiz replied to Sir Henry Wellesley's request for an *exequatur*¹ that the "Laws of the Indies" were still in force, Perceval dropped the matter and the ministries thereafter disavowed the actions of Staples in South America.² In 1814 a treaty was entered into with

¹ Memorandum of June 26, 1823. *F. O. Mss.*

² The archives of the British Foreign Office contain materials upon the South American wars of liberation, and on recognition, surpassing in interest those of the State Department. They are, so far as the

Spain binding England to prevent her subjects from furnishing "arms, ammunition, or any other warlike article to the revolted in South America." For his Britannic Majesty was "anxious that the troubles and disturbances which unfortunately prevail in the Dominions of His Catholic Majesty in America should entirely cease, and the Subjects of those Provinces should return to their obedience to their lawful sovereign."³

The attitude of the Liverpool ministry was by no means favorable to colonies struggling for independence. The regent was narrow and aristocratic to the last degree; later, as George IV., he followed the course that could have been expected of him. He remembered with bitterness the day that marked the separation of her American colonies from Great

period here in question is concerned, preserved in the Public Records Office; and are described in detail in C. O. Paullin and F. L. Paxson, *Guide to the Materials in London Archives for the History of the United States since 1783* (Carnegie Institution, 1914). In the preparation of this *Guide* all of the Foreign Office volumes relating to the United States and many others relating to South America were handled. The search brought to light many new documents relating to recognition in addition to those referred to in the pages of the above chapter.

³ Hansard. *Parl. Debates*, XXXV: 1200; *British and Foreign State Papers*, I: pt. 1, 292; Treaty of Madrid, July 5, 1814, and additional articles, August 28, 1814. In return for this pledge, England was to receive a full share of the colonial trade if Spain should throw it open to any power. C. K. Webster, "Castlereagh and the Spanish Colonies, 1815-1818," in *English Hist. Rev.*, XXVII: 78.

Britain, and with such antecedents could with difficulty bring himself to countenance the separation of her own from Spain. The force that drove him to the final recognition was commercial, with George Canning as its prophet. That the latter "called a New World into existence to redress the balance of the old"⁴ may well be doubted, for before he moved, another and a not uncertain voice had sounded from America. He guided his influence by the side of John Quincy Adams to maintain the new republics, less for their effect on old world politics or for the sake of the republics themselves, than that the commerce of the British merchants might be protected and increased.⁵

Recognition became a subject of agitation in Great Britain as early as in the United States, but

⁴This assertion was made near the end of the debate upon France, Spain and Portugal, in the House of Commons, December 12, 1826. *Parl. Debates*, New Series, XVI: 396.

⁵H. W. V. Temperley, "The Later American Policy of George Canning," in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, XI: 779, attempts "to show that the later American policy of George Canning was intended to defeat certain claims and pretensions of the Monroe doctrine." He presents various documents, some of them not used in the above chapter, to defend the substantial truth of Canning's rhetorical boast, but seems to give too little weight to the obvious fact that the new world was already clearly in existence before he acted. *Ibid.*, 781. Doubtless a fear of United States hegemony in America was among his motives, but so far as this was the case it was the balance in the *new* world that he was attempting to redress. Compare with this E. M. Lloyd, "Canning and Spanish America," in *Transactions of the Royal Hist. Soc.*, new Series, XVIII: 93.

there is in the former country no trace of a purely factious opposition using a widespread popular emotion to embarrass an administration. The United States had little commerce with South American ports; its sympathies were almost entirely sentimental. Great Britain also had a feeling for what it considered a struggle for liberty, but the feeling was buttressed up by considerations of a commerce that fed and clothed the southern patriots. Feeling the depredations of Spanish and insurgent privateers, Mackintosh and Brougham could with better grace than Henry Clay demand governmental intervention in their behalf.

Eleven years after their conclusion the treaties of 1814 rose to plague the Foreign Secretary, but in 1817 they constituted the foundation of his strength. Sir Henry Brougham, professionally a member of the opposition, and in all things liberal, interrogated the members of the ministerial bench on their South American program almost a year before the spectacular oratory of Henry Clay began. "The conduct which this country followed with respect to these disputes," replied Lord Castlereagh, "was, that of adhering to a strict neutrality, and not that which the hon. and learned gentleman seemed to recommend—to assist the colonies against the native country, which would be in direct contraven-

“tion to the treaties between Great Britain and Spain. . . . [The] events in the river Plate. . . . must be considered not as a mere South American question, but as an European question.”⁶

The war thus opened was continued with increasing energy as the English South American commerce increased in volume. The ministry fought off recognition until of possible evils it was the least; until nothing was to be gained by further conciliation of Spain; until it was convinced that the provinces were independent and possessed of responsible governments. As it was hostile to the new republics, this conviction came with deliberate steps. At last the ministry yielded to the commercial influence, intensified by popular sympathy, and by its recognition incurred the disapprobation of all of Europe.

The weapons of the opposition in England were much the same as in the United States. Speeches in House of Commons, demands of South American agents, equipment of South American armaments were all brought into use. Brougham, who had stirred up the ministry in March, 1817, returned to the attack in July in his speech on the State of the Nation. On the very day when Secretary Rush was pushing the preparations for the South American

⁶ In House of Commons, March 19, 1817. *Parl. Debates*, XXXV: 1196.

Commission, Brougham complained to the House of Commons that Great Britain had no system respecting that portion of the globe.⁷ In later months Don Bernardino Rivadavia, who was at a future time to play such a significant part in the development of Buenos Ayres, was passing through Europe, from capital to capital, making his representations and upholding the interests of his country. When Spain asked the mediation of the powers, he assured Lord Castlereagh that Buenos Ayres respected the other nations of the world and wanted peace, but that no peace would be admissible save on the basis of absolute separation from the mother country. Six months later he announced that the mediation of Great Britain would be welcome if founded on no other motive than humanity. It was too late for Spain to seek to preserve her supremacy.⁸

The part played by British officers and men in the war of South American liberation has already been described. Lord Cochrane and General Miller are only the most notable names among those who fought with the armies of the south. Whole regiments are found with the armies of the north. The end of the Napoleonic wars, coinciding as it did with

⁷ July 11, 1817. *Parl. Debates*, XXXVI: 1384.

⁸ Rivadavia to Castlereagh, October 29, 1817, April 10, 1818, enclosed in Gallatin's Nos. 70 and 73, *S. D. Mss.*

the beginning of the second period of the South American war, made it possible for the patriots to secure the services of many trained soldiers for their cause. Whole battalions are said to have listened to the glowing promises of Don Luis Lopez Mendez the agent of Bolivar in England, and been mustered out of the British army only to enlist immediately for South American service. Others flocked to the support of adventurers armed with stacks of blank commissions, and sailed for Margarita on the assurance that there they would receive rank, expenses and increased remuneration. Only too often their hopes went the way of the funds of investors in high-rated South American stocks.

It was not without reason that the Prince Regent issued his proclamation in the fall of 1817 warning his subjects against participation in the war and holding before their eyes the penalties of felony prescribed by the old statutes of George II. Six expeditions are said to have been sent from London by Mendez before the year came to an end. Further proclamations in the summer of 1818 were equally necessary and unavailing. An instruction was issued by the Admiralty for the seizure of South American armed vessels guilty of aggressions on British commerce,—pirates they were designated; and customs

officials were ordered to check illegal preparations for South American service in their ports.⁹ But all these efforts could not prevent an Irish and English brigade of two thousand, under one Colonel English, from sailing in June to reach the insurgent ports before the end of August.¹⁰ And other expeditions sailed for South America at will.

As in the United States, these expeditions revealed the inadequacy of the laws of neutrality. Strictly speaking, Great Britain had no law expressing her duties as a neutral upon her statute books. The provisions of international law upon the subject were admittedly a part of her common law, but she had let the United States remain the first and only nation to embody these duties in a statute and provide means and measures for their enforcement. When the latter, in 1818 and 1819, went further, and modified her laws to meet the situation created by the South American revolt, the British ministry was shamed into doing its duty by Spain and offered in the House of Commons a Foreign Enlistment Act. Thus they established a principle, later to vex them greatly, that neutrality demands more than an

⁹ November 27, 1817; June 8 and July 9, 1818. *British and Foreign State Papers*, IV: 488, V: 963, 1224; *Present State of Colombia*, 87.

¹⁰ *Recollections of a Service*, I: 6-19; Chesterton, *Proceedings in Venezuela*.

observance of existing laws; it demands that adequate laws shall exist.

The law which the Attorney-General asked leave to introduce on 13th May, 1819,¹¹ was avowedly based on the recent neutrality act of the United States, but went beyond the requirements of international law. It made it an offence not only to enlist in England for foreign service, but to enter the foreign service at all. As was to be expected, the opposition seized upon the measure as of political intent, and charged that it was an unneutral service in behalf of Spain itself. Sir James Mackintosh at once, amid loud cheers from his followers, attacked the bill, "which he considered in no other light than as an enactment to repress the rising liberty of the South Americans, and to enable Spain to reimpose that yoke of tyranny which they were unable to bear, which they had nobly shaken off, and from which, he trusted God they would finally be enabled to free themselves, whatever attempts were made by the ministers of this or any other country, to countenance or assist their oppressors."¹²

The debate on the act ranged over the whole of foreign and commercial policy. "Independent of the sympathy which Great Britain, as a free country, must feel in every contest for liberty," complained

¹¹ *Parl. Debates*, XL: 362.

¹² *Parl. Debates*, XL: 367, 368.

George Tierney, member from Knaresborough and acknowledged leader of the opposition, "independent of the ardor with which she would be inclined to aid the oppressed, it would not have been extraordinary if ministers, merely upon mercantile considerations, had looked towards South America as a vent for our trade. Yet they had not only done nothing, but they had done worse than nothing. They had done their utmost to prevent the success of those by whose triumph we might be benefited; for a bill was now depending, calculated to exasperate the whole mass of South Americans, and to destroy every hope of commercial advantage."¹³ In answer to this complaint Canning sustained the policy of the ministry, characterizing an open interference on behalf of South America as mad as well as criminal. "No," he continued, "the British government had but one wise, as but one honest course to pursue in this contest. They have not interfered to assist either party; but have repeatedly offered their good offices with a view to reconciliation through an impartial mediation. . . . Amicable intercourse has been kept up with every part of South America, to which our flag has access. . . .

"In one respect, his majesty's ministers are certainly guilty of the charges brought against them.

¹³ *Parl. Debates*, XL: 482.

"In their transactions with South America, they have abstained from endeavoring, by a commercial treaty, to turn the troubles and distresses of a struggling people to the advantage of this country. The assistance which they did not think it right to grant, they would not be tempted to sell."¹⁴

It was a more difficult task to put the Foreign Enlistment Act through Parliament than it had been to put its prototype through Congress, for it had in the former body to meet an opposition of longer standing, of more close amalgamation, and based upon a more sincere cause. The petitions from British merchants that were offered in opposition of the act show how seriously it threatened to affect their commerce. One of them bore the signatures of seventeen hundred tradesmen from London alone. "We could not forget," cried one of the opposition, taking another line of attack, "that we first invited them to throw off the yoke which our government was now trying to reimpose, and that the birth of their independence took place under the protection of England." It is vain, declared another, to say that the act is only now introduced because the proposed mediation has failed and the struggle will proceed indefinitely. The conclusion of the American negotiations with Spain by the cession of the

¹⁴ *Parl. Debates*, XL: 534.

Floridas is the true cause. And, "Although a sop has," added still another, "for the present, been given to Cerberus, by the cession of the Floridas to the United States, the policy of the government will not long be able to restrain the wishes of the people, but be compelled to join this popular and patriotic cause; an event which will at once consummate the independence of South America."¹⁵

The passage of the Foreign Enlistment Act seems to have had little effect upon the promotion of expeditions, for within a month General d'Evereux, after an elaborate public banquet in Dublin, took another expedition to South America.¹⁶

It was indeed too late for Tory ministers to check the progress of the revolt, or to restore the supremacy of Ferdinand in his colonial dominions. Even if it had been desired or possible to enforce the new law of neutrality in all its strictness, the flickering light of Spain would have continued only to flicker vainly until its ultimate extinction. The events of the past year in Europe had shown that Spain must stand alone in her struggle against the insurgent powers; in the peninsula they had shown that even her own power could not be relied upon to any great extent. At the time of the passage of the law there was impending an explosion that was within the next

¹⁵ *Parl. Debates*, XL: 373, 858, 888, 894. ¹⁶ *Niles Register*, XVII: 53.

five years to make Spain herself, rather than Ultramar, a subject for the armed intervention of the allied powers of Europe.

In the spring of 1818, while Henry Clay was bringing up his motion for the recognition of her provinces, Spain, terrified at the possibility of American intervention, was entreating the powers to take action in her behalf. Her petition was not received with enthusiasm, although nearly every court in Europe was at heart in sympathy with his Catholic Majesty. France and, to a greater degree, Russia might have been induced to enter an armed suppression, euphoniously named mediation, of insurgents boasting of democratic principles. For they were in a position to take a theoretical attitude respecting Spain's American colonies. Neither possessed any South American commerce, while the rotten ships that the founder of the Holy Allies sold to Ferdinand gave the only profit that came to either from the revolution. But their philanthropic readiness to check the career of Ferdinand's subjects was itself held back, not by the real tendency of the British ministry, but by a feeling "out of doors" that warned Castlereagh to be careful of his commerce. The avowed disposition of the United States to discountenance armed intervention may also have had some weight in the mind of the British minister. It

is my opinion, wrote Richard Rush, "that the cause of the South Americans gains upon the esteem of this country, and that should our government see fit to acknowledge their independence the measure would receive support in the approbation and popularity of extensive and powerful classes."¹⁷

No definite conclusion upon the application of Spain was reached for some months and when reached it was distasteful to the applicant. The gathering of the sovereigns at Aix-la-Chapelle, in the fall of 1818, had been watched with anxiety from both sides of the Atlantic. But at the conference there was shown, as Rush had anticipated, "no serious intention on the part of any of the great sovereigns to take the cause of Ferdinand effectively in hand." Vague generalizations in behalf of peace, and a suggestion of a Wellington mediation that should have no ultimate resort to force failed to meet the situation.¹⁸ It was clear that Spain could at this time hope for little support from without.¹⁹

Early in the next year the decay of the Spanish empire began with the cession, practically forced upon her, of the Floridas to the United States. This

¹⁷ Rush to Adams, October 12, 1818. *S. D. Mss.*

¹⁸ Rush to Adams, November 20, 1818; Campbell to Adams, February 18, 1819. *S. D. Mss.*

¹⁹ C. K. Webster, "Castlereagh and the Spanish Colonies, 1815-1818," in *English. Hist. Rev.*, XXVII: 89.

“sop to Cerberus,” as a jealous statesman called it, seems to have deferred recognition by the United States for more than two years. Direct testimony is wanting, but inference is powerful that Adams and Monroe feared to acknowledge the new republics lest Spain should decline to ratify her treaty. Certain it is that Spain herself, and France and Russia in her behalf, tried to persuade the United States to purchase Florida by a renunciation of the right of recognition.

Throwing over the cargo failed to save the sinking ship of Spain's colonial system, for a mutiny of the crew made it impossible to navigate the vessel on its charted course. A great expedition had been sent to New Granada upon the restoration of Ferdinand, in 1815. In large measure it had been dissipated, and another extensive armament was preparing to take its place as Spain sought the aid of the allies in 1818. By the following year this was ready to sail. But the months that were required to make the Holy Ally's fleet of death-traps less unseaworthy weakened the discipline of the army until mutiny broke forth. Three thousand troops that were started for America promptly went over to the service of the insurgents at Buenos Ayres. Yellow fever de-

stroyed the remainder at Cadiz. This was the last serious attempt of Spain to quell the insurrection.²⁹

After the mutiny of the troops at Cadiz came the Spanish revolution, with its liberal constitution and its reconstructed Ferdinand. On top of this the doctrine of intervention received new elaboration as the congress of the powers met in session after session to deal with these manifestations of popular activities. The culmination of the concert is reached when a French army marches into Spain and restores for a second time Ferdinand and his absolute régime.

The attitude of the British ministry has already been described. At heart it distrusted and feared the popular movements in South America, but it was constrained by a generous popular sympathy and a vivid popular realization of the necessities of South American trade, to refuse its sanction to any scheme for restoring the old order of affairs by force. It permitted a free trade with the colonies and allowed their flags to enter British ports, but it went no further. In Parliament it preached the duty of neutrality in much the same language as Forsyth preached it in the American Congress.

²⁹ *Niles Register*, XVII: 143; *Annual Register*, 1819, 178; Spencer Walpole, *A History of England from the Conclusion of the Great War in 1815*, II: 299.

The triumphant advance of the French army into Spain made a further step in development of British policy essential. It was well enough to let the contest between Ferdinand and his trans-Atlantic subjects run its course, for it had become evident that the former could never restore his authority. But, with the power of France behind his throne, and with the combined forces of the Holy Allies at the back of France, it was time once more to look to the interests of English commerce.

There is a distinct difference between the policy of the British ministry at the congresses of Trappau and Laybach, and that which was manifested to the mystification of Prince Metternich at the congress of Verona in 1822. At the former meetings the attitude of the British envoy was one of non-participation, it is true, but the private assurances of the Duke of Wellington were that his ministry was not averse to the suppression of the revolt in Italy by the troops of Austria. Before Wellington set out for Vienna for the last of the meetings, for the Verona meeting commenced its sessions in Vienna, a change had taken place in the British cabinet that affected the whole European situation. Lord Castle-reagh, who had intended to take Wellington's place at the congress, had become insane, and killed himself. In his stead, in September, 1822, George Can-

ning had been made Secretary for Foreign Affairs. One of the last acts of Castlereagh had been to instruct himself to fight to the end any movement for a combined intervention in the affairs of Spain.

George Canning had no great love for the insurgent republics of South America, but he failed to share the fear of their principles that animated the king and a portion of the cabinet. For years he had been opposing the South American agitators in the House of Commons. While denouncing recognition as an unneutral and impolitic act, he had come to see that the restoration of Spain's colonial system must be prevented and to believe that the surest way to accomplish this was to leave Spain and her subjects to themselves. So long as Spain remained without assistance nothing was to be feared from her.²¹

The commercial opposition that had made the enactment of the law on foreign enlistments so difficult in 1819 was a constant quantity, though never violent or unreasonable. In the summer of 1820 Dr. Lushington brought up the question once more by calling upon the ministry for documents respecting

²¹ There is a good general account of Canning's influence upon the Liverpool Ministry in H. W. V. Temperley, *Life of Canning* (London, 1906), 127-191. With this should be compared the more recent *George Canning and His Friends, containing hitherto unpublished Letters, Jeux D'Esprit, etc.* (London, 1909), edited by Captain Josceline Bagot.

the proposition to seat the Prince of Lucca on the throne of Buenos Ayres—the proposition which had already driven Pueyrredon into a temporary exile. He asked the opinion of the ministers “as to the obligations of other governments to recognize the independence of those South American provinces which had emancipated themselves from the yoke of the mother country. His own opinion on the subject was, that when colonies had once acquired independence for themselves, it was at the option of other governments either to acknowledge their independence or not, according to the views of policy which they might entertain. It was indeed a matter of pure necessity to make such an acknowledgment, on account of the great inconvenience and injustice that would otherwise attend the existence of an unsettled and unrecognized state.”²² One cause for the presenting of this motion at this time was the attitude of the United States. The reports of the South American Commissioners had been reprinted and edited as soon as they reached London in 1819.²³

²² *Parl. Debates*, N. S., II: 393; *Annual Register*, 1820, 113.

²³ Rush to Adams, March 16, 1819. *S. D. Mss.* Messrs. Baldwin, Cradock, and Joy, who printed much other South American literature, brought out those discordant reports as *The Reports on the present State of the United Provinces of South America; drawn up by Messrs. Rodney and Graham, Commissioners sent to Buenos Ayres by the Government of North America, and laid before the Congress of the United States; with their accompanying Documents; occasional Notes by the*

They had been eagerly received by the commercial classes. The news that came in the spring of 1820 that Clay's resolution had at last passed the House inspired the opposition to keep pace with their American rivals. The moderate nature of the opposition is shown by the withdrawal of this motion when Castlereagh stated that it would embarrass the ministry.

The year 1822 was a busy period in matters pertaining to South America. In Spain the constitutional government was considering the basis of independence. Monroe recommended recognition by the United States in March and consummated the act in June. The Colombian agent, in April, issued a threatening manifesto to such nations as should not acknowledge his country. British merchants took alarm and filled the mail of the foreign office with their petitions. Castlereagh died; there was an interregnum for a month, then Canning took his place.

"Great Britain of course likes it," wrote Gallatin from Paris, when he heard of the message of 8th March, "and will be glad of a pretence to do the same thing substantially, though probably not in

Editor; and an introductory Discourse, intended to present, with the Reports and Documents, a View of the present State of the Country, and of the Progress of the Independents. With a map.

“the same fair and decisive way. The other lesser maritime powers have the same feelings. Russia has now other objects to engross her attention. The continental powers are indifferent about it.”²⁴ Indeed the continental powers were too much occupied to take American action seriously to heart. Affairs in the peninsula and the Balkans were nearer home and engrossed their attention. “It seems that the cannibals of Europe,” wrote one American ex-president to another, “are going to eating one another again. A war between Russia and Turkey is like the battle of the kite and the snake; whichever destroys the other, leaves a destroyer the less for the world.”²⁵

But in the British foreign office the importance of the South American question could not be hidden or suppressed. “Every day convinces me more and more,” declared Canning, “that in the present state of the world, in the present state of the Peninsula, and in the present state of this country, the American questions are out of all proportion more important to us than the European, and that if we do not seize and turn them to our advantage in time, we shall rue the loss of an opportunity never to be

²⁴ Gallatin to Adams, April 26, 1822. *S. D. Mss.*

²⁵ Jefferson to John Adams. *Niles Register*, XXIII: 247.

"recovered."²⁶ The conditions upon which the Foreign Secretary based this opinion are patent. On 8th April, 1822, the Colombian agent in Paris, Zea by name, Minister Plenipotentiary by title, had issued a circular to the powers of Europe and asked for it a quick response.²⁷ Stating the general and well-known incidents of the revolution, Zea declared that Colombia was an independent State, with a right as such to be recognized; that she desired to establish reciprocal relations of trade with all the world; that she was prepared to treat with any government regardless of the legitimacy of its origin; but, and here was the threat that disquieted the British merchants, that these other governments, as the condition of the establishment of commerce, must recognize the independence of Colombia. The news that the United States had determined to grant this recognition, coming close upon the publication of the Zea circular, increased the agitation and swelled the number of petitions. Later, the news that the Colombian government had disavowed a loan negotiated by Zea on 13th March, 1822, gave a new impetus to the movement, which the news that

²⁶ Canning to Wellington, November 8, 1822. Walpole, *Hist. England*, II: 356.

²⁷ *British and Foreign State Papers*, IX: 851; *Niles Register*, XXII: 247.

his threatening circular also had been disavowed could not entirely check.²⁸

As early as 23d April, 1822, meetings were held by London merchants with a view to maintaining commercial intercourse with the colonies "formerly under the dominion of Spain, a mode of expression which . . . has sprung into use since the President's message on the recognition, and seems already to have become as universal, as it was before unknown."²⁹ Similar meetings were held in the other commercial centers of Great Britain, and their resolutions fill the files of the foreign office. On the 9th of May the Liverpool Ship Owners' Association presented its memorial; in June the Liverpool merchants followed suit in a petition to the Privy Council; in July sixty-one firms of Glasgow petitioned Canning for the recognition of the republics; and in the same month the merchants and shipowners of Liverpool begged the House of Commons for action in their behalf. Commons could not fail to notice the pressure thus brought, and Lord Liverpool had to defend the ministry on more than one occasion.

²⁸ Memorandum on loan of March 13, 1822, dated January 9, 1823, with a copy of contract and an original bond. *F. O. Mss. Colombia*, vol. III. Gazette of July 7, 1822, with decree of June 1, 1822, by Santandar, Vice-President of Colombia; report of Pedro Gual, Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Colombia, April 17, 1823, saying that he had disavowed the circular. *F. O. Mss.; British and Foreign State Papers*, X: 740.

²⁹ Rush to Adams, May 6, 1822. *S. D. Mss.*

“Every right of real value, as regarded their ships and their commerce especially, had been conceded to them,” he declared on 23d July, when opposing a motion for the Zea correspondence.³⁰ The question of recognition, he maintained, was purely a British question, unfettered by any treaties made at Aix-la-Chapelle, resting only on the law of nations and the generosity and prudence of Great Britain. His ministerial majority rejected the call for papers by an overwhelming vote. But the public din was increasing. “This voice will grow louder and louder, nor can it, I believe, be ultimately resisted by the government.” The ministry could not permanently ward off the effect of the American precedent by pleading that it “stood upon a ground by itself, the United States having no European connections to look to when determining upon such a policy.”³¹

With these facts in mind, George Canning turned in the fall of 1822 to American affairs as more interesting than those of Europe, instructed Lord Wellington, as his predecessor had done, at Verona to oppose a general intervention in the affairs of Spain, and in Parliament himself expressed disapproval of the invasion of the peninsula by the army of the Duc d'Angoulême in the spring of 1823. At

³⁰ *Parl. Debates*, N. S., VII: 1731-1736.

³¹ Rush to Adams, July 24, 1822. *S. D. Mss.*

the same time, while protecting Spain at Verona, he took another step in the development of commerce. Up to this time the colonial system of Spain was still theoretically in force, and from the few remaining ports held by Ferdinand in the Americas issued fleets of Spanish privateers to prey upon the commerce with the insurgent states. The constant seizures of British vessels by these cruisers had been borne with by the ministry for years, but in 1822 they became too great. In June of this year Parliament passed a new navigation act to regulate the trade with South America, while in October Canning despatched Sir Thomas Hardy with a fleet to southern waters and announced to Spain that these seizures must stop.³² An indemnity, with a decree permitting commerce with South American ports resulted from this protest. With this Canning was temporarily content. He took no further action until the result of the war between France and Spain had been reached.

When the triumphant march of d'Angoulême to Cadiz revealed that France was to dominate in the affairs of Spain, Canning determined that that domination should not extend to Spanish America. He seems in vain to have tried to get a self-denying

³² Walpole, *Hist. England*, II: 356.

pledge from France.³³ He sounded the American minister on the question of a joint defiance, and began to collect in more systematic form than heretofore information on the conditions prevailing in the republics. Great Britain had not, like the United States, filled South America with consuls from the very beginning of the revolt. In December Canning had accepted the offer of one Patrick Mackie to go out to Mexico, on the public service, at his own expense; had addressed the Lords Commissioners for Trade as to proper locations for consuls in South America, and the Lords of the Treasury for funds to pay them; and had asked the Colombian agent to prepare a report upon the condition of his country.³⁴

The conditions that were decisive in determining the policy of both the United States and Great Britain were those prevailing in Buenos Ayres and Colombia. Mexico seems to have had no weight in bringing either cabinet to a decision.³⁵ But the instructions prepared for Dr. Mackie are significant,

³³ W. C. Ford in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, VII: 679.

³⁴ Mackie to Canning, November 28, 1822; Planta to Lack, Secret, December 7, 1822; Lack to Planta, Secret, December 13, 1822; Canning to Mackie, December 21, 1822; Planta to Geo. Harrison, Secret, December 21, 1822; Revenga to Canning, January 22, 1823. *F. O. Mes.*

³⁵ H. E. Bolton, in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, XVII: 640, has called attention to the valuable and recent *Documentos Históricos Mexicanos: Obra Commemorativa del Primer Centenario de la Independencia de Mexico* (6 vols., Mexico, 1912), edited by Genaro García.

in spite of his destination, as showing the attitude of the foreign office at the end of 1822. They were simply instructions to acquire information: as to the probable stability of the government; as to the disposition of the ruling class towards British commerce; as to their disposition towards Spain and a return to a condition of dependence, and towards a mediation by Great Britain; as to the treatment they would accord commercial agents in their ports. You "will state on all occasions," concluded the instructions, "with the utmost confidence your persuasion of the friendly disposition of this Govt.; of its determination to maintain, so long as Spain and her late colonies are at variance, a perfect & scrupulous neutrality, between the contending Parties, and of its desire to see the Contest brought to a Conclusion on terms consistent with the Interests and Happiness of Both."³⁶

On 3d October, 1823, French intervention in Spain was crowned by the capitulation of Cadiz; on the same day Canning instructed Sir William à Court, the British minister to Spain, to enter into no discussions on the subject of Spanish America whatever.³⁷ He had decided that the time was come to act. The petitions that indicated the disposition

³⁶ December 21, 1822, *F. O. Mss.*

³⁷ Canning to à Court, October 3, 1822, *F. O. Mss.*

of the merchants in 1822 had continued to be presented in 1823 to confirm the Foreign Secretary in his opinion that their interests must be paramount in his policy. Sir William Adams had presented a memorial to the foreign office on the 29th of June;⁸⁸ three weeks later "sundry British merchants" petitioned Mr. Canning; the Manchester Chamber of Commerce acted in August, as did a body of British merchants trading with Mexico; other petitions were presented in great numbers. Among the commercial class there seemed to be but one opinion upon the subject of recognition.

On the 9th of October, 1823, Mr. Canning had a conference with the French minister, Polignac, that has become famous among the historians of the Monroe Doctrine. In a way the memorandum that was prepared on this day is a British Monroe Doctrine, for the Foreign Secretary declared in explicit terms that Great Britain wanted none of the colonies of Spain, nor any special preference in their commerce; that she would, however, make no special stipulation on the subject of recognition, for she could not agree to postpone it indefinitely; and that foreign interference in the affairs of the colonies would be the

⁸⁸This, and other memorials, are in *F. O. Mss., Mexico*, vol. 2, and *Spanish America*, vol. 283.

signal for an immediate acknowledgment.³⁹ With this declaration before their eyes, fortified by a veiled threat of war from the President of the United States, eight weeks later, the allies were content to take no effective action upon the appeal of the newly-liberated Ferdinand that they carry their intervention across the Atlantic to the territories of the revolted in America. The day after the conference with Polignac, Canning instructed consuls for service in the ports of South America and commissions of investigation to Colombia and Mexico.

The instructions to the Colombian Commissioners, drawn up before the conference with Polignac and the disclaimer of American ambitions which that minister had then made, are extremely significant. "The growing importance of the States of Spanish America," wrote Canning to Colonel Hamilton, the head of the mission,⁴⁰ "and the unsatisfactory nature of the accounts, which are to be derived from accidental sources of intelligence, with respect to events that are passing on in that part of the world, have determined His Majesty's Government to send

³⁹ *British and Foreign State Papers*, XI: 49.

⁴⁰ October 10, 1823. *F. O. Mss.* The Commission consisted of Col. Hamilton, Lieut.-Col. Campbell and a Mr. Henderson who was to be Consul-General. The same instructions, *mutatis mutandis*, were given to the Mexican Commissioners and to Parish at Buenos Ayres.

“out a Special Commission, for the purpose of ascertaining the actual state of affairs in Colombia.

“The apparent hopelessness of the recovery by Spain of her dominion over her late South American Provinces: the purpose of France (notorious to all the world) to support with arms every attempt of the Spanish Crown, to recover that dominion; and on the other hand, the public Acts of the Legislature of the United States of North America, empowering their President to recognize the independence of whatever Government the Spanish Colonies respectively may have erected, or may erect, for themselves, present additional motives for sending out such a Commission. . . .

“Notice ⁴¹ has long ago been given to Spain of the intention of His Majesty to recognize whenever His Majesty shall think fit, the independence of such of the late Spanish Colonies as shall have formed to themselves a *de facto* Government, with a reasonable prospect of stability;—and the appointment of Consular Agents has been announced to Spain as a measure actually resolved upon, and one of which the execution could not long be delayed.

“If upon your arrival at [blank] you shall find that Events have induced the Government to direct

⁴¹ From this point the extract from the instructions given to Parish has been followed.

“their thoughts towards a Union with Spain, you will bear in mind that there is no desire on the part of Great Britain to interpose obstacles to the restoration of a *bona fide* understanding between the Colonies and the Mother Country:—But it must be with the Mother Country really independent; not in any shape subjected or subservient to [*France*, struck out in the original draft] any Foreign Power, nor employing the intervention of [*French*, struck out] Foreign arms to re-establish its supremacy in the Colonies. So far from interposing Obstacles to a beneficial arrangement between [blank] and old Spain on the principle of reconciliation and mutual advantage, you are authorized to receive and to transmit for the consideration of your Government any proposal to that effect which the ruling party in [blank] may be desirous of having communicated to Spain.

“Should their Government be established as independent, whether as a single State or as a federal System of States, but purely national and neither connected with Spain by subordination nor with any other Country by incorporation or federal union,—the decision of your Government as to the mode of dealing with such State or States would depend mainly on the following considerations; with respect

“to which you will therefore employ your best endeavors to collect the most accurate information.—

“1st. Has the Government so constituted, already notified, by a publick act, its determination to remain independent of Spain, and to admit no terms of accommodation with the Mother Country?

“2dly. Is it in military possession of the Country; and also in a respectable condition of military defence against any probable attack from Europe?

“3rdly. Does it appear to have acquired a reasonable degree of consistency, and to enjoy the confidence and good will of the several orders of the people?

“4thly. Has it abjured and abolished the Slave Trade?

“Should these enquiries all be answered in the affirmative; and should it appear to your satisfaction, that there is a fair probability of things going on in the train in which you find them, You are to address yourself to the person exercising the Office of Secretary to the Government, and are to suggest the expediency of sending to England some individual in the confidence of the [blank] Government, upon communication with whom as well as upon receipt of your Reports, We may be enabled to determine whether the time is ripe for the Establish-

“ment of an ostensible political relation with [blank] by the interchange of diplomatic Missions. . . .

“It may perhaps be unnecessary to state to you, but it is very material, that it should be understood by the persons with whom you communicate in [blank] that so far is Great Britain from looking to any more intimate connection with any of the late Spanish Provinces, than that of friendly political and commercial Intercourse, that His Majesty could not be induced, by any consideration to enter any engagement which might be considered as bringing them under His Dominion.

“Neither, on the other hand, would his Majesty consent to see them (in the event of their final separation from Spain) brought under the Dominion of any other Power.”

So far the instructions to the two sets of Commissioners were the same even in wording. Beyond this point the peculiar monarchical tendencies which had been developed in Mexico demanded special treatment.⁴² “Among the possible Arrangements of the affairs of Mexico, which are contemplated in the Instructions already given to you for your guidance,

⁴² Further instructions to Mexican commissioners, October 10, 1828. *F. O. Mss.* This commission consisted of Messrs. Hervey, O’Gorman and Ward; the first to be minister upon a recognition, the second chargé, and the last consul-general. Dr. Mackie’s commission was revoked.

"one is not specified, of which nevertheless there has been much question at former periods, and of which recent events may not improbably revive the consideration.

"I mean the settlement of that great Country under a monarchical form of Government, practically independent of Spain, but with a Spanish Infante upon the Throne.

"This case was not included among those specified in your Instructions, because the condition of Spain at the time when those Instructions were drawn, while the duration and issue of the War were still uncertain, afforded no immediate probability that a Spanish Prince would be available for such destination, otherwise than through the contrivance, and with the aid, and under the superintendence of France.

"The conclusion of the war brings back the possibility of such an arrangement with Spain, if there shall exist a disposition to it in Mexico.

"The constitution of Mexican society favors the notion of the existence of such a disposition. The great number of large Proprietors, the wealth and influence of the Clergy, and the long experience of a Vice-Regal Establishment, invested with all Monarchical forms, afford many probabilities of a predilection for that mode of Government.

“The experience of Iturbide’s Reign will (as stated in your former Instructions) have shewn to the Mexican People the instability of an elective Monarchy, and will have taught any new General, who may find himself in possession of the confidence of the Army, that he would better entitle himself to the gratitude of his Country, by exerting his influence for the purposes of a solid pacification, than for that of his own temporary and precarious aggrandizement.

“In this state of things, and in the present exhaustion of the Mother Country, which, while it diminishes on one side the apprehension of forcible conquest, may perhaps create, on the other, a willingness for amicable compromise, it does not seem unlikely, that the views of the Mexicans should be turned, with pretty general concurrence, to the restoration of a Monarchy, in the person of one of the Princes of the Spanish race, but on the basis of Mexican Independence.

“To any proposal for your co-operation to bring about such a settlement, you will not hesitate to avow yourself ready to accede, with the certainty of obtaining the cordial approbation of your Government.

“I need not add, that, while you are to accept such a proposal, if submitted to you, you are not

“to attempt to prescribe to the Mexican Authorities this, or any particular course of action. Nor need I repeat, that, to your acceptance of the proposal, it is an essential and indispensable condition, that the Negotiation is to be carried on with Spain alone, and that no foreign force should be employed to conduct the Spanish Prince to Mexico.”

The policy of George Canning, as indicated in these instructions to his Commissioners in the fall of 1823, is political only so far as his determination to maintain the commerce that had been developed with Latin-America during the years of turmoil forced him to use political means. The facts do not justify his famous boast. If it be true that he really did “call the new world into existence,” which may well be controverted, it is still manifest that his motive, as has been said before, was not to “redress the balance of the old.” Nor had regard for the rights of the belligerent communities any considerable share in determining the steps of his policy. He took at this time the irrevocable step of sending consuls to South American ports to emphasize before the world the fact that Great Britain would be no party to a forcible rehabilitation of Spain’s colonial system. In taking the step it was the interests of the Liverpool and Belfast and London merchants that he had at heart.

The declaration to Polignac, coupled with the sending of consuls, which was made public on 17th October, had the desired effect of driving the Holy Allies into cover. Legitimist sympathies must have been powerful indeed to have moved in opposition to the wishes of Great Britain in a matter of maritime significance. "With respect to the question of Spanish America," Canning was able to write to Sir William à Court at the end of the year,⁴³ "I am happy to inform you that there appears now to be little prospect of any practical divergence between this Country and the Powers of the Continent. Of the opinions of Russia, indeed, I am not yet enabled to speak positively: There has not yet been time to hear from Petersburg since the communication of the Memorandum of my conversation with The Prince de Polignac. You will probably have collected from General Pozzo di Borgo, all that could be known of those opinions up to the period at which that communication was made; but Russia can hardly act alone for the re-establishment of Spanish Supremacy in the Colonies. France has repeatedly and distinctly disclaimed any intention of engaging in such an enterprize:

"Austria and Prussia have severally declared their opinion that a Congress upon South American

⁴³ December 29, 1843. *F. O. Mss.*

"Affairs would, in any case, have been a matter of very doubtful policy; and that is one which it would be idle to think of, when Great Britain declines being a party to it.

"It is not immaterial to add, that the Government of the United States has declared Its Sentiments upon this subject in a manner wholly consonant with the declarations previously made by this Country; going indeed beyond us, in as much as, It has actually acknowledged the Independence of the Spanish American Provinces.

"A frank communication was made to the American Minister some months ago of the course which Great Britain intended to pursue, which was no doubt reported by that Minister to his Govt. before the opening of the Session of Congress."

The sending of consuls to South American ports was in contemplation of a recognition at no distant date. The various Commissioners were instructed to gather information upon which to justify the same; for Great Britain was now definitely committed to the policy which Canning had anticipated in 1822, when he saw in America matters of more interest to his country than in Europe.

"As to any further Measures," announced the Speech from the Throne at the next session of Parliament, "His Majesty has reserved to Himself an

“ unfettered Discretion, to be exercised as the Circumstances of those Countries, and the Interests of His own People may appear to His majesty to require.” ⁴⁴

The collection of information upon South American conditions was attended with embarrassing complications in Great Britain, as it had been six years before in the United States. In the case of the latter, the files of consular despatches were rich mines of information: the official reports of the special Commissioners adding no new facts of consequence. But the Foreign Office had not this regular source of knowledge. Previous to the consular despatches that began to arrive in the end of 1823, the Foreign Secretary seems to have derived his information through a number of channels, none of which were official. The correspondence in the newspapers gave him all that was printed in America. Despatches of naval officers on duty in South American waters were turned over to him by the Admiralty in considerable numbers. South American agents in London wrote to him profusely. British commercial houses possessing branches in the republics frequently sent copies of letters from their agents for his edification. In all, little of importance that occurred in those regions could have failed to reach

⁴⁴ February 3, 1824. From an original pamphlet edition in *F. O. Mss.*

the Foreign Office; but in the establishment of consuls in October, 1823, is found the beginning of official channels of information.

The difficulties of South American diplomacy have been seen in a previous chapter. With an agent leading a division of the insurgent army, with another guaranteeing an insurgent loan, with a third engaging in the tempting game of privateers, the neutral course of Mr. Adams had been embarrassed. Canning did not fail to encounter similar distractions.

The agents in Mexico were particularly hard to handle. Dr. Mackie, who had gone out on an informal mission, in 1822, had exceeded his instructions from the first. On arriving at Vera Cruz he learned that the Mexicans were at the point of concluding a commercial treaty with Spain, giving marked advantages to the latter. "It therefore required," he reported to Canning with complacency,⁴⁵ "no little Address and Management to do away the proceedings which had taken place; but upon my assuring him [General Vittoria, the successor of Iturbide] of the friendly disposition of Great Britain I had the satisfaction, before I left him to annul a Treaty so inimical to the Policy & Commerce of the British Empire." The successors

⁴⁵ Mackie to Canning, July 14, 1823. *F. O. Mss.*

of Mackie,—Hervey, O’Gorman and Ward,—were of course instructed to disavow this interposition of their predecessor and apologize to the government. But they themselves were no more willing than he to obey their orders. Arriving at the city of Mexico on the last day of the year, they were able, in eighteen days, to prepare an enthusiastic report upon the condition of the country, and were willing to send it home in the care of Mr. Ward just as a dangerous insurrection, known by the name of Lobato, was in progress. To this superficiality of investigation was added a more positive offence when the head of the Commission, Mr. Lionel Hervey, repeated Devereux’s action, and guaranteed a loan to sustain the existing government in a crisis. The reproaches of the Foreign Secretary, that the report was based on a “fortnight’s, or three week’s, experience,” and despatched, not only “before you had allowed yourselves time to form a mature judgment,” but at “a moment of publick disturbance,” were followed, as news of the loan reached London, by the imperative recall of Hervey: the vessel bringing out his successor would wait to take him back.⁴⁶ James Morier, the new Commissioner, went out ordered “That you are sent to ascertain the Fact of Mexican

⁴⁶ Hervey to Canning, January 1, February 18 and 20, 1824; Canning to Hervey, April 23, July 20, 1824. *F. O. Mss.*

“Independence, not actively to promote it; and to form and report an Opinion of the Stability of the Government, not to prescribe its form or attempt to influence its Councils.” But even Morier and Ward, the latter as a subordinate having retained the confidence of the Ministry, were not impervious to Mexican influence. At the beginning of the next year they were instructed to conclude a treaty of commerce with Mexico: in the negotiations they allowed themselves to admit into the treaty clauses radically at variance with their instructions. It is not to be expected, wrote Canning with exasperation as he rejected the whole treaty and ordered the negotiation of a new one, that we will abandon “for the sake of this new connexion, principles which we never have conceded, in our intercourse with other States, whether of the Old World or the New, either to considerations of friendship, or to menaces of hostility.”⁴⁷

This investigation of the character of South American agents has carried the account somewhat beyond the limits of recognition. It reveals a tendency that prevailed in most of the negotiations. As in the case of Adams's envoys, many of Canning's

⁴⁷ Canning to Morier, July 30, 1824; to Ward and Morier, January 3, 1825; to Ward, September 9, 1825; Ward and Morier to Canning, No. I, April 10, 1825. *F. O. MSS.*

were little more than mere enthusiasts; if they were not often "fanatics in the cause of emancipation,"⁴⁸ they were almost always devotees of a more selfish interest—that of British commerce. The Colombian experiences of Canning hardly rival those of his Mexican negotiations.

The British Commissioners to Colombia reached Jamaica, on their way out, before the end of 1823, and on the 8th of the following March they were graciously received by the Vice-President, Santander, at Bogota. Their reception, however, was in an unofficial capacity as Don Pedro Gual, Minister for Foreign Affairs, found himself unable to grant *exequaturs* to consuls who were commissioned to "provinces and dependencies" rather than to independent States. Four months after their arrival, Colonel Hamilton, the head of the mission, wrote a report in answer to the questions of his instructions, and announced that it expressed the unanimous opinion of the Commissioners.⁴⁹ That he had never shown his instructions to his colleagues, and that he had not hesitated publicly to pledge the support of Great Britain in case of a forcible intervention in South America, seemed to him no deviation from

⁴⁸ Reddaway, *Monroe Doctrine*, 26.

⁴⁹ Hamilton to Canning, December 19, 1823, March 19, 1824, July 5, 1824; Gual to Hamilton, April 14, 1824. *F. O. Mss. Annual Register*, 1824 [223].

the line of duty. He was typical of his class of agents. Here, as in the Mexican business, Canning was angry and made little attempt to conceal his irritation. He had already received a report on Colombian conditions from Hurtado, the London agent. Now he was forced to take other reports from Campbell, who had brought home that of Hamilton, and whose "unanimous opinion" had been pledged by his chief without his knowledge.⁵⁰ Already the Foreign Secretary had had Joseph Planta, his chief subordinate, write to Hamilton, that⁵¹ "Mr. Canning desires that you will take the trouble to reperuse your Instructions; and to compare them with the letters which you have written since your arrival at your place of destination; and with the language which you are represented by the Colombian Newspapers to have held at your presentation and other Publick Meetings.

"The unsatisfactory meagreness of your written communications to this office, falls as far below what was prescribed to you on the one hand, as the vague and unmeasured terms in which you have publicly pledged the opinions and intentions of your Govt. go beyond it on the other.

⁵⁰Hurtado to Canning, July 16, 1824; Campbell to Canning, November 6 and December 10, 1824. *F. O. Mss.*

⁵¹Planta to Hamilton, August 19, 1824. *F. O. Mss.*

"Both have exposed your Govt. to the greatest possible inconvenience."

Upon the arrival of Campbell, with his verbal accounts of the Chief Commissioner's policy, the latter was censured for a second time, and by Canning himself. In words that were no less emphatic because they were veiled in diplomatic phrases, he was ordered during the rest of his stay in Colombia to carry out the objects of his mission.⁵² From this point, so far as the Foreign Office was concerned, the Colombian negotiations progressed smoothly. It did not become necessary there, as in Mexico, actually to disavow any of the agents.

In Buenos Ayres alone, the most important of the three storm-centres of Spanish America, did the agents of Great Britain carry out the wishes of the Ministry in thoroughly satisfactory manner. Here the revolution had advanced to the furthest point, here the interests of English merchants were the greatest, and so upon the course of events here British policy depended. As the most important post in the republics, it received the ablest of the agents in the person of Woodbine Parish, later in life to become vice-president of the Royal Geographical Society, and a knight, who went out as Consul-General at the beginning of 1824.

⁵² Canning to Hamilton, November 8, 1824. *F. O. Mss.*

Before Woodbine Parish had had time to send home many despatches upon the condition of Buenos Ayres, there occurred in Parliament the last and most exhaustive debate that the subject of recognition had yet received. To this day the speech of Sir James Mackintosh is the best statement of the theory and nature of recognition that has been made.

The announcement made in the speech from the Throne, on 3d February, 1824, that Great Britain would follow her own interests regarding South America, did not satisfy the representatives of the commercial classes, who had been preparing petitions for two years, and were now more anxious than ever for a formal recognition. Debate on the speech, beginning the night it was presented, was continued in Commons for two days, bringing Canning to his feet more than once to defend the Ministry against the attacks of Brougham, and to announce again the policy guiding it; that Spain might recover her colonies if she could, but that she must do it unaided.⁵³ In both Houses notice was given within the next two weeks of general motions on South America in case the Ministry should so long hesitate to act. On 4th March, Canning proved his statements as to policy by laying before Parliament the Polignac memorandum of 9th October, 1823, and a correspondence

⁵³ *Parl. Debates*, N. S., X: 90.

with Sir William à Court, British Minister to Spain, on the subject of the South American conference, invited by Ferdinand on his second restoration in the fall of that year.⁵⁴

In the House of Lords, Lansdowne, who had, a week before, shown interest in the action of Spain on Canning's last proposal of mediation, made an elaborate speech in behalf of a motion for an address to the King on the expediency of a recognition.⁵⁵ He thanked the Ministry for the papers of 4th March, begging at the same time for further steps and speedy ones. He proved to his complete satisfaction that the States of South America were *de facto* independent; that they could maintain their independence, so that Spain had no prospect of recovering them; that their commerce with Britain was of exceeding great importance. In the year 1821, he declared, they bought from British merchants goods to the value of £3,227,560; in 1822 they increased their purchases; and now they consumed half as much as their neighboring republic in North America. By comparison with the United States, he showed that once independent their purchasing capacity would be much enhanced. To him

⁵⁴ *Parl. Debates*, N. S., X: 105, 157, 708; *British and Foreign State Papers*, XI: 49.

⁵⁵ *Parl. Debates*, N. S., X: 777, 970-992.

replied the Earl of Liverpool, in words that brought out a ministerial majority of 95 to 34 to veto the motion, saying "that what had been done was all that could have been done, embracing every practical advantage consistent with honor and good faith. A formal acknowledgment of independence could properly be made only by the power who claimed dominion over another; and, in a strict sense of the word, we had no right either to acknowledge or dispute their independence."⁵⁶

The Earl of Liverpool touched lightly upon a theory of recognition in his reply to Lansdowne: the subject received an exhaustive examination at the hands of Sir James Mackintosh, in the House of Commons, on 15th June, 1824. With a petition from 117 commercial houses of London in his hand as a text, he cleared away much of the confusion existing in the minds of both parties as to the meaning of recognition.

"I must go back for a moment," he explained,⁵⁷ "to those elementary principles which are so grossly misunderstood. And first with respect to the term 'Recognition,' the introduction of which into these

⁵⁶ *Annual Register*, 1824 [23]; *Parl. Debates*, N. S., X.: 992-1010.

⁵⁷ *Substance of a Speech of Sir James Mackintosh in the House of Commons, June 15, 1824, on presenting a Petition from the Merchants of London for the Recognition of the Independent States established in the Countries of America formerly subject to Spain* (London, 1824), 5.

“ discussions has proved the principal occasion of darkness and error. It is a term which is used in two senses so different from each other as to have nothing very important in common. The first, which is the true and legitimate sense of the word ‘ Recognition,’ as a technical term of international law, is that in which it denotes the explicit acknowledgment of the independence of a country by a State which formerly exercised sovereignty over it. Spain has been doomed to exhibit more examples of this species of recognition than any other European State, of which the most memorable cases are the acknowledgment of the independence of Portugal and Holland. This country also paid the penalty of evil councils in that hour of folly and infatuation which led to a hostile separation between the American colonies and their mother country. Such recognitions are renunciations of sovereignty. They are a surrender of the power or of the claim to govern. They are of the utmost importance, as quieting possession and extinguishing a foreign pretension to authority; they free a nation from the evils of a disputed sovereignty; they remove the only competitor who can with any colour of right contend against the actual Government, and they secure to a country the advantage of an undisputed independence.

“ But we, who are as foreign to the Spanish States

“in America as we are to Spain herself, who never had any more authority over them than over her, have in this case no claims to renounce, no power to abdicate, no sovereignty to resign, no legal rights to confer. They are as independent without our acknowledgment of their independence as with it. No act of ours can ever remove an obstacle which stands in the way of their independence, or withdraw any force which disturbs its exercise. What we have to do, is therefore not recognition in its first and most strictly proper sense. It is not by formal stipulations or solemn declarations that we are to recognize the American States; but by measures of practical policy, which imply that we acknowledge their independence. Our recognition is virtual. We are called upon to treat them as independent; to establish with them the same relations and the same intercourse which we are accustomed to maintain with other Governments; to deal with them in every respect as commonwealths entitled to admission into the great society of civilized States.”

Here, for the first time, Mackintosh defined recognition in clear and precise terms. He went on to show, as John Quincy Adams had shown six years before, that it was no violation of neutrality. “It implies no guarantee,” he declared, “no alliance, no aid, no approbation of the successful revolt; no in-

“timation of an opinion concerning the justice or injustice of the means by which it has been accomplished. . . . As a State, we can neither condemn nor justify revolutions which do not affect our safety and are not amenable to our laws. . . . The principle which requires such an intercourse is the same, whether the governments be old or new. Antiquity affords a presumption of stability, which, like all other presumptions, may and does fail in particular instances. But in itself it is nothing; and when it ceases to indicate stability, it ought to be regarded by a foreign country as of no account. . . . [When] Great Britain (I hope very soon) recognizes the States of Spanish America, it will not be as a concession to them, for they need no such recognition; but it will be for her own sake, to promote her own interest; to protect the trade and navigation of her subjects; to acquire the best means of cultivating friendly relations with important countries, and of composing by immediate negotiation those differences which might otherwise terminate in war.”

From this legal analysis of the doctrine of recognition, Mackintosh returned to the customary trend of South American speeches. Once more he told the history of the revolt, and described the needs of his

commercial constituents. On subsequent days he presented more petitions to the House.

At the last sitting of the House of Lords, for Parliament was prorogued on the 25th of June, 1824, the Earl of Liverpool replied to an interrogation from the Marquis of Lansdowne that every attempt to bring Spain to a recognition on her own account had failed; that the government held itself ready to recognize when it should become expedient.⁵⁸ During the ensuing recess the Ministry had time to meditate upon the attitude of Parliament and the reports of its South American Commissioners.

Woodbine Parish, Consul-General for Buenos Ayres, embarked on the ship *Cambridge* on 3d January, 1824. With him were the consuls for the region under his supervision, and in his despatch bag were the instructions of 10th October, 1823, that have already been examined, a copy of the Polignac memorandum, and three gold snuff boxes, bearing the portrait of his Majesty, George IV. The spirit of friendly conciliation that is implied by the presence of the snuff boxes has been borne out by the examination of the more formal *impedimenta* of his mission. After a voyage of nearly three months, Parish landed in the city of Buenos Ayres. A month later, on 17th April, arrived *The Countess of Chi-*

⁵⁸ *Parl. Debates*, N. S., XI: 1479.

chester, the first of the line of British packets that the Admiralty had established at this time.⁵⁹

The reception of the new agent was cordial, as was to be expected. Rivadavia, on the verge of retirement from the all-important post he had held for three years, was ready to enter into the negotiations proposed, with freedom. On the terms of a "previous Recognition of the Independence of this State (which he said was a *sine qua non*)" wrote Parish, a few days after his arrival,⁶⁰ "and, of Spain being placed with respect to her Commerce, upon the same footing with the Natives of the Country, they were sincerely disposed to enter into any arrangement with His Catholic Majesty's Government upon such terms as Great Britain would say were fair and reasonable."

In the performance of his duty, in the collection of information, Parish was in strong contrast to the agents in Colombia and Mexico. At his request a native of the country wrote an elaborate monograph on its conditions and resources;⁶¹ his despatches are full of details upon the subjects of British interest and local politics; and not a few South American gazettes, bulletins and pamphlets were enclosed in

⁵⁹ Forbes to Adams, March 31, 1824. *S. D. Mss.*

⁶⁰ April 15, 1824. *F. O. Mss.*

⁶¹ Ygnacio Nuñez, *An account, historical, political and statistical, of the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata* (London, 1825).

his mail to the Foreign Office. So assiduous was he in the work of conciliation that in two months he wrote to Planta for more snuff boxes, and intimated that a few framed portraits of the king would be highly useful.⁶²

The report that was sent to England on 25th June, 1824, was highly favorable to the government existing at Buenos Ayres. The value of the labors of Rivadavia and Garcia was as apparent to Parish now as it had been to Forbes, the American, three years before. There was no reason to believe that the new government of Las Heras, just come into existence, would prove less stable than its predecessor. The general congress, whose time of meeting was in sight, would probably complete the union of the provinces, for as yet Buenos Ayres conducted the foreign relations only by tacit consent. There was no fundamental law of union. "It is of importance to observe," wrote General Alvear, their minister to the United States, then in London *en route* to his post, "that all the Provinces about to meet in Congress, have enjoyed for the last fourteen years, and upwards, without interruption, their full Independence, that is to say, ever since the 25th of May, 1810."⁶³

Before the exhaustive report of Parish reached

⁶² Parish to Planta, June 4, 1824. *F. O. Mss.*

⁶³ Alvear to Canning, July 24, 1824. *F. O. Mss.*

London, Canning was ready for the final step towards recognition, and had convinced his reluctant Ministry of its necessity. The debates of June had brought out as never before the importance of South American trade; and reports of the London agents, of Alvear, and of Parish himself, showed in good light the character of the new republic. On 23d August, he instructed Parish once more.

“Before His Majesty’s Government,” read the instruction, after commending Parish for his satisfactory despatches, “can take any decisive step for drawing closer to their relations with any of the new States of America, it is obviously necessary to ascertain,

“1st. That any such State has renounced finally and irrevocably all political connection with Spain. 2ndly, That it has the power as well as the will to maintain the independence which it has established; and 3rdly, That the frame of its Government is such as to afford a reasonable security for the continuance of its internal Peace, and for the good faith with which it would be enabled to maintain whatever relations it might contract with other Powers.

“It is neither the right nor the intention of Great Britain to do anything to promote the separation of any one of the Spanish Colonies from Spain: But the fact of that Separation is an indispensable pre-

“liminary to any further proceedings or inquiries; and it is not till after that fact has been decisively ascertained, that a question can arise as to the expediency of entering into arrangements founded upon a recognition of it.

“The fact of Separation seems to be clearly established with respect to Buenos Ayres, by the length of time which has elapsed since its original Declaration of independence, and since a Spanish force has existed in its territory; and by the absence of anything like a Spanish party in the State.

“The competency of that State to enter into arrangements with other Countries does not appear liable to question. But there is one point upon which Your Report is not so clear as might be desired—I mean as to the power of the Government of Buenos Ayres to bind by its Stipulations with a Foreign State, all the Members of the Confederacy constituting the United States of Rio de la Plata. . . .

“As however the General Congress was about to assemble when Your last Despatches came away, it is to be presumed that if the requisite Authority was not already formally acknowledged it will have been clearly and definitely established long before these Instructions, and the Full Power, which accompanies them, can reach you.

“The Full Power is drawn in that presumption: and would be inapplicable to any other case.

“Supposing then that case to exist, and supposing the general situation of affairs at Buenos Ayres to continue as favorable, as your last Despatches describe it, You will, upon receipt of this Despatch, declare to the Minister with whom you are in the habit of communicating, that His Majesty has been graciously pleased to direct to be prepared, and transmitted to you, an Instrument of Full Power, authorizing you to treat with such Persons, as may be duly appointed on behalf of the United States of La Plata, for the negotiation of a Treaty which shall place on a regular and permanent footing the commercial intercourse that has so long subsisted between His Majesty’s Subjects and these States.”

Upon the receipt of these instructions, Parish acted with self-restraint unparalleled in South American agents. Although in close sympathy with the patriots, and confident that their government was permanent, he obeyed his orders in the fullness of their spirit.

“From my preceding despatches,” he replied to Canning, on 24th October, “you will have learnt that the General Congress of the Provinces of La Plata has not yet met, and that however united these Provinces are nominally, and to all appearances

“upon all General Points, they are as yet unconnected by any precisely defined National Government.

“The Administration of Buenos Ayres has indeed taken the lead upon all those National Points which under other Circumstances would have devolved upon a General Government; a Course in which the rest of the Provinces have unanimously acquiesced, more especially in matters connected with their Foreign Relations;—but, the Authority so assumed, and so acquiesced in, does not appear to me to be sufficiently formal to justify me, under your Instructions, in entering with the Government of Buenos Ayres upon the very important matter entrusted to me. Under such Circumstances I have considered that I should more properly fulfil the Spirit of those Instructions, by withholding any *formal Communication* of my being authorized to enter into a Negotiation with the United Provinces of La Plata, till such time as those Provinces shall have re-installed their National Government.

“I have had the less hesitation in coming to this determination, as the Meeting of the Congress, though frequently delayed, is now upon the point of taking place; and on the very morning I had the honor to receive your despatches, the first preliminary meeting of the Deputies was held at the Residence of the Governor of Buenos Ayres, when it was

generally determined that they should commence their Public Proceedings on the 1st of January next at latest, or sooner, if possible.

“Under such circumstances I trust that I shall not have erred in the Course I have adopted.”

Although not presenting his new credentials in an open manner, a course which Canning thoroughly approved,⁶⁴ Parish informed Garcia that he possessed them, and that the erection of a national government was the one thing necessary to secure a recognition. With this condition in mind, the government of Buenos Ayres presented its report on foreign relations to the General Congress in the middle of the month of December.⁶⁵ While not remiss in expressing its acknowledgments to the United States, who had “constituted Itself Guardian of the Field of Battle, in order to prevent any foreign assistance from being introduced in the aid of our Rival,” the Government dwelt most at length upon the conditions of Europe. “The vacillation of some of the great Powers of the Continent of Europe, and the malevolence which they shew towards the new Republics of this part of the World proceed from the forced Position to which they are reduced by a Policy inconsistent with the

⁶⁴ Canning to Parish, December 28, 1824. *F. O. Mss.*

⁶⁵ Enclosed in Parish's N. 70, December 22, 1824. *F. O. Mss.*

“true state of things. Kings can have no force or Power but by those means which perfect social order affords. They are well aware of the extent and advantage of those means; but alarmed by the movements they perceive around their thrones, they are endeavouring to recover their former passive state and to preserve the fruitful activity of human reason. They would wish that truth and error could be united in order to strengthen their Authority. From hence has arisen that inexplicable Dogma of Legitimacy which now disturbs the Nations of ancient Europe, and for the propagation of which the Holy Alliance has created itself. It is indeed a matter of difficulty for this Alliance to acknowledge as legitimate, Governments whose Origin is not obscure and whose authority is not supported by miracles, but merely by the simple and natural Rights of Nations. Nevertheless it can never be feared that the Soldiers of the Holy Alliance will come over to re-establish on this side of the Ocean the Odious Legitimacy of the Catholic King. Great Britain unfettered by the engagements of the Allies has adopted with respect to the States of America a Conduct noble and truly worthy of a Nation the most civilized, the most independent, and certainly the most powerful of Europe. The Solemn Recognition of the Independence of the new Republics

“ must be the Result of those Principles which she has proclaimed; and you may believe Gentlemen, that this important Event with respect to the Provinces of Rio de la Plata principally depends on their appearing as a National Body, and capable of maintaining the excellent Institutions they already possess.”

The inspired hint contained in the last sentence of the message was soon acted upon by the General Congress. From day to day, in expectation of what should occur, Parish held the January packet at Buenos Ayres. Then on the 24th of January, 1825, he let her sail, bearing with her to England a copy of a fundamental law of the Congress, placing in a formal manner in the hands of Buenos Ayres those powers which she had already exercised for so many years. Nine days later he concluded, in the terms of his instructions, a treaty of amity, commerce and navigation with the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata.⁶⁶

Before the Buenos Ayrean treaty was concluded, Canning had announced the final step in recognition from the Foreign Office. Fearful of a domination of France in Spanish policy, and determined to maintain British trade, even at the cost of European hos-

⁶⁶ Parish to Canning, No. 6, January 24, 1825. *F. O. Mem. British and Foreign State Papers*, XII: 29.

tility, Canning had persuaded his reluctant government to send consuls to South American ports in October, 1823. Thus pledged to the ultimate recognition of the provinces, the final act had become only a matter of time and means. But even Canning shared with his colleagues a reluctance to enter upon the establishment of formal diplomatic relations. Once more, as the proposed conference on South America was under consideration, he gave Spain the opportunity to come to his rescue by recognizing her rebellious provinces herself. And once again he offered British mediation for the furtherance of that end. "The British government," he instructed Sir William à Court, at Madrid,⁶⁷ "have no desire to anticipate Spain in that recognition. On the contrary, it is on every account their wish, that his Catholic majesty should have the grace and advantage of leading the way, in that recognition, among the Powers of Europe. But the Court of Madrid must be aware, that the discretion of his majesty in this respect cannot be indefinitely bound up in that of his Catholic majesty; and that even before many months elapse, the desire now sincerely felt by the British government, to leave this precedence to Spain, may be overborne by considerations of a more comprehensive nature,—considerations

⁶⁷ January 30, 1824. *Parl. Debates*, N. S., X: 717.

“regarding not only the essential interests of his majesty’s subjects, but the relations of the old world with the new.”

It has been seen that the cry for recognition was loud in Parliament in the spring of 1824, and that the Ministry was induced to justify its inaction in March by making public the Polignac memorandum and the *à Court* correspondence as showing a determination to admit no European interference in the Spanish question. As the months advanced the opposition became more insistent in its demands for a formal recognition. Spain, at the same time, was content to acknowledge the receipt of Canning’s offer of another mediation: but she took no action. The reports of Parish meanwhile, and of the other Commissioners, were beginning to come in with their accounts of a reasonable stability in some of the South American governments. There were two things which, in Canning’s mind, were indispensable preliminaries to a recognition. The former was a promise of permanent independence. The latter was a less reasonable condition, and one which international law withdraws from the cognizance of outside powers, but which could be insisted upon in this case with impunity. He was not content that a government should exist capable of maintaining its international duties, but insisted that it should have

the rare Latin-American quality of permanence. The reports of Parish led the Foreign Secretary to believe by August that these had been attained in Buenos Ayres.

And so, convinced that it was hopeless to await the co-operation of Spain, Canning conquered the prejudices of his colleagues and his king, risking thereby the resignation of the Duke of Wellington from the cabinet, and authorized Parish to conclude a commercial treaty in August.⁶⁸

We do not expect Spain to be reconciled to this step, wrote Canning to George Bosanquet, at Madrid, on the last day of the year, but she must long have expected it, for our declarations have left no doubt that we should ultimately be called upon to take it. We have consistently informed her, and so late as 30th January last, that we should be guided by the reports of our agents and the interests of our subjects. Since then the consolidation and capacity of the republics have been advancing, commerce has increased in proportion, and Spain has once more refused to listen to our offers of mediation. We are convinced that her struggle is hopeless. Such extensive portions of the world should not continue longer without a recognized existence, so we have

⁶⁸ Walpole, *Hist. England*, II: 367; Report of Gen. Alvear, June 29, 1824, enclosed in Parish to Canning, November 6, 1824. *F. O. Mss.*

sent instructions for a treaty to Buenos Ayres, and are preparing them for Colombia and Mexico. The effect of the treaties when ratified "will be a Diplomatick Recognition of the *De facto* Governments of those three countries."

On 3d January, 1825, the instructions for the Colombian and Mexican treaties were signed, and the determination of Great Britain was announced to the diplomatic corps in London.⁶⁹

The reply of Francisco de Zea Bermudez, the Spanish Minister, to George Bosanquet, was filled with bitter complaint that Great Britain should take such action at a moment when—with Castilian hopefulness—everything was favorable for a reconquest of the "rebellious subjects, who, after having perfidiously seized upon the Government in various parts of his [Catholic majesty's] American Dominions, now affect to consider themselves the arbiters of the destinies & to defend the political Interests of those very people whom they oppress and destroy." In language of surprise and grief he cited the old treaties between England and Spain, alluded to their joint resistance to "the Usurper of the Throne of France," and the opposition of Great Britain to "the recognition of the momentary

⁶⁹ *F. O. Mss.*; the report of the Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations for 1826 is in *British and Foreign State Papers*, XIV: 1106.

"triumph of violence over justice." Was this the time for her to cast aside her treaties and contradict these principles to "sanction the existence of some Governments *de facto* the offspring of Rebellion.— Infants in strength, but old in crime, supported by Ambition, and defended by blood and Anarchy?" The Minister made the most of the turbulence of South American republicanism, and of the factious services of the very British Commissioners on whose evidence recognition was to be accorded. He would not attempt, he said, to enumerate the times British subjects had provided the insurgents with arms in defiance of treaty stipulations. He complained that Britain's professed desire for mediation had always been based upon the inadmissible condition of independence—a charge which some one at the Foreign Office saw fit to deny on the margin of the despatch: "this is not true of any offer from 1812 to 1818." He cited brilliant, but imaginary, victories of the Royalist armies in Upper Peru, maintained the unswerving loyalty of the majority of the South Americans, and insisted, in conclusion, that Spain would never abandon in those provinces her legitimate rights.⁷⁰

To this tirade replied Canning toward the end of March, in a note to M. de los Rios, his Catholic maj-

⁷⁰ Zea to Bosanquet, January 21, 1825. *F. O. Mss.*

esty's minister in London. He declined to enter into any controversy upon the facts in the case, Spain's weakest point, for de Zea Bermudez had systematically and blindly denied every essential fact upon which British opinion was based. Upon the theory of recognition he replied at some length in the language that Mackintosh had thrust upon him for eight years. He saw in the determination of Spain never to recognize the independence a complete justification for British action. "We admit," he stated in conclusion, "that no question of right is decided by our recognition of the new states of America." Four days later he enclosed a copy of his note to Bosanquet, and hoped sincerely that Spain would let the discussion drop.⁷¹

In 1822, nearly two years before the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States saw fit to recognize the independent existence of the South American republics. Although the action was in direct opposition to the avowed policy of Europe, no Power took occasion in a formal manner to reproach the United States for this deviation from their course. Instead, the European statesmen admitted at this early date the principle of isolation as applied to American policy, while European journals ex-

⁷¹ Canning to de los Rios, March 25, 1825; to Bosanquet, March 29, 1825. *F. O. Mss. Annual Register*, 1825, 51*.

pressed jealous regrets that their governments could not act in similar manner. In striking contrast to this treatment of recognition by the United States is the procession of diplomats to the Foreign Office in the early days of March, 1825, in protest against recognition by Great Britain.

Canning had entered deliberately into the course which led him to recognition. The fight he had fought in his own cabinet against an aristocratic hostility to the provinces must have prepared him for the treatment which his policy received when publicly announced. Evidently by concert, the ministers of Austria, Russia and Prussia called upon him, on the second and fourth of March, to protest in a formal manner against his action.

Prince Esterhazy⁷² announced to the Foreign Secretary:

"1. That the Court of Vienna views with regret and disapprobation the Course adopted towards the Countries of Spanish America, as being a deviation from the Principles of Legitimacy, which guide the Politicks of the Great Powers of Europe.

"2nd. That the Court of Vienna does not pretend to erect itself into a Judge of the Interests of Great Britain, nor to decide how far those Interests

⁷²Substance of a communication from Prince Esterhazy, March 2, 1825. *F. O. Mss.*

“ might, or might not be sufficiently urgent to necessitate a step which, It could not but consider precipitate, even in that point of view.

“ 3d. But that it could not admit the validity of such a Plea, because, affecting as it does, in this instance, the rights of Spain, it might, if once admitted affect equally in some instances the right of some other Power.

“ 4th. That the court of Vienna faithful to its principles would not *acknowledge any of the Countries of Spanish America, until the Mother Country shall have set the example.*”

In place of the fourth article of the memorandum, Prince Esterhazy desired to substitute, “ 4th. That the Court of Vienna, faithful to its principles, would not deviate from those which guided the Politicks of the Great Powers of Europe for these last ten years.”

The communications from the ministers of Russia and Prussia were identical in substance with that of Austria. Count Lieven added ⁷³ that “ History will not forget to record that, if in Spain and in France the Cause of legitimate authority obtained an advantageous Triumph, if Monarchs long unfortunate, recovered their Crowns and the Dominions

⁷³ Substance of a communication from Count Lieven, March 2, 1825.
F. O. Mes.

"of Their Ancestors, it was more especially to the British Govt that was to be attributed this memorable Reparation of the Evils caused by Revolutionary Violence.

"That, applying the Maxims of a Policy so generous, to the Situation of the Peninsula and of her insurgent Colonies reciprocally, Russia could not forbear to follow the Example which had been given by England, in those past transactions."

By the time that Baron Maltzahn⁷⁴ bore to him a third message of this character, the serenity of the Foreign Secretary seems to have been disturbed. "Upon Mr. Canning's taking the liberty of asking," runs the memorandum, "how it was possible to reconcile with the strictness of those principles which Baron Maltzahn described as constituting the rule of the conduct of the great Powers of Europe, the willingness which had been manifested by some of those Great Powers, after the successes of 1814, not only to make peace with Buonaparte to the exclusion of the Bourbons, but, even after Buonaparte was out of the question, to place some other than the Bourbons on the Throne of France, and with the unqualified acknowledgment of the present King of Sweden, while the legitimate King of Sweden, who

⁷⁴Substance of a communication from Baron Maltzahn (undated, but corrected on March 5, 1825). *F. O. Mss.*

has certainly not abdicated his rights, was wandering an exile over Europe.

“Baron Maltzahn declared that he was not instructed to enter into discussion upon these points; but simply to express the dissatisfaction of His Court at the steps taken by His Majesty towards the States of Spanish America.”

The South American policy of the British Ministry has now been traced to its conclusion, the recognition of the independence of the South American republics. It has been seen how the Ministry was in the beginning legitimist in its actions, and the center of the opposition to revolutionary tendencies in Europe; how it was legitimist in its real sympathies to the end.⁷⁵ The progress of European wars, throwing the South Americans upon their own resources, enabled them to establish a freedom of commerce, meaning English commerce, that had been unknown. The restoration of the Bourbons in Spain, unenlightened by gleams of intelligence in the policy of Ferdinand, forced the issue of liberation upon them. And in this issue the interests of an enormous British trade, amounting to more than three millions in

⁷⁵ H. W. V. Temperley, in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, XI: 783n., seems to have misunderstood this last clause, and to have interpreted it as applying to England's *policy*, rather than to the *sympathies* of the Liverpool Ministry. Cf. *ante*, and Temperley, *Life of Canning* (1905), 149, 159, 179, 186.

1821, were involved. Reinforced by a popular sympathy, as in the United States, the commercial interests made themselves felt in the Parliamentary opposition to the Ministry, convincing Canning at length that they, rather than legitimist principles in Europe, should be the object of his solicitude. To protect them, he was forced by the threatening action of France in Spain to take steps towards recognition, which the logic of events forced him as soon as might be, to follow to the end. He "called" his new world into existence because he must.

Upon the details in connection with the opening of diplomatic relations with the new States, but little time need be spent. The first treaty was concluded, with Buenos Ayres, on 2d February. In approbation of his conduct, Parish was commissioned as the first Chargé to the Provinces, and was accorded his formal recognition in that capacity on the 26th of July, 1825. The Commissioners to Colombia, forcing their project upon that government as the price of any treaty, signed their treaty on the 18th of April,⁷⁶ and ten days later Patrick Campbell was received as Chargé. The Mexican treaty, later to

⁷⁶ *British and Foreign State Papers*, XII: 661; Canning to Parish, May 24, 1825. *F. O. Mss.*

be rejected by Canning, was signed on 6th April by Morier and Ward, the latter being given his audience as Chargé on the 21st of May.⁷⁷

⁷⁷ Campbell to Canning, April 28, 1825; Ward to Canning, No. 1, May 21, 1825. *F. O. Mss.*; J. H. Smith, "The Mexican Recognition of Texas," in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, XVI: 36, is interesting as a basis for comparing the attitude of Spain and Mexico in similar situations.





3 2044 020 020 137



